#DevTalks: Gambling on Development / The Role of Local Elites in a Growth-based Future
Stefan Dercon is Professor of Economic Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government and the Economics Department, and a Fellow of Jesus College. He is also Director of the Centre for the Study of African Economies. Prof. Dercon’s latest book, “Gambling on Development: Why Some Countries Win and Others Lose” draws on his academic research as well as his policy experience across three decades and 40-odd countries, exploring why some countries have managed to settle on elite bargains favoring growth and development, and others did not.
This discussion was moderated by Clement Brenot, Growth Lab Research Manager, on October 19, 2022 at Harvard Kennedy School.
Transcript Part 1
DISCLAIMER: This webinar transcript was loosely edited and there may be inaccuracies.
Brenot: Hello, Hi! Everybody! And welcome to Dev talks. I’m, Clement Brenot and I’m a Research Manager at the Growth Lab, and today it’s my great pleasure to be welcoming Professor Stefan Dercon from Oxford University for a session that will largely revolve around his latest book, titled Gambling on development.
I’d like to start in the simplest way. Really, my question is, why did you write this book? What was the question, or maybe the questions within it that you were trying to answer?
Dercon: Thank you for the introduction as well, and it probably helps already to explain a little bit. You know I’m a development Economist. I’m a micro-economist. I do our Ct these days. I used to collect longitudinal data sets I used to follow farmers for thirty years of twenty-five years in Ethiopia, and keep on going a micro person back so very much. But at the same time, I’ve always had that interest on the policy side, and when I had the chance to work as a chief economist that did it, you know, at the time it’s not been abolished. But anyway, it was definitely quite an influential development agency, and also investing in a lot of research and work like that.
But when you work more in the policy environment you know the big questions are always or hanging over you. You know it’s like, what makes in the end a big difference? There’s a lot of the small changes we can do, and you know I have a lot of the fundamental difference. Why was it, for example, in our organization in different, we felt like we could make quite a lot of progress with our eight in place, like Bangladesh, or in Ghana or in Ethiopia, where everything we seem to be doing in Nigeria felt like, you know it’s well to get anywhere. And so, for me the question on the line was a little bit, you know, do I understand well enough to know why some of the things we’re doing make a difference at scale, and why not?
And so, this is about an impact question. But once you don’t deal with an impact question this is a more Macro, question about what’s driving in the end in a country, whether they are embarking on large scale growth, and large scale of two reduction or not, was that hanging over me? So, this is me as a micro-economist, having to delve into the bigger questions as well, and to hitting fairly quickly that well, if I look around the world, the details, policy advice doesn’t seem to be the biggest factory change.
But it seems to be a lot to do with the big things that’s going on. I remember talking to who was at the time, the Chief Economist of the World Bank, and he said, you know, once you hit politics you can’t think of anything else anymore, because you start actually seeing that in countries that a lot of the big things happens by what’s happening with the people in power and influence, and it’s not. You know we can give technical advice as economists, but we need to be aware of the bigger picture, and the bigger picture involves Politics involves political economy, and that’s what I wanted to write about.
That’s the kind of thing that is much harder to test. I know, with a growth regression we don’t quite do this anymore, I think, across country regions, maybe some do. But I wouldn’t, not with the micro regression. I can’t randomize political economy at scale, and so kind of thinking, you know there are certain things about bigger than what I can easily analyze. But I need to begin to understand the politics of places and the way politics and economics interact. And I think I wanted to write about this building on the experience I have, because I have been lucky to work in so many different countries, spending a lot of time. I used to have the habit of moving my office in the summer to another developing country, and it just worked from there. So, I spent time in China or in India, in the Zambic, in the Drc.
Quite a lot of time that you usually, as an academic, never have, and actually just see what the policy process where the politics was. And I just wanted to write, bringing together what I knew from reading your research, but also a lot of the experience on the ground trying to actually see, well, how does change happen?
Brenot: Thank you. That sounds like a lot of travel, and it looks like It’s resulted in a lot of the insights as well that we’re trying to get into with you today.
I wanted to when get to the idea that I feel is at the heart of the book. To sort of organize how we can think about the political economy aspects that you were just uh mentioning, and also maybe to talk about why you call it a gamble, and this risky aspect that you feel there is in trying to take that development to approval.
So, I was wondering, if you could maybe in a few words, tell us about the main thesis of the book, and why you think it’s a useful way to approach these political economy questions.
Dercon: So not so long ago the prince gave a lecture at Yale, and he put it actually very nicely. All these things, matter, structures, matter, colonialism, matters all these things. But, he said, even though he works quite a lot of these social economics, and that’s like fifty percent.
To understand what’s going on in a country is the agency, and what he that actually also calls daily to people with power, not just the President Prime Minister, but the agency of the actors, on the ground that have power and influence.
So, this is how I also want to think about it. And this kind of a very close alignment, the way he thinks about it. History, institutions, matter.
But what happens at the moment in time matters as well in terms of these elite players. And so, I talk in the book quite a lot about the underlying elite barking. You know. The kind of political side of the school is political settlement, you know, the kind of the underlying deal between the forces in not just purely politics, but also in the economy, may be well definitely in the military, probably also in the senior civil service, maybe even civil society journalists, blue public intellectuals, those people with power and influence in a society could be a thirty. It could be a thousand, but actually the kind of underlying understanding about the boundaries on their actions and behavior. It’s almost more informal than the institutions. But just how they actually do operate around power and making decisions so totally acceptable.
If you run Congo at the time, it’s called Zaire, as a Kleptocracy, purely Kleptocracy, where the State, if you were controlling the State, you could steal from anyone. I like you famously told to civil servants when uh when he had heard that people were complaining about corruption, and said, you know, friends, I hear that people are complaining about you that you steal from the people. Can I please ask you not to steal too much and leave a little bit for the next one, otherwise it will all go wrong. You know it’s like if that becomes almost the principle of the Kleptocracy of all society, you also have an all sorts of states coming out of often out of independence as well, is that, and often in the political games that are being played is that if you gain power, you know you should reward those who gave you power. So, it’s like your plentalism. You can. The idea reward people with jobs, with influence. You owe a reward, and with contracts, and so you could have lots of a lead bar in simplicity. So, what is that? The essence for me saying, look, given that we can have a lot of these is that underlying this elite bargain was definitely actions and behavior that were fundamentally focused on growth and development.
That actually was a key part of what they do, you know, and I think often in Western countries we forgotten that even in our societies, you know until well into the twentieth century. You know, they didn’t really care about growth and development of the broader population. The new deal probably brought it out in the Uk. Similarly, and in most European countries, after the first and Second World War it became an understanding. If you were in power and had influence that somehow you have to care about growth and development one or another.
Now we have actually quite a few societies where that’s not the case. We all have to side is at some point with those with power and influence. Stop focusing on that. And so, I call that the development barking where I fundamentally the elite bargain once it’s not just in words, not a beautiful development plan, but actually in action in behavior.
Why do I call it a gamble? Because every elite knows the game in town. The easiest gaming town to play is the state of school, because they understand it. That’s the basis of their power, the distributive politics that everybody gets a little bit. You know that gaming town is what they understand. Gambling on, actually a growth trajectory where there is a great chance, and history tells us that that new elites will emerge, that all the leads will be be displaced, and so on, is quite a gamble.
So, you have to have either you have so much pressure that there is no other way that you can do, or you think you know you have no more legitimacy, or you’ve gone like as it happened in Western countries after conflict, one first in the second world or in Europe, you need to start delivering because you have no legitimacy, legitimate seeking behavior. It’s things like that.
That often compels an elite to do this because growth, yes, it’s not to see or some game, but distributionally, it’s not self-evident that it actually always will be for the present-day lead to improving. You know you. You may well lose your power in determining the distribution, and you need, you may actually be a loser in it. So that’s why the gamble comes into it, which makes it even more surprising that so many countries are doing it these days. And I think in the last twenty or thirty years, that’s the positive part of the story.
Quite a lot of countries did it, and they did it in very different ways, very different institutional setups, with very different political systems, even with the kind of economic policy making was actually quite a lot of variation in it.
