A Growth Diagnostic of Kazakhstan

This Growth Diagnostic Report was generated as part of a research engagement between the Growth Lab at Harvard University and the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) between June 2021 and December 2022. The purpose of the engagement was to formulate evidence-based policy options to address critical issues facing the economy of Kazakhstan through innovative frameworks such as growth diagnostics and economic complexity. This report is accompanied by the Economic Complexity Report that applies findings from this report on economy-wide challenges to growth and diversification in order to formulate attractive and feasible opportunities for diversification.

Kazakhstan faces multifaceted challenges to sustainable and inclusive growth: macroeconomic uncertainty, an uneven economic playing field, and difficulties in acquiring productive capabilities, agglomerating them locally, and accessing export markets. Underlying Kazakhstan’s transformational growth in the last two decades—during which real GDP per capita multiplied by 2.5x—are two periods that underscore how Kazakhstan’s growth trajectory has been correlated with oil and gas dynamics. The early and mid-2000s characterized by the global commodity supercycle led to an expansion of the economy upwards of 8% annually, with a mild slowdown during the global financial crisis. In 2014, Kazakhstan’s growth slowed with the collapse of commodity prices, and alternative engines of growth have not been strong enough to fend against volatility since. These trends, along with growing uncertainty in the long-run demand of oil and gas, continue to highlight the limitations of relying on natural resources to drive development.

As in the experience of other major oil producers, diversification of Kazakhstan’s non-oil economy is a critical pathway to drive a new era of sustainable and inclusive growth and mitigate the impacts of commodity price shocks on the country’s economy. Kazakhstan’s growth trajectory demonstrates that the country has enough oil to suffer symptoms of Dutch disease, but not enough to position it as a reliable engine of growth in the future. Development of non-oil activities has been a policy objective of the government of Kazakhstan for some time, but previous efforts for target sectors have failed to generate sufficient exports and investments to produce alternative engines of growth. This report characterizes the relationship between growth, industrial policy, and the constraints to diversification in Kazakhstan. It utilizes the growth diagnostics framework to understand why efforts to diversify into non-oil tradables has been challenging. The report proposes a growth syndrome to explain the constraints preventing Kazakhstan from achieving productive diversification and sustainable growth.

This report is organized in six sections, including a brief introduction.

Related project: Sustainable and Inclusive Growth in Kazakhstan

The Economic Complexity of Kazakhstan: A Roadmap for Sustainable and Inclusive Growth

Since the end of the 1990s, Kazakhstan has relied on oil and gas as the main drivers of economic growth. While this has led to rapid development of the country, especially during years of high oil prices, it has also subjected the economy to more severe downturns during oil shocks, bouts of currency overvaluation, and procyclicality in growth and public spending.

Stronger economic diversification has the potential to drive a new era of sustainable growth by supporting new sources of value added and export revenue, creating new and better jobs, and making the economy more resistant to fluctuations in oil dynamics. However, repeated efforts to stimulate alternative, non-oil engines of growth have so far been inconclusive.

This report introduces a new framework to identify opportunities for economic diversification in Kazakhstan. This framework attempts to improve upon previous methods, notably by building country and region-specific challenges to the development of the non-oil economy directly into the framework to identify feasible and attractive opportunities. These challenges are presented in detail in the Growth Diagnostic of Kazakhstan and are summarized along three high-level constraints: (i) an uneven economic playing field dominated by government-related public and private-entities; (ii) difficulties in acquiring productive capabilities, agglomerating them locally, and accessing export markets; and (iii) ongoing macroeconomic factors lowering external competitiveness lower and making the economy less stable.

Our approach applies the economic complexity paradigm to identify what specific products and industries are most feasible for diversification, based on the existing productive capabilities demonstrated in the economy. We examine Kazakhstan’s economic complexity at the national but also subnational levels, highlighting the heterogeneity of export baskets across regions that makes an analysis of opportunities at the subnational level essential.

