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Working Papers
Innovation Policies Under Economic Complexity
Recent geopolitical challenges have revived the implementation of industrial and innovation policies. Ongoing discussions focus on supporting cutting-edge industries and strategic technologies but ignore the impact on economic growth. In this paper, researchers explain why effective innovation policies should be place-based and multidimensional, leveraging countries’ existing capabilities and addressing countries’ current problems.
Recent geopolitical challenges have revived the implementation of industrial and innovation policies. Ongoing discussions focus on supporting cutting-edge industries and strategic technologies but hardly pay attention to their impact on economic growth. In light of this, we discuss the design of innovation policies to address current development challenges while considering the complex nature of productive activities. Our approach conceives economic development and technological progress as a process of accumulation and diversification of knowledge. This process is limited by the tacit nature of knowledge and by countries’ binding constraints to growth. Consequently, effective innovation policies should be place-based and multidimensional, leveraging countries’ existing capabilities and addressing countries’ current problems. This contrasts policies that lead to economic efficiencies, such as copying other countries’ solutions to problems that countries do not currently have.
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Book Chapter
A more globally-minded European green industrial policy
Sparking Europe’s New Industrial Revolution: A Policy for Net Zero, Growth and Resilience, 152.
Industrial policy has for a long time raised difficult questions for policymakers to unpick. What justifications are there for government intervention in market mechanisms, and how and to what extent […]
Industrial policy has for a long time raised difficult questions for policymakers to unpick. What justifications are there for government intervention in market mechanisms, and how and to what extent should governments intervene? What are the pros and cons of picking ‘winners’ for support? These questions have made a powerful return in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical uncertainty, and because of the pressing need to move to net-zero emission economies. In addition, the European Union is reviving its industrial policy in the context of support given to companies in the United States under the US Inflation Reduction Act. This volume, produced with financial support from the European Climate Foundation, assesses what must be done to implement industrial policy in a way that will achieve overarching goals while minimising distortions. -

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Working Papers
Horrible Trade-offs in a Pandemic: Lockdowns, Transfers, Fiscal Space, and Compliance
In this paper, we develop a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium framework to analyze optimal joint policies of a lockdown and transfer payments in times of a pandemic. In our model, […]
In this paper, we develop a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium framework to analyze optimal joint policies of a lockdown and transfer payments in times of a pandemic. In our model, the effectiveness of a lockdown in mitigating the pandemic depends on endogenous compliance. A more stringent lockdown deepens the recession which implies that poorer parts of society find it harder to subsist. This reduces their compliance with the lockdown, and may cause deprivation of the very poor, giving rise to an excruciating trade-off between saving lives from the pandemic and from deprivation. Lump-sum transfers help mitigate this trade-off. We identify and discuss key trade-offs involved and provide comparative statics for optimal policy. We show that, ceteris paribus, the optimal lockdown is stricter for more severe pandemics and in richer countries. We then consider a government borrowing constraint and show that limited fiscal space lowers the optimal lockdown and welfare, and increases the aggregate death burden during the pandemic. We finally discuss distributional consequences and the political economy of fighting a pandemic.
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