Brenot: That’s actually at the at the heart of the book as well, which is structured around country chapters to go into the edges and crises of of each of these places, and to show that there is no magic recipe or silver bullet to to strike the developing bargain. For those who haven’t yet read the book. I was wondering if you could maybe give us two examples, contrasting two different examples of how very develop and bargains both proved, conducive to to development.
Dercon: Definitely. So, you know the most obvious one that people always seem to think about is like China. Okay, so. And that’s actually very striking that, you know, we sometimes forget that Uh, China was an absolute mess in one thousand nine hundred and seventy’s, you know me was my or died. Cultural revolution had had been reaching destabilized society. Uh, substantially the gang of four matters miles with.
And there you actually got, you know, a real crisis of legitimacy in that country. I remember. I’m I’m actually old enough to somehow remember, as a youngster people talking about. Will China, uh persist? Will it continue to exist like this? The Chinese probably spot It was a real crisis.
So, what actually happens to them? It has much to do with, you know, convincing all the others in the party to form a coalition of reformers to actually being able to say, we actually need to try to do this differently. We can’t do everything based on ideology, but we’re going to have to in the spirit of it Doesn’t matter where the cat is. Why, to black as long as it catches mice, be far more pragmatic about economic policy.
And so actually, they choose a model of pragmatism in economic policy making, but still strongly stateless.
Why did they do it? We’ll actually just to survive with the legitimacy. There’s plenty of R. And I’m always very struck about if I have Chinese students in the audience. That’s the moment when a lot of them started nodding that actually the the underlying legitimacy seeking behavior that was actually a crucial part of the one thousand nine hundred and eightys. We need to deliver food security and then grow to the population. That was a key part of it. But they went down for state like development. Yes, they did reform, and of course they did governance reforms around the economy and all.
It was much more decentralized, but it’s hard to say that this became suddenly a a simple, totally liberal capitalist economy. Of course, you know, property rights were still very strongly aligned relative to the party and the controlling role, as they were all there, one hundred and one.
If we then contrast it with, say, Bangladesh, a country that we like to describe by saying, some people’s even say it was a surprise. It was a miracle. In any case. Henry Kissinger was saying, uh, what this one of his eight wrote. All sets around one thousand nine hundred and eighty-one that Bangladesh is a basket case, and i’m also long enough old enough to be able to write, and yes, absolutely because of demographic change, climate
Dercon: all these things nothing will ever come from Bangladesh. Of course I was writing this in the nineteen eighties when it’s already. Clearly, we didn’t really know as well it was actually starting to grow fast. The garment industry developed um, and also this. Now a country with Muslim country, with girls’ education and a health that goes for girls being better now for boys, and actually a real success in in in poverty, reduction, and growth five, six of growth for last twenty years.
So how did they do that? Well, actually almost the opposite to China that in a sense that they have gone after there they want the independence for nineteen seventies. They went through a whole crisis period, as well with the family of the in the nineteen seventies, the execution of the founding, the founding leader of the Independence and a cool, and, you know, politically, stability whatever, but also very little to show, for, in fact, we will cross, in fact, Henry Kissinger had a good reason to call it a basket case by the early nineteen eighties
But, interestingly enough, what they did, although they have initially chosen for, you know, stateless development, but also, they have built up the States, rewarding the freedom fighters with jobs in government, and the whole kind of things. The clientelist state was built up one hundred and fifty.
You got to the early one thousand nine hundred and eighties, where the Government started to take new decisions, but actually quite different.
To liberalize the fertilizer markets, to denationalize some state of the enterprises, to actually go for a quite a very cautious, prudent, micro-economic policy, where they called in the Imf and and and they did actually all kinds of structural adjustment. And indeed, sometimes You know, people in Central Bank definitely like to say that this is Bangladesh chose. They say fair, and it’s actually total, as it may be, an over statement. The State plays a role in the whole kind of thing. But it is actually very different from the whole China model, and it was definitely the entrepreneurship in the garment industry that built it up, and its now ninety percent of its exports or something, but also strikingly. This was a state that understood that was not very good in delivering, and actually it’s allowed in the early in the seventies, but definitely one thousand nine hundred and eighty to nineties.
To get NGOs to grow, for example, Back, you know economists that that study this thing. They know it’s very well. You know these programs are very well analyzed and evaluated the back. What is most striking? Well, it is the largest Ngo in the world. It is actually a state within the States. You know. The state allowed civil society to become stronger almost than the state on certain things.
There is no other country in the world that I can’t even imagine what’s allowed this to happen. You know India definitely within G. O. Laws would not allow Back to be commerce, because it is. But that’s a sell. The way of States around the State that development. It shows a much more state that says, well, we know what we can’t do, and we allow all of the actors to do it, and that’s part of the success. So, NGOs Back, in fact, aids play the big role there, because probably easily more than a billion dollars, if not close to two billion dollars, was provided to back over the last decade or so by Australia in the Uk. Massive, financing on their programs, you know, which State would usually allow an outside actor to do this. So, it’s a very different model economic policy, far more liberal and very different ways of dealing with it, but actually quite successful. So very contrasting models don’t the same level of success, maybe on China, but very remarkable from where it came from.
Transcript Part 2
Brenot: Thanks. Before we went into these two. Uh, very interesting and contrasting examples. You started to talk about some of the contextual elements in story code context that may preside over um, you know um choosing or opting for development, bargain or not. And so, you mentioned the role of course you need legitimacy. When they send you that, maybe at some point your back is to the wall, and you need to, you know, maybe have a little bit more space to reinvent the growth model, or the way things work in in general.
More broadly, I was wondering how you how you think about some of these either contextual or structural uh factors that you say are not everything, but they’re still there.
And some of them might be, you know. You’re talking about different sort of a good examples. Some of them happen on the back of, let’s say, favorable in terms of trade dynamics. The multi- commodity booms um Some of them happened in all the regional contexts were more or less conducive to development, and also more structurally, uh, one very important uh factor that economist, I think, are very split on is the role that natural resources more structurally play on, on the country’s development best.
So, I was wondering how you, you, you integrated these different factors. If you think there are contextual external structural kind of preconditions to striking a development bargain, or whether really uh, anything is possible because the shapes such a bargain can take or are out, there can be very different.
Dercon: Look history definitely has constraints, constraints, any country, history, geography, all these things will matter.
You know history of China matters here. Why, China can be successful in a very simple way. Two thousand years of centralized bureaucracy, two thousand years of actually meritocracy in the in a bureaucratic system, centralized taxation for two thousand years, you know, you ever going to do state like development, and I could pick a country to do it. I’ll probably do it in China. It’s like there is a good chance. It can work because you have a nature of a state you inherited. If I do the reverse, colonialism delivering boundaries and borders in countries that make it just fundamentally different. You know there’s not for nothing, even though I may be slightly dismissing cross-country growth regressions, the correlations are there, you know, in the fractionalization. You know that these things are correlated. It’s all about how the causalities play out, but they are there, you know, and the fact that you create complicated countries. It’s, of course, much harder to do a deal between the elite in terms of how to set it up.
If you have natural resources, your state of scroll is so well defined. If I go to Nigeria, I was in Nigeria last week I had a great time. Um, actually our complete was some private meetings organized with what the organizers said. I’ll get you the elite in the room, and I must say the elite was in the room. It was quite striking audiences all right about it at some point. But it was fascinating to sit there. Some of the richest people in the country, most of the political shakers is the controllers, and whatever they totally got me. When I said, Look, the Nigerian elite bargain simply about the distribution of oil. Fundamentally, you have about five hundred dollars per capita.
That’s two hundred million people. But if I divide it amongst one hundred thousand people, that’s a million dollars per capital per year for everybody we basically have to find really bargain in Nigeria they totally get it. Some get more, so get less, but that’s basically the political structure.
I put it slightly differently, why would you gamble to? It’s quite a gamble, then, to let that go, because you’re already quite secure to get your million dollars per year. Why would you actually even be arguing for that? Maybe someone you get a hundred thousand to a house in London. Okay, so that’s then maybe a bit less and some get the billion. But actually, there is a lot to lose for the at least. If you don’t, have natural resources, you need every year produce the rent to be able to control.