Related project: Sustainable and Inclusive Growth in Kazakhstan

Development in a Complex World: The Case of Ethiopia

This research compendium provides an explanation of Ethiopia’s fundamental economic challenge of slowing economic growth after an exceptional growth acceleration — a challenge that has been compounded by COVID-19, conflict, and climate change impacts. Ethiopia has experienced exceptional growth since the early 2000s but began to see a slowdown in the capacity of the economy to grow, export, and produce jobs since roughly 2015. This intensified a set of macroeconomic challenges, including high, volatile, and escalating inflation. This compendium identifies a path forward for more sustainable and inclusive growth that builds on the government’s Homegrown Economic Reform strategy. It includes growth diagnostics and economic complexity research as well as applications to unpack interacting macroeconomic distortions and inform diversification strategies. Drawing on lessons from past success in Ethiopia and new constraints, this compendium offers insights into what the Government of Ethiopia and the international community must do to unlock resilient, post-conflict economic recovery across Ethiopia.

The research across the chapters of this compendium was developed during the Growth Lab’s research project in Ethiopia from 2019 to 2022, supported through a grant by the United States Agency of International Development (USAID). This research effort, which was at times conducted in close collaboration with government and non-government researchers in Ethiopia, pushed the boundaries of Growth Lab research. The project team worked to understand to intensive shocks faced by the country and enable local capability building in the context of limited government resources in a very low-income country. Given the value of this learning, this compendium not only discusses challenges and opportunities in Ethiopia in significant detail but also describes how various tools of diagnostic work and economic strategy-building were used in practice. As such, it aims to serve as a teaching resource for how economic tools can be applied to unique development contexts. The compendium reveals lessons for Ethiopian policymakers regarding the country’s development path as well as numerous lessons that the development community and development practitioners can learn from Ethiopia.

A Survey of Importers: Results of a Survey Conducted in Collaboration with the Ethiopian Economics Association

Executive Summary

Ethiopia suffers from a chronic shortage of foreign exchange (forex).[1] The resulting lack of access to imports prevents firms from accessing imported inputs required for production. This creates a vicious cycle as exporters are constrained by this same problem, which further reduces overall supply of foreign exchange in the Ethiopian economy. The inability to reliably access foreign exchange for imports affects firm decisions on sourcing, capacity, and output. While the cost of this constraint is known to be high on the Ethiopian economy and firms are known to use a range of measures to attempt to bypass this constraint, quantitative assessments of the problem and response actions by firms are limited. It is in this context that an importer survey was conducted with the goal of informing policy decisions. A total of 202 firms with an active importing license were interviewed in March-April 2022. These firms were randomly sampled from firms registered with an importer license.

All firms interviewed reported that they were operating below capacity, often well below capacity. Foreign exchange shortages were the main reason respondent firms cited for not operating at full capacity (63% of firms reporting this as their biggest constraint). Forex shortages far surpass the second and third reasons cited for not operating at full capacity — constraints due to the conflict (13%) and COVID-19 restrictions (11%). Firms operating below capacity cited forex shortages as the main constraint, regardless of whether they imported or not in the previous year. This was the most pressing constraint reported by firms of all sizes and sectors surveyed. It was the most pressing constraint faced by exporters and by foreign-owned firms as well as non-exporters and domestic firms. Amongst the total sample of firms with a renewed importer license, more than one-third of respondent firms (37%) had not imported in FY2020-21.

Overall, 74% of firms reported experiencing challenges in accessing forex. Access to forex was reported as most challenging for manufacturing firms and smaller firms but impacted all sectors and firm sizes. The losses attributed to forex scarcity at the firm level were largest for agricultural firms, for micro-firms, and for firms that did not import at all in the previous year. In general, the larger the firm sales, the higher the likelihood that they were able import. The survey found different types of imports for different sectors. Manufacturing firms imported a large share semi-finished goods as imports as compared to agricultural firms that primarily imported finished goods. The survey results find that foreign exchange shortages and an inability to import are most severe for the manufacturing and agriculture sectors, small and micro-sized firms, and all non-exporters. However, the constraint is also the top problem facing all firm types in the survey, including exporters and foreign-owned firms.