So, this is how the political economy of the of the natural resources, of course, plays a big role. So, you know, you get these factors that that will shape that you know the problems of coalescing the elite bargain link to historical factors the natural resource endowments making it’s just less likely that you will gamble, or indeed, you know just your whole history that does that does play that, so these things matter, you know. But I still stick to it that there are surprising countries, you know. I’m talking to you now from Mauritius. It’s lucky me. Um I’m in Mauritius here. Mauritius is fascinating, because very few people know much about beyond that. It’s probably now in high income country.
In the early nineteen sixties a noble price named James Meet. He was a trade economist, actually brilliant. Guy., He wrote a piece where he said, that’s basically nothing will ever come from Mauritius. You know historical structures of huge divisions with, uh people, descendants from the French, controlling all the land where you have indentured labor from the Indians in the middle. And then you have Creole um, basically ex slavery population structures that where no way huge it no fractionalization. When they get independent, nothing will come from it. One thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight They become independence. Yes, they go into a full crisis fairly quickly, the one thousand nine hundred and seventies for transform.
But what seems to happen then is by the late nineteen seventies they recognize, and they are basically both the political elite strongly supported by the majority uh Indian descent population, and the business elite still controls very much by the French and the sugar elite. They actually make an implicit deal, an implicit contract that has health since then, that actually they are good to go for growth and development.
They build up a welfare state over time. And now this is a real welfare state as a high-income country, but in the beginning carefully doing it, but then also going very actively, you know, sugar exported. They were leading proponents of a good deal with Europe on the low make conventions that the kind of trade deals early trade deals. They were early movers of the export processing zones, you know. They called in the if in eighty-three, eighty-four for structural Justin by one thousand nine hundred and eighty-seven they were growing up close to eleven percent per year and exporting manufacturing they now a big financial sector. So again, the agency of people, and the way the elite it comes together can actually determine that you don’t have to fall into this trap. So, my argument is really about agency matters. There are constraints in it.
History, will, and institutions practice matter. But there was political agency of those people with power and influence, and again. Not just the Prime Minister, the finance minister, but the business leads, and whatever. And so last week that was my preaching to the in Nigeria and the press covered it quite handsomely is that basically they have a choice between the Nigerianization of poverty, because all projections suggest Nigeria will have the large number of extreme, for by two thousand and thirty or a newly bargain between business and the political class in Nigeria, because, for God’s sake, it really uh requires effort to run the economy so badly.
Brenot: Thank you for, uh, these very uh powerful and candid words that’s much appreciated to hear you unfiltered about what you’ve seen. I was wondering about what you define as success. My understanding from the book is that your main lens is the eradication of extreme poverty, and that’s that. That’s maybe the primary thing you’re looking at now is actually I’m slipping in a question received from the audience. Um! We were wondering. How do you think your reasoning? And this question of the bargain applies a bit further away further up in the Development letter.
Is it still key in your opinion, to understand why some countries escaped, say the middle-income trap and develop into full-fledged advance economies. Or is it something that you feel is most relevant at the early stage of accumulation and development?
Dercon: So, in the book. I large to talk about the early stages. Okay, and that’s consciously to do it. But also, it’s where the experience that I have. I spent one hundred, you know, as if it was focused largely on the poorest countries. This is where I went. This is where I had time to spend, and so on. So, I didn’t spend much time in Latin America definitely not on in the job as a for the Uk Development Agency,
But I think you know, and it’s really interesting, you know. Since then, you know. And since the book has come out, I’ve spent time again in Bangladesh and I’m Marisha. These are countries in very different levels of development now, and by magicians on the brink of being middle income.
Actually, what was the success factor of the early stage of development could potentially become now a limitation. It’s in the following way is that you know. Take these, both these factors that I highlighted the garment industry when it emerged. These people were not politically powerful, but they could. They could build up the government industry,
And they got a bit of support from the government where they were not. There was no immediate rent capture, and all this kind of things that could have happened in all kinds of other places.
Now these guys are in Parliament, and now they are blocking any form of industrial policy to any other sector, but to the garments. So, the most, the support still goes to the garments. Well, actually, we desperately to diversify that economy, and moving to all the sectors. So just was there where the engine of success. They may now become the risk factor in in stagnation.
I wouldn’t say the same thing with the NGOs, but at some point, in terms of the complexity of what you need to deliver. The State will need to be better on social sector delivery than actually can’t just be about almost charged all our organizations funded by aid. To do this you need to much more sophisticated model of doing it in the State will probably play a role in that. So, in all this case the State has to evolve, and that’s now the challenge of Bangladesh.
So, and that’s the beginning of middle income. Actually, the more I look around now and here in marshes as well all the time these elite markets have to evolve, in fact, to the reasons that we’re alluding to earlier is that when growth happens newly, that means new. Elite bargains have to be made, and you can’t have any more blocking. And that actually is the real challenge, you know, if we talk a lot about these growth spots, you know, like Pritch would like to have all these papers going on, and they have some really nice things, and descriptively, you know, a lot of growth of spurts, and that they fizzle out, and I think it has a lot to do with that inability to overcome the underlying political economy challenge to actually restructure. You know what your earlier success is needs to new configurations. It may actually need a different type of leader, and so think of it in Indonesia that us now have about fifty years of about three four percent per year uh growth consistently, except for a brief period, in one thousand nine hundred and ninety-seven, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-seven sorry with the Asian crisis.
So, if you go to Latin America, and I’m very pleased that actually quite struck how many reviews I’ve had in Spanish and Portuguese about the book, and how much comment and twitter traffic I’ve had in these languages, which is actually really interesting, because I never wrote about any of these places. They recognize very much, I think, in Latin America the role of all these elite stuffs that some point may have been the growing the growth factor and then become the blocking elite that doesn’t want to change because it will challenge their position. So, I’m working hard at the at the series of translations of a few pieces in Spanish and Portuguese to fee to the Latin American market. Because I think there’s an interesting debate to be had indeed, in middle income countries as well, in terms of how to we think this elite part is actually at the moment I’m traveling quite a lot. It’s a lot of. I want to look at middle income countries now, what’s going on there, and how this kind of thinking can be helpful there. You know, if I find it’s not, then I will ditch it. But I have an impression, it’s a general framework, this requirement to keep on having that focus on growth and development is quite essential.
Brenot: This is a great news, because if I understand what, first of all, you were telling us that there’s no magic recipe that you’re telling us that even if you find the right recipe, the recipe actually changes over time, and you need to that. I find that um, of course, very, very insightful, but also a lot of work for policymakers and those who are trying to have them on the way. But precisely, I want you to turn a bit to and maybe um, let’s say an individual agency in that landscape um, and to start with uh we’ll talk, maybe about outsiders uh afterwards.
But if we think about policymakers from these countries, people who have some agency but are not at the very top of the Government letter, and who want to make a difference, and who are aware of the political economy uh considerations that you developing in your in your book? At an individual level, what do you think is uh is possible to do? And how can that be taken into account in in advancing once uh work towards uh can be development?
Dercon: So maybe the first thing to say is that you know, in most societies people have agency to do good things. That doesn’t mean that they necessarily can change. Okay, there’s a difference between being able to do sensible, reasonable things, good things, doing things better, more efficiently, more distributionally sound and whatever, even if they can’t change the system. So, amid level civil servant still has a role to play to work within it.
But you know what I find interesting in these countries is that you do find, it’s not a junior level. It comes to almost by their nature, but like in mid-level people that are involved in business that are involved in civil service that actually can nutshell or along the set the edges of the whole system. So, I’m a strong believer in a civil servant, I being one, you know, public servants. It’s actually something that is, you know members of just don’t have terribly good your reputation, but you know well intentioned can actually, because you know they are the ones that need to implement what politicians, once they actually have a big role, and also shaping the thinking and so on. Those definitely was my experience that they can be quite influential.
Okay. So, I’ll give you a little bit away for what was happening in Nigeria. I had a closed sessions with the forty-three, most powerful civil servants, a closed session, you know. One suggests that the only way Nigeria will change for the revolution. That’s quite interesting for a top civil servant to hear that.
And actually, there was a lot of debate that said, no, actually, we are still quite powerful, even though we are not controlling, and the political class is a very powerful business class. We can actually, you know, within, you know, most countries are actually fairly good laws, we can actually stop them doing certain things. Yes, we’re taking risk. We have to pick out battles, choose our windows or opportunities where we can do it the same in civil society. They can push in mostly many societies, if not most for some transparency from some notching along the edges.
So, I think people can do things but at the same time we should have a bit of humility that actually those really can do the change are probably still these at least, and the simple reason is because they have blocking power. the one power that the elite has, and that’s the kind of pessimistic version of the book, the one power that the elite has is blocking power. The power that they lead us to block things because they can actually stop it. So, you need to find entry points of some place within it that want to change. And so same time, I look around. You know, I see finance ministries in developing countries that actually have very smart technocrats playing the game very smartly, but actually creating the conditions in all the countries that I looked at. You know what it’s a Ghana Ethiopia.
Also, in Indonesia you can almost name the individuals in the government. They were not the most powerful people, but actually we’re rarely reporting in driving the change. So, I always encourage an economist in this place, and say, you know, just align yourself with person, X, y, and Z. And there are these in these countries, you know, and they would know them, say that people that are actually totally honest, that are really committed to have to, to actually get growth and develop within the country. So, you know, align yourself, strengthen them, support them, give them a bit of more attention, you know. Find, make sure that they become unbackable that they can’t really be blocked.
And they you make bits by bits, lots of progress. But um, yeah. So. But the blocking power of the lead don’t underestimate. So, we have to have a bit of humility. That’s a simple sense of like. As long as we spend some money on civil society. Everything will change. I’m afraid that’s not as easy as that, so I didn’t realize we would uh be covering a carrier advice here, but I think it’s uh given the audience where we have a lot of current uh current students in doing the grad study, I think it’s very uh an important thing to keep in mind as well in terms of um individual strategies.
Brenot: Now presently I want you to turn back to these people. Maybe uh those uh you call the outsiders because we don’t leave, you know, close. I mean this country, the country you’re talking about in your books don’t leave uh as a close system. Uh, there are lots of exchanges with the with the external parties which I mean you, you’ll tell us, but to some extent might be part of this uh this lead system that you that you describe So for people looking at the situation from the outside. And I’m thinking about people uh like you used to be in the ins in government, in in aid organizations. People like us at the world’s lab, uh who research these topics, but with the view to improve policy, all these people are from the outside.
How do you think they can play a positive role in the Development bargain development process. And maybe also, what do you see as no goes, or what do you think, uh? We, as it as it should not be doing.
Dercon: So, the one thing as an outsider that we definitely shouldn’t be doing is peddling the idea that it’s all easy that we all have a line silver bullets that it’s so obvious that tech will change it all with some kind of one intervention, so almost we scale it will change it all.
So don’t do it. You know. I was in Kenya the other day, they were talking to a radio station, but also giving a talk to some of the you know international community, I mean young eight workers, and so on. And um, and we came to some kind of line is that there’s probably four times too many people driving for by falls that actually people in you the context of these places. So, the first thing what you shouldn’t do is to go to this place is thinking, I don’t need to know anything about these places,
That’s actually general advice. You know. I worked in a capital like worked in London on Development aid. There are far too many people who decide things around some of these countries that have no clue about these places. So even if you’re technically economists, even if you run our Ct. Even to do very specific small things invest in understanding these places, because, whatever you do, you got to be far more effective in doing something. If you start from some understanding, and it has to be not just the history, but that would help not just the culture, yes, learn the language, but also actually understand the politics, and not just the electoral politics to your own lens, but just very much, you know who matters House power here, organize how it’s happening, because without that you just never going to be very effective.
So, and then comment to us more constructively, you know, how do we think about change them? So again, you know, I know of interventions that will get children to learn much better than otherwise. I know of interventions that will help to uh make children healthier than another way.
However, I would want us to do is to all the time think about the underlying incentives. Why is the situation as bad as it is?
Why is it that actually, what can we change about the incentives that it’s not the outside that needs to common, effective. And how can we basically create positive incentives for better elite bargains for Elite Park in small for development and actually stop some of the incentives for the very bad ones. Okay. So, let’s do, then think of three things. One thing is very obviously this way: The economist comes into it. The economist thing comes into it, you know. Once a country tries to export and tries to sell things to the rest of the world.
The shenanigans. The kind of playing around by connected business with the governments is actually much harder because you have to compete with the world.
The political economy of export requires you not to just screw up the whole thing. So, it’s not just about getting the contract from government anymore, to be semi-corrupt or just work from the connections, and the whole terribly part in that we’ll have from business that just live of the government.
So exporting is a great thing, and of course, that’s part of why it’s been so successful to sustaining development bargains, doing a huge period of trade civilization, and so that actually the countries that manage to start exporting, say, like manufacturing, which you need to bite of investment in learning how to do it often kept on doing it, because actually it gets to be nine political economies as well.
So, there’s actually a political economy reason for why actually export orientation is actually helpful. So, anything we can do, and as I told people in Nigeria, anything that we have a local elite or the international community can do to get Nigeria to sell something else to the world, and crude oil will be an amazing achievement, because it will create business elite that has in its interest to be actually doing something else than just living of the rents from oil and the political economy around it. So that’s one thing, of course, as so many people say, trades and globalizations have that.
You know, I think there’s still going to be opportunities because value change for them to shift out of China. So, Bangladesh and maybe Ethiopia could have felt could have huge opportunities. And you know, if they move, move in there, because that’s the moment.
However, there’s another thing of how you can create incentives that actually stop some of the worst, the lead markets.
So, I think there’s a huge opportunity now, because of Ukraine. Why is that? Because you know you as European countries are countries of rule of law, which is, you know, despite the fact that we have allowed all kinds of uh bad behavior by our companies, not our companies, but I meant financial services and lawyers and accounts, and so on to help with a lot of elicit finance by whether it’s directly or indirectly, by Delaware or by London, or whatever. Actually, because we’ve tightened all these laws, we actually get an opportunity to really properly up last fight to elicit finance, not because of all the tax revenue that is lost to Buhari, Nigeria, or to Kabila family in the Drc, but because their terrible elite bargains are essentially funded through elicit finance. You know, Myanmar, the regime would collapse if it couldn’t rely on elicit finals anymore.
You know that’s actually really important, that these things that we actually change. But we do that finally. Well, um, you know these are things that we, as outside this. I can do that for the rest, when we don’t work much more locally. Well just don’t take for granted that every program that looks good doesn’t help to embed the lead bargain in a bad way.
If I’m doing a health program in Nigeria, at least think a little bit about the fact that Nigeria spends the low share with budget on health, and it has partly these terrible health indicators, because the Federal Government and many of the State level Governments couldn’t give it down.
That’s not a good reason for us to step in and provide all the aid to the health systems in Nigeria. It’s not a reason good enough reason not to do it.
But at least let’s think carefully about what we are doing in places where actually we need to step it with semi humanitarian support, because actually States are fair. I’m not arguing for sanctions, or we are drawing from Aids I’m not at least to be in that sense. But I’m actually asking us want to do something to think carefully about what we are doing in these places with our aid, with our support, and keep in mind a good understanding of the unlike political economy of all the things we do.
And so doing good is fine, but actually doing goods made long-term do back, if we are not careful, because we may setting sentence such a way that actually we perpetuate future generations of children not to be able to go properly to school or learn, or indeed not to get to the nutrition programs that we should have, even if we give the perfectly excellent little nutritional learning program today to the children of today.
Brenot: Thank you for this. Sounds like something inspiring and difficult at the same time. Let the audience reflect on that. And in the meantime, I took too much of your time myself, and I want you to try to quickly switch to all the messages that we’ve been receiving. And maybe I can try to cover most of them hopefully.
We got a series of questions around what makes people take what makes the elite uh take development bargains? So, Karen is telling us under what conditions do you think the leak we feel obliged to the development bargain. What will make them go up from just protecting their interest, to pursue wider development goals and another uh person who is saying um how much, and that’s maybe more anthropological type of question, more than any economy questions strictly speaking, they were asking when the bot successful bargain occurs, how much your act is driven by patriotism versus self-interest. So, I was wondering, um, yeah, if you had any and any take on that difficult question, which is how to how to make that bargain happen if it doesn’t that happen naturally.