The primary means of accessing foreign exchange where it did occur was through specialized forex accounts or ‘diaspora’ accounts. The second most common means of accessing foreign exchange was through retention accounts available to exporters. The black market featured in many responses, but questions across the survey suggest that self-reported use of the black market by survey participants is underreported versus actual usage. The ability to source foreign exchange differed significantly by firm size. Exporting firms primarily used retention account earnings, as compared to non-exporters, which relied more on forex accounts. For faster access to forex, most firms reported that they approach banks, followed by turning to the black market. Friends and family abroad also served as a source of forex for one-quarter of firm respondents, and that foreign exchange was often used immediately. Foreign exchange access from banks is nevertheless a major pain point for firms. Most firms (55%) requested forex from a bank in the past year. On average, fulfilled forex requests took three months to be processed when they were fulfilled, but many firms reported that they have an unfulfilled request that has been in the system for more than a year. These firms are especially likely to report foreign exchange access as their top challenge.

The survey finds that individual firms do not tend to use both official and black-market foreign exchange sources but rather tend to access all their forex at the (lower) official rate or all at the (higher) black-market. Large firms import most of their products at the official rate. By contrast, most small and micro firms import through other means. Manufacturing firms are also more likely to import all their production through other means and outside of the banking system. Non-exporting firms tended to import through other means than the official rate and outside of the banking system at a higher prevalence than exporting firms. The survey gleaned new insights on the implicit exchange rate that firms face as they navigate official and black-market channels of foreign exchange access. The survey does not allow for a precise estimate of the transaction-weighted exchange rate facing the economy but finds firm-level estimates align with previous macro-level estimates. The implicit exchange rate was higher for non-exporting firms, which show a greater willingness to pay a higher exchange rate to access imports. This signals the importance of the retention account for exporters to guarantee an import price closer to the official exchange rate.

When asked about the maximum rate firms would pay to guarantee access to forex, some groups of firms were willing to pay higher amounts, including all non-exporters, firms that imported in the past year, and those that declared forex access a challenge. When compared to the implied rate they paid in the past year, many firms are willing to pay more than the implied rate to guarantee access to forex. Firm perspectives on policy changes to the exchange rate underscored challenges faced by policymakers. Current policy has been one of a crawling peg, with changes within the last several years to increase the rate of devaluation. The survey asked respondents about their support for faster devaluation, for a one-off movement to unify the official rate with the black-market rate, or about alternative exchange rate systems such as a floating exchange rate. Most respondents (71%) opposed maintaining the current regime, yet no option received majority support. Most firms appear to want both a stronger exchange rate and easier access to foreign exchange despite a tradeoff between these two priorities. The largest share of support for policy change was to adjust the exchange rate such that the official rate matches the black-market rate.

[1] See “Development in a Complex World: The Case of Ethiopia” ­– the Growth Lab’s compendium of project research from its Advancing Economic Diversification in Ethiopia project.

An Integrated Epidemiological and Economic Model of COVID-19 NPIs in Argentina

We added a multi-sectoral economic framework to a SVEIR epidemiological model, combining the economic rationale of the DAEDALUS model with a detailed treatment of lockdown fatigue and declining compliance with Public Health and Social Measures reported in recent empirical work, to quantify the epidemic and economic benefits and costs of alternative lockdown and PHSM policies, both in terms of intensity and length. Our calibration replicates key features of the case and death-curves and economic cost for Argentina in 2021. The model allows us to quantify the short-term policy trade-off between lives and livelihoods and show that it can be significantly improved with targeted pharmaceutical policies such as vaccine rollout to reduce mainly severe disease and the death toll from COVID-19, as has been highlighted by previous studies.

Economic Costs of Friend-shoring

Geo-political tensions and disruptions to global value chains have led policymakers to reevaluate their approach to globalisation. Many countries are considering regionalisation and friend-shoring – trading primarily with countries sharing similar values – as a way of minimising exposure to weaponisation of trade and securing access to critical inputs. If followed through, this process has the potential to reverse global economic integration of recent decades. This paper estimates the economic costs of friend-shoring using a quantitative model incorporating inter-country inter-industry linkages. The results suggest that friend-shoring may lead to real GDP losses of up to 4.6% of global GDP. Thus, although friend-shoring may provide insurance against extreme disruptions and increase the security of supply of vital inputs, it would come at a significant cost.