Dercon: It’s, of course, quite a tricky one, you know. If you take a more case, study approach as I was doing, and in each place, it feels a little bit different of how it came about. I mean just to be clear; you know. I’m kind of thinking in a world with multiple equilibrium at any moment. In time Multiple articles are possible, and at some point, in some places most of the time we settle, maybe on particular expectations. Equilibria. We pick These we end up being there, but others could have been possible. So, there’s something to do with the agency here, and so, and there is something to do with, you know. Why would they switch to another equilibrium? Well, I think one thing would be anything that makes an equilibrium that is bad, unstable, okay?
Basically, if you can disrupt it, you know, there may be a chance that you move to another one. Now I want to be careful, you know. I remember Jim Robinson being very excited when why Nations Failed came out during the time of the Arab spring, and he has a lot of talks in Northern Africa and the Middle East, and they were going around saying this is your moment. Looking back at it, of course, yes, they shifted in equilibrium, but probably it was a worse one that we than they were before the you know, and there was a massive capture. So, you know anything that’s destabilized. The equilibrium may give us a chance to move to a better equilibrium, but just as well it could get to a well as well, and I think that’s probably, for example, why there is such a clear case as in so many places after conflicts the development bargain may have emerged, but we know that the best predictor of conflict is when you have past conflict.
So, most of the time conflict leads to more conflict, but occasionally it actually gets us somehow an expectations equilibrium. Surely, we should do this better, and I think that’s probably what happened in Bangladesh. Surely, we need to do this better. This definitely happened to another place as well.
But then you have legitimacy seeking behavior. You know, Basically, it’s another source of saying, look, I may actually not be able to keep my equilibrium stable. I need to get legitimacy, and otherwise I will lose my power. I need to go.
So, I think, in a lot of Western countries after the World War that must have been one of the driving factors. Similarly, you know, you get it in quite a few places in China. So, you get these kinds of moments that you need to grab, and that’s actually makes it the other part of it as well important.
I keep on also referring to it. I thought it a few times today around the agency of the people in the elite – that actually there are these moments that can be that can be taken, but actually, sometimes they just slip away, and then they go somewhere else.
So, it does mean there is some role of individuals of agency. I’m not a big believer, that’s all about the one person that puts it together. You know the leak one you like in Singapore that’s supposed to be, brings it all together. I try to avoid this question around needs to leader. But you do need somehow groups within the elite, but actually one to actually go, for collectively, implicitly, you know it’s not going to be a signing ceremony, but somehow, they get to somehow doing so that fork out is referred to as a moment, and they’re apartheid to the business community. Realize. You know our game is up. We better stop talking to the A and see, and are willing to do a deal which is arguably what the South African deal was post um post-apartheid, you know. Deal between and then the business community. So, you get that somehow.
Where does nationalism fit into it. Well, it’s often one way of using, You know you have terrible elite bargains that are built around nationalism that are just exploitative or whatever, but you also have good ones, you know, in Indonesia that was part of the elite bargain the narrative around the new easier to kind of the ideas around it, You know it can be used, I think basically this, where leadership comes into it.
A smart leader finds a good narrative to do this. So, rather than having the commander of chief who tells you all this is the new elite park you get a communicator in chief, who actually managed to get a language to the elites and to actually start using it. And then you actually can start being able to sell it both to the elite and maybe also to the population, because let’s not forget often in the population, they may not be immediately funds for it, because, and the development, bargain, and growth means so often investing in the future. But it means consumption less today. So, it may actually be some hard decisions to be taken as well with our popular, so you need to have it so. I think nationalism can help with that narrative.
I don’t believe that nationalism is, you know I come from Belgium with all kinds of problems with nationalism, but let’s not go into that, but it can be used by leadership actually in a constructive way. And so, Yeah, it’s complete role.
But you need to narrative. It could be national. It could be another directive, it the Development narrative. And then whatever works basically again, context, specific, whatever it works. Let’s try to find it locally.
Brenot: Thanks. Actually, this is nice Segway to the next question that we received, uh, which I suspect was asked by a Federal uh micro economist uh of yours. The questions around the use of what we do in in terms of positive co economy.
How do you feel? Uh, they can contribute, and maybe other types of research can be useful to build evidence and to inform a particular economy type of research, and especially in a context, as you just stated where things are so context specific.
Dercon: Yeah. So yeah. So, look one thing you know, I do my as well. One thing I’m not going to try to. This is trying to say, you know you shouldn’t be doing this, you know you can. You can answer questions. You get relatively precise answers to questions doing this. Okay, so it tells you. I remember I’m strategy on saying when I when I was Steve, because it’s different. And he came and said, look, it tells us what’s possible. You know it tells what’s possible, you know. If you, if you your control circumstances, you can’t even get it to work. Maybe you shouldn’t even be doing it.
Okay. So that’s fine. So that’s the one thing that I am worried about, you know I as research, do a lot of big fun, I’m worried about overstating the relevance in using it, and people talk about you. We can test the scaling up, or whatever. But you know, once it meets me to a political economy, you know, that determines. You know there’s a lot of really good interventions that are not being implemented in the Uk Government, even though it’s supposedly totally evidence base. You know there’s just no way we could do certain things because it hits some politics, and it won’t be done interestingly. And I think the question here alludes to also how to actually think smartly about political economy within it. So, I’m actually very big fun of, uh, you know. And there was some, you know.
I mean, I used to be at the time at I talked to with me. You know the three is to be, for example, in education. It’s really neat paper on Kenya that took an intervention that manual cream and colleagues had done in Ngo schools and said, Okay, what happens when it needs state schools? And that’s a really interesting thing where they can’t fully prove it. But they are most plausible explanation was, it hit the political economy of the three Teacher unions. So, the successful program didn’t work anymore, because it hits this. So, I’m very much in fun
of trying to actually think through these things and allow all three of ourcts allowing it to hit political economy in an explicit way, you may not be able to fully change it, but actually to think about it.
Finally, my book at documents by a lot of civil society interventions. You know things that you can do in Ghana and in Kenya, why, they are quite effective. Lots of good evidence of all kinds of things that may work and not work. I also know very good reasons why they wouldn’t work in in Nigeria, and you should be willing to, to develop a bit of a political economy, understanding why certain things that may work in Ghana, in Kenya, and the democracies as they have, may not have much impact in Malawi and in any Nigeria, and it would be so much richer if we were willing to bring some kind of good case study understanding Why, actually, you know, it’s a question of external validity. But actually, just context understanding of the context of why implementation would look so different to different places. So, let’s marry these things, and definitely that’s my own commitment to do a bit more like that.
Brenot: I wanted to ask you in in closing something that’s come up in different questions from the audience, we talked about the methods uh, but maybe in closing it will be interesting to hear from you, from your experience in in what you’ve seen, both on the academic side of the Government side and on the ground.
A bunch of many students or young researchers here are curious to hear your views. What do you think are exciting questions right now that needs to be answered by academics, but also by more applied researchers, such as this uh at the growth plan.
Dercon: So, I suppose there’s one set of questions that is actually trying to touch on this distinction that I was trying to make between doing good and actually getting to change, you know, some serious change, and I think would be quite helpful, I think, to actually start thinking more about it. You know this a lot of very awful contexts, and just to be blind to these circumstances, and simply saying, oh, it’s all just so humanitarian, doing good kinds of stuff. That’s all that we can do. And I think you know, we want to study how we can change in senses, both economic and others in this kind of system. So, I would just like us to do just far more engaged in what is happening in these very difficult places, because these are the ones that’s you know. There’s nothing not much going on. So, it’s yeah fragile conflict affected. I’m very excited these days about actually trying to bring so rigorous research measures to humanitarian work as well. Because this is where the context, where we have so little evidence, and where we are then also all the time have to think carefully about the political economy. Uh, there as well.
I’m very keen myself to try to think you know. What does the impact agenda look like when you allow for political constraints and implementation as well. Would you actually still advice for the same things to be scales?
If you’re kind of more explicitly analyzed. Maybe we know the methods, the kind of constraints it’s hits. And so, you know, there’s a really interesting paper. Actually, it is by Jim Robinson and Darren. I simult blue in the general economic perspective. I think it was in two thousand and thirteen, where they have a very simple model where you’re actually saying, rather simply thinking through the economic advice, to give houses to prove the economy, but actually dynamically. Think how, whatever advice you give, how does that feed through to the political incentives as well? If we could do at the micro and a more macro level to build this in much better, will actually begin to really properly integrate sensible economic thinking, that sense for political thinking at the moment we are not really integrating that that much. And so, I think there’s a lot of stuff, you know. And then the final thing I’ll say, look, anyone who does any research on any country, just invest in understanding what’s going on.