Yet it Endures: The Persistence of Original Sin

Notwithstanding announcements of progress, “international original sin” (the denomination of external debt in foreign currency) remains a persistent phenomenon in emerging markets. Although some middle-income countries have succeeded in developing markets in local-currency sovereign debt and attracting foreign investors, they continue to hedge their currency exposures through transactions with local pension funds and other resident investors. The result is to shift the locus of currency mismatches within emerging economies but not to eliminate them. Other countries have limited original sin by limiting external borrowing, passing up valuable investment opportunities in pursuit of stability. We document these trends, analyzing regional and global aggregates and national case studies. Our conclusion is that there remains a case for an international initiative to address currency risk in low- and middle-income economies so they can more fully exploit economic development opportunities.

Editor’s note: The paper was later published in Open Economies Review.

Leaning-against-the-wind intervention and the “carry-trade” view of the cost of reserves

For a sample of emerging economies, we estimate the quasi-fiscal costs of sterilized foreign exchange interventions as the P&L of an inverse carry trade. We show that these costs can be substantial when intervention has a neo-mercantilist motive (preserving an undervalued currency) or a stabilization motive (appreciating the exchange rate as a nominal anchor) but are rather small when interventions follow a countercyclical, leaning-against-the-wind (LAW) pattern to contain exchange rate volatility. We document that under LAW, central banks outperform a constant size carry trade, as they additionally benefit from buying against cyclical deviations, and that the cost of reserves under the carry-trade view is generally lower than the one obtained from the credit-risk view (which equals the marginal cost to the country´s sovereign spread).

Overcoming Remoteness in the Peruvian Amazonia: A Growth Diagnostic of Loreto

Is there a tradeoff between environmental sustainability and economic development? If there is a place where that question can be approximated, that is Loreto. Located on the western flank of the Amazon jungle, Loreto is Peru’s largest state and the one with the lowest population density. Its capital, Iquitos, is the largest city without road access in the world. For three decades, the region’s income and development has diverged from that of Peru and its other Amazonian peers by orders of magnitude. And yet, despite plummeting contributions from natural resources – that predominate in the policy discussion in and on the state – Loreto has developed a more complex productive ecosystem than one would expect, given its geographical isolation. As a result, it has a stock of productive capabilities that can be redeployed in economic activities with higher value-added, able to sustain higher wages and better living standards.

We deployed a thorough Growth Diagnostic of Loreto to identify the most binding constraints preventing private investment and development in sustainable economic activities. In the process, we relied on domestic databases available to the public in Peru and international datasets, combining and validating our analytical insights with extensive field visits to the Peruvian Amazonia and lengthy interviews with policymakers, private businesses, and academia. Improving fluvial connectivity, developing the capacity to sort out coordination failures associated with the process of self-discovery, and substituting oil for solar energy, are the three policy goals that would deliver the largest bang for the reform buck. The latter presents an opportunity for environmental organizations – subsidizing solar – to move away from their status quo of preventing bad things from happening, to a more constructive one that entails enabling good things and sustainable industries to happen.

Project page: Economic Growth and Structural Transformation in Loreto, Peru

On the Design of Effective Sanctions: The Case of Bans on Exports to Russia

We analyze the effects of bans on exports at the level of 5,000 products and show how our results can inform economic sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. We begin with characterizing export restrictions imposed by the EU and the US until mid May 2022. We then propose a theoretically-grounded criterion for targeting export bans at the 6-digit HS level. Our results show that the cost to Russia are highly convex in the market share of the sanctioning parties, i.e., there are large benefits from coordinating export bans among a broad coalition of countries. Applying our results to Russia, we find that sanctions imposed by the EU and the US are not systematically related to our arguments once we condition on Russia’s total imports of a product from participating countries. Quantitative evaluations of the export bans show (i) that they are very effective with the welfare loss typically ∼100 times larger for Russia than for the sanctioners. (ii) Improved coordination of the sanctions and targeting sanctions based on our criterion allows to increase the costs to Russia by about 60% with little to no extra cost to the sanctioners. (iii) There is scope for increasing the cost to Russia further by expanding the set of sanctioned products.

Wall Street Journal: Sanctions Against Russia Could Be Better, These Harvard Economists Say

Video summary: How can sanctions against Russia be more effective?