And I read too many papers where I really think, my God, they have no clue what kind of place this is. And please read, learn about these places. That’s actually one part of the agenda we should do about localization and the whole, you know, empowering of these countries and people, there is to actually give them to courtesy that even if we say that Harvard or it also that we actually try to understand why they are, where they are and what’s going on in these places, rather than treating them as few technocratic problems where we can deal with some kind of whether it’s an experiment or another kind of paper. I don’t care, but that stands a little bit better these contexts there will be better research.
Brenot: Thank you. That’s a conclusion that’s hard to disagree with. But I feel wisdom that we can keep with this after this talk. I can believe it’s already past time that one hour has gone by. There is so much more in the book, I really encourage viewers who are interested in the type of mission we discussed, to dive into the specific country examples that you described in the book.
I think that we learned a lot, not only about these countries, but about how to think about the issues we discussed today. Thank you very much for visiting us today, and uh, and I hope you’ll come again with a new book, new papers, and new things to discuss, to tell us more about that what we’re doing. Thank you so much for this absolute pleasure to talk to you.
#DevTalks: Political Favoritism and Regime Stability / Why Bad Policy is Almost Always Good Politics
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is an emeritus senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Silver Professor of Politics at New York University (NYU). An expert on foreign policy and nation building, his current research focuses on political institutions, economic growth, and political change. Alastair Smith is the Bernhardt Denmark Chair of International Relations at New York University and a professor of political science in the Wilf Family Department of Politics. This session revolves around their book, “The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics.”
José Morales-Arilla, Research Fellow at the Growth Lab moderated this discussion on November 2, 2022 at Harvard Kennedy School.
Transcript (Part I)
DISCLAIMER: This webinar transcript was loosely edited and there may be inaccuracies.
(José) Hello and welcome to Dev talks. I am José Morales-Arilla I am a post-doctoral fellow at the politics department in Princeton University, and a Research Fellow at the Growth Lab here at Harvard, and it is my great pleasure to be welcoming Professors Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, Bernhardt from NYU for a session that will largely revolve around their book, The Dictators Handbook Why, Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics. So without further ado,professor Bueno de Mesquita.
(Bruce) It is it really a pleasure to be here. I appreciate you all coming out.
I’ve got about ten, fifteen minutes, so i’m going to be cutting a lot of corners. I’m going to quickly introduce you to selector theory, which we developed with some colleagues. It’s a game theoretic model about leaders survival. And we’re going to use it to talk about why bad behavior is often good politics, and demonstrate some applications of it to real-world problems.
In the selector theory, we think of all organizations, not just governments, we’ve also studied corporations, and so forth. All organizations are set up through a set of nested groups as opposed to a government is democratic or autocratic and then we have arguments on what does that mean.
A nominal selectorate, people who have at least a legal say in choosing leaders, shareholders get to vote, and we, as citizens, get to vote. And in Saudi Arabia the royal family has a say, and so on a real select We won’t worry about today, the winning coalition, which is the portion of the selectorate, whose support is essential to keep a leader in power, and it can be made up of blocks which in questions i’m happy to talk about and I’m sure Alastair is, but otherwise we won’t touch on it today.
The basic idea is that a leader always has rivals who are trying to take the leader’s job. They may be ordinary challengers. They may be revolutionaries, coup plotters, whatever. So, in order to stay in power, you have to pay your winning coalition just enough so that they aren’t better off defecting to arrival.
In this theory, leaders do in this version of it three things: they raise revenue through, for example, taxation, and they spend money on public goods to benefit everybody, and private goods, such as corruption opportunities to benefit members of the winning coalition and any money that they don’t have to spend in equilibrium, to fend off the challenger and keep their coalition, succeed in keeping their coalition Loyal is at their discretion they might choose to send, spend it on pet projects, civic-minded projects, or they might prefer to have a swiss bank account.
Rivals make the best offer that they possibly can, which means that they make a very big offer today, Go, rob the palace blind, but they have the problem that they can’t credibly commit to keep you in their winning coalition tomorrow. They want to sort out the coalition to find people who have affinity for them have some attachment to them, so that they’ll be to to keep the people who are thinking about defecting from the existing winning coalition to a to a challenger.
I’ll have to think about the lump sum payment, but they also have to think about the flow two hundred and fifty, and they’re confident about the lump sum today, but the flow is problematic. It’s risky. And for the um incumbent once. So the coalition gets reshuffled Gradually people come in and out of it. They’re brought in and out.
You begin to learn who has higher affinity for you, and who has lower affinity, and people who have higher affinity remain in the coalition people of lower affinity get booted out. And so you have an expectation that you will, as you, as you survive these shuffles that you will, with higher probability, continue to get the flow; whereas, if you are distrusted, if you are a low affinity type, if the incumbent thinks that you are not reliable. You get ousted, and that’s why bulogs exist as a good place to send you off to, so it’s it’s costly not to be trusted. That’s a very, very, very brief summary of about thirty years of work.
The theory leads an equilibrium to lots of predictions about behavior. Some of the important ones are summarized here. The thing to be conscious of is that the coalition gets bigger, we might say more democratic as you depend on more people, You shift to more public goods, because private goods get to be expensive, as you have to give them to more and more people. So public goods go up. Private goods go down. The longer a leader is in office, the less they spend on the coalition, and as the coalition gets bigger, the more of the revenue that has to be spent in equilibrium to keep the coalition loyal, So there’s less discretionary money, less opportunity for kleptocracy for example.
The leaders welfare strictly decreasing as the coalition gets bigger. Those who are disenfranchised, and those who are in the selectorate, their welfare restrictions
increasing as the coalition gets bigger the welfare of the coalition. We will look at a figure. It’s more complex. It looks like the Nike swish curve, and we’ll talk a little bit about that.
Tax rates decreases, the coalition gets bigger chances of foreign aid decrease, and the amount of foreign aid you get if you get aid increases. That’s a very quick summary of a lot of stuff.
The longer a leader is in office. These are quite new results. It turns out there is a life cycle effect for leaders within the selectorate framework. It turns out that the longer you’re in office, the less you have. So now the people in your coalition have survived the reshuffles, so they know their probability of surviving is going up. It’s increased. They’re less likely to get tossed out in the future, so they can be bought more cheaply, fewer public goods, a higher ratio of private public goods, fewer freedoms. But there are fewer coups, fewer revolutions, and reduced leader change. The longer you’re in office, the less likely you are to be ousted except by mortality. So the welfare of the coalition, as
I see it looks like this: Nike switch the welfare of outsiders just rising as the coalition gets bigger. Two things are happening as the coalition gets larger that leads to the drop, it’s an asymmetric drop and then increase. The first thing that happens is you’re sharing the private goods with more people. So you’re getting fewer private goods. The second thing that’s happening is as the coalition gets bigger to defeat the Challenger, you have to spend more of the revenue. So the pie that is being spent on public and private goods is expanding. So, even though the proportion of private goods is going down. Of course the total may be going up, and then eventually that curve turns up. And if you look at that red dotted line is a very important cut point here, the local maximum when the coalition is tiny, is an expectation equal to a point.
We have it at Point eight, but that’s just an example where when the coalition is quite large. Below that cut point is the world of revolutions and coups. If you get past that cut point the only way to improve the welfare of coalition members is to increase accountability, Expand the coalition more. No country, by our estimation that has passed that cut point has ever had a successful core revolution.
Okay. So we wanted to do some quick and dirty easy tests on some of this. So we’re interested in two elements here, lots of control variables that I’ve shortened this or they’re not listed. And there are year and country fixed effects in these regressions, and they’re very simple regressions. So we are interested in the effect that the size of the coalition has on total rewards, public goods and private goods, and the theory makes predictions about that. And we’re also interested in how longevity and office affects those things.
So, as you can see, bigger coalitions means more total rewards, more public goods, exactly as the theory predicts, and fewer private goods as a proportion of spending also, as the theory predicts. But the longer you’re in office, the fewer total rewards you provide the fewer public goods, and the more the ratio. So that’s as predicted.
We look at some other effects: Freedom of assembly, an indicator of the ability of people to coordinate that goes down the longer leaders or an office. But it goes up
And the bigger the coalition press restrictions. You get more press restrictions The longer a leader is in office, and fewer as the coalition gets bigger. I should know, by the way, the composition effects run against these results. Right leaders, for example, who do better survive longer one hundred and fifty or not, and torture Ah, torture goes up the longer you’ve been in office. Ah! And it goes down the bigger the coalition! It’s very unpleasant.
We have a conjecture. We have not proven this yet. Everything else We have proofs for that I’ve said so far. The conjecture which we think we will prove soon is that as the longer you’re in office two Ah, the more public goods. Ah! The the fewer public goods are producing. Public goods are going down. Ah! The more the more that corruption is going up, and the impact on the economy of fewer public goods, less infrastructure, less freedoms to innovate, and so forth.
And more corruption is that growth goes down, and we see that the longer you’ve been in office, the lower the growth rate composition effects running exactly in the opposite direction. Here, size of the coalition does not affect the growth rate significantly. What it does affect is the variance in the growth rate. So in small coalition regimes, some of which produce hot high economic growth is very high variance, especially when you change leaders. Very big swings in large coalition regimes. There’s very little variance in the growth rate. As you change leaders.
It’s just this steady slog. Okay.
So when governance it depends on a large coalition, Then societies are wealthier in terms of per capita income. People are healthier. They live longer,lower infant mortality, so on, and they are a lot freer their society, their governance is more transparent. We know what the government is doing, and they turn out to be better places to live, which means that they attract a lot of immigrants, and they have relatively low emigration.
And, in fact empirically, this is as simple. Of course we do much more sophisticated things in the academic work, but as just a simple portrayal as possible. This is Ah, the V dam measure of public goods looking at nineteen, seventy to twenty, twenty, one, and we are looking at the size of the winning coalition,as we estimate it, and you can see It’s a strong, positive effect. More public goods with bigger coalitions when the coalition is small. On the other hand, we’re looking at corruption. Corruption is really high. When the coalition is small, it’s almost a perfect fit here, and corruption is plummeting, as the coalition gets bigger.
The few exceptions like these guys are oil or petrol states. They don’t need to engage in corruption. They got tons of money around.
So we wanted to illustrate how this can be used. Ah, practically so. We want to give some examples from Ah Ukraine and from Ah, the Arab spring, all of the results. I’m. Going to show you are based on the model being one projecting the the variable of interest, the dependent variable two years, one to two years into the future. So these are all. When I say two thousand. Here’s what will happen in two thousand and eleven. It’s based on data from two thousand and nine predicting forward.
So if you pay your coalition enough, a little bit more theory, you get stability. If you pay too little below that swish curve, and then you get instability, and if you pay too much it’s a little bit more complicated. So people like to get paid too much, so that induces some loyalty. But if you pay too much, they have to wonder. Why are you doing that? One possibility is uncertainty. So then, you should be a good Bayesian you should be updating, and that overpayment should be dropping if it’s not dropping one hundred and fifty and you can anticipate a purge is coming. If a purge is coming, the leader can anticipate that people are going to plot a coup to avoid the purge. Ok. So here we looked at one hundred and fifty,
the political stability in Ukraine’s neighborhood, first in two thousand and nineteen. The next slide will be in two thousand and twenty one, and we see there’s only one country that was below the curve in two thousand and nineteen. This is the year that Zelensky came to power. Only Ukraine is below, and you see the other thing it’s interesting is how efficient governments are. The curve is exactly the incumbency constraint. It’s paying just enough to defeat the best offer that arrival can make. So everybody else is just about perfectly on the curve. Ukraine below, that tells us Ukraine was looking at a period of change.
We go to two thousand twenty one. I want you to before we do that, to remember that Belarus is on the curve in two thousand and nineteen. And now we’re looking at two thousand and twenty. One. Belarus is below the curve in trouble. Remember, this is projected from two thousand and nineteen data. Ah! And Belarus, in fact, was in trouble in two thousand and twenty one. Ukraine is in trouble, and we see that Russia is above the curve and if you go back to the previous slide you’ll remember they were on the curve, so they’ve gone up. They’re paying too much, not out of uncertainty,but Putin has chosen to pay too much, paying too much. There’s a precursor to purges it. It could be a precursor to expanding the coalition, but then there’s less money for him and his cronies that would seem unlikely.
So i’m going to take too long. So i’m going to flash with These, These are details of changes in Ukraine as Rock went on Arab spring.
Oh, there we go, and you can see in the circled area that Yemen is at the Peak in terms of revolutionary threat. Right behind Yemen is Egypt, and so on. You can see, for example, Saudi Arabia in two thousand and eleven projected not to have any problems.f we
repeat this for the risk of coup, we see that in two thousand and eleven Egypt is now at the peak it’s way above the global average risk of such events, Followed by Tunisia, and so on. When I hear when Alice hears that the fellow who, self-immolated in Tunisia, is the cause of the Arab spring. We think well. But back two years earlier the data we’re telling us that trouble was coming, and if we look at the two thousand and thirteen fourteen, we see that this is the period where more seek it’s overthrown, we see again, Egypt has a big risk, and we jump ahead to two thousand and twenty. We see that Sudan is at the top, and Sudan had a coup in two thousand and twenty Again, Remembering this, is projected two years in fans so to wrap up when the coalition is large. Then good policy and
low-private goods production improves survival. If leaders engage in corruption that hurts their prospects. On the other hand, when the coalition is small,good policy is bad politics, it hurts political survival. Corruption is good for political survival when you have a small winning coalition. Ah! The best survival prospects arise when the ratio of the coalition to the selectorate is small, so the costs and the risks of defection are high. So to wrap up institutions.
In this view of the world shape, policy, leader, survival is a function of the ratio of coalition is electorate size, and of affinity leaders anticipate threats, so it’s much more important to to study it. When you are an instability there expectation about the coming of threats rather than the realization of threats, because Real realize that it means a mistake they should have when they anticipate. They take counter moves to prevent the threat from being realized. They engage in suppression, extralegal killing, ah, or policy changes which induce institutional change in equilibrium, such as liberalization or autocratization. Sorry I read a little over.
Thank you so much for the say Two or four on on the logic of selector theory. I mean I read the handbooks, the the Dictator’s Handbook not long ago, and I was, you know I just loved it because it gave me straight answers for some of the most frustrating political events in my life. Right like it. It helped me understand why the illness of which I was managed with such a capacity and right like, why, why that was so important for the survival of the regime beyond the and the passing of of him. One hundred,
But in the spirit of this question let me pose a couple of questions right like one of the things that I noticed that the theory kind of tells you what happens at different levels of the size of the winning coalition. But it doesn’t emphasize enough how the size of the winning coalition can change two.
The very first question is like, What does electorate theory tell us about the process of democratization? Right? Ah! And and a How do winning coalitions grow when leaders incentives are to shrink them, and how can they interchangeable A. What can they do to change this equilibrium into a more democratic one and as Bruce was alluding to some of the things we’ve been doing at the end is to think about. When is it that leaders are not providing the policies that we would anticipate? They would provide. Given their institutional settings, how healthy they are, how long they’ve been in tenure. The economic circumstances where they’re getting their revenue from.
So we’ve been looking in terms of trying to make an assessment about how institutions are changing, looking at where the leaders are over providing, and where the leaders are under providing.
So, for example, Bruce was talking a little bit about Russia. There it wasn’t for us just the key that the Russian leadership is providing too many rewards. We’ve actually been looking in the sense of how are they over providing those rewards? And the over provision is that there’s a lot more corruption and private goods rewards that we would anticipate giving the institutions that Putin has, and given how long he’s been in office and the economic conditions and stuff. And so for that is the key as to what the future trajectory of institutions are going to be so, leaders that are over providing freedoms of assembly, for example, providing freedom of assembly is terrible for your institutions in the sense that you might start democratizing. There’s an incentive that it’s going to be much harder to resist the people if you make it too easy for the people to come onto the streets. And so one logical consequence is, you’re already providing the goods that reward a large coalition. So one easy way to get this is equilibrium. To go away is to actually have more inclusive political institutions. So this is not a way we’ve been thinking about trying to bring a dynamic element to what.
For twenty five years we studied a very static theory.It’s super interesting. Another question has to do with these, you know. If you were to steal the core message of the theory. One could argue that it is like more. Democracy is good because it leads to more public goods, but two hundred and fifty.
Well, the high versus not. But if you leave it for citizens, Yeah, it’s terrible for you. But then on that exact point, right like when we think of the cases of the developmental successes of the station tigers, right like these are countries that started with very limited coalitions of Forum, and very dictatorial, and not only were able to to develop, but many of them. I also got to democratize right again, and people argue for them as as one
Case studies of democratic, a modernization theory, right? You developers, and then you, you you the mocker guys.
It’s kind of hard for me to think of these cases as just like, you know, exceptional quirks, and you know it’s in the regression. It’s supposed to be different.
The institutional context that can also lead to development. Right. So how could we think about these cases in the context of electorate theory? So I want to go back to comment on this slide. That’s so up there about the realization of one
Destabilizing events versus their anticipation. So if you look at the Korean case, for example,there was concern about military coups when it was a military regime. The
I think these big changes are kind of haphazard because a coup hasn’t happened. A revolution hasn’t happened. But leaders are researching this now. Leaders. If they’re rational, spend a lot of their time anticipating. Am I getting into trouble? And what adjustments do I have to make if i’m getting into trouble, And it turns out that even though leaders would always prefer a smaller winning coalition, there are conditions within this theory under which, when I anticipate, for example, a mass uprising may be better off expanding the winning coalition, which means producing more public goods, all of which is going to support having a more successful society, two to buy off that risk and preserve myself in power rather than try to, and I try to crush it as well. It depends upon what the details of the case are um, but there are conditions under which it’s in my interest to expand the coalition because it keeps me in power. J. J. Rawlings in Ghana is the classic example of this. Um. There are other cases where it’s in my interest. There’s this wave of paper in two thousand and nine shows where the cut points are.
For this, shrinking the coalition is what’s in my interest. And so those places Don’t become tigers. They become smaller coalition, more autocratic places. One of the factors that affects this is the conjunction of how long a leader’s been in office, and how healthy the leader is so when a leader is believed, for example, to be dying so they can’t be counted on to provide payments in the future because they’re going to be dead, so that changes their equilibrium behavior because they want to hang on till they’re dead, and that often leads to liberalization.
So the theory predicts when you will get the tigers, and when you won’t, remembering as well that the theory predicts with regard to growth specifically, that when the coalition is smaller, there’s more uncertainty and more uncertainty breeds its own problems. The variance in growth is much, much higher in small coalition regimes fantastic, and the the book also seems to my my recollection of the of the argument itself is that you know we’re thinking about strategic leaders that want to stay in power, no matter what right and and and that that that kind of logic might be the most certain and most accurate in most cases.
But it also leads very little room for leadership, right like and positive leadership in terms of leaders that want to expand. They want to democratize their country, and you know it. That might be most accurate in most settings. But we’re in the Kennedy School, and you know many people here have been inspired by. You know, cases of people that had the chance to, you know, be narrow minded, take over almost power all the power for for themselves but
And actually decided to take a different avenue and confront the probably the Radicals that took them to power, and and and actually allow for the opening of the political system. So, on the one hand, it’s like it’s like a two-fold question right like on the one hand, What’s the role of leadership in selector theory, if any but second one hundred and fifty
One can selector theory, how can selector theory help inform the decisions and the strategies of democratizing leaders in hard settings in dictatorial settings. The fundamental assumption we make is that leaders want to stay in power, and we just make the assumption two hundred and fifty.
You want to be in power, but you can also motivate that by the fact that if you are not in power you cannot implement the policies that you want to implement. So we’re not saying that leaders have no interest in policy. They may actually want to do certain things, but you can’t do those if you don’t keep your job.
And so instrumentally, we’re going to work with that assumption. There’s a great deal of discretion that leaders have particularly in small coalition systems. So you know, I know It’s very popular at the moment to think China is this wonderful country, and that we should all be dictators because we could get ten percent economic growth.
I just like to point out that a hundred years ago China had about the same Gdp as the United States. So yes, it can be higher. But it’s also. There’s those years in the fifty S. And sixty S. When they were doing so massively worse. And so there’s high variance. But the the There’s a big discretion here in what you want to do.
So Deng wants to grow the economy and produces policies that keep him in power and allow him to grow. The economy now before him chose policies that kept him in power, and also impoverished the country and killed. I I don’t even want to guess how many tens of millions of people, but many millions of people died. So there’s a lot of discretion that leaders have. What is very rare is to see leaders take actions that are going to get them in political trouble, and it’s going to cost them their job without them being the position that they really they’re going to lose anyway.
So I mean, I think of very, very few leaders who act against their own political interests.
Transcript (Part II)
Let me illustrate this with a real world example of an unusual case. Somebody who ruled two countries simultaneously.
Ah, Leopold Ii. Was King of Belgium from eighteen, sixty, nine, till he died in nineteen O. Nine, and he was the leader of the Congo Free State. Any place it’s called Free, or called Democratic, or called peoples Isn’t um In any event. Ah!
In Belgium, even today he is revered, he is among European leaders. He depended on a relatively large coalition. It was a multiparty system. It was not a super strong constitutional monarchy, but not a really weak monarchy.
Leopold promoted the first laws in Europe, protecting women’s rights, banning child labor, producing free trade, and so forth.
He depends on a relatively large coalition in the Congo. He depended on the Force Public as two hundred Europeans, and he did not have the constraint of a large coalition, and his rule of governance was a small Coalition leader.
I want you to produce first. It was from ah Ivory, later from Rubber X. Amount of money for me, not for Belgium. This was his money, not Belgium’s money. I want you to produce X amount for me. How you get it as your business, you know. Essentially they were tax farmers. You go do whatever you want.
They cut off millions of hands. They murdered millions of people, and he became fabulously wealthy. So there was a place for leadership. There was variance in leaders,but the institutions are much more constraining. Same guy, same culture, same personal history, By the way, mobile Ducasseco, in case you think it was colonialism. Racism governed the Congo in exactly the same way as Leopold did in theory. We recognize that among small coalition leaders there can be three.
So there’s a big pool of discretionary money, and the leaders can be in what we call our Hall of Fame. H. A. You Well, they’re stealing tons of money um mobile do with such a person. Marcos was such a brilliant plenty. There could be plenty of such people like Kim Jong-un, certainly one or they could be civic minded, and among the civic-minded they come in two flavors. They have good ideas about how to promote social success.
Lee Kwanhad good ideas. Dunk, chopping had good ideas, and they could have really bad ideas for me, and Kruma had bad ideas. Ah, nasa don’t have bad ideas, and we tend, then selectively after the fact, to look at the ones who did well and say, Oh, it’s It’s not so bad, and we don’t’ look at all these other guys who didn’t do so well.
That’s super clarifying. Then I want to to shift gears to the role of
international relations in selectoral theory right like, on, On the one hand, one of the theories that has been presented on why some of the is Asian tigers pursued developmental policies was because they were facing foreign threats, right like Taiwan from China, South Korea, from North Korea. But at the same time something that you do discuss in the book at some length is at this point.
That debt forgiveness is one likely counterproductive, because you’re removing the consequences of being extracted right like in a way. So so a I wanted to to to, perhaps give you the opportunity to discuss more about the role of international relations in electoral theory, and also more precisely like what’s the role of economic sanctions or other economic, one hundred and fifty tools of foreign pressure on on on dictatorships in terms of like driver of the potential expansion of winning coalitions, I mean, i’m always shocked about debt.
I mean, if you’re a leader and you get to borrow It’s like getting a credit card going to a nightclub. You can run up the biggest bill you like, and only if you’re extremely lucky you’re going to be in power when that credit card bill has to be paid, is actually shocking to me that people aren’t borrowing even more money
right? It’s only a very lucky leader who’s going to come around for the consequences of this. And so this is the problem is that leaders have incentives to borrow because they can, and it and it’s somebody else’s problem. Um! And so we’re very much of the opinion that the only time we always think about debt problems as not financial problems, but political problems, because in order to finance or get the economy going enough to make debt payments, you have to implement more liberal policies. You have to let people talk to each other. You have to root out corruption. These are all things in ah, an autocratic small coalition system that are very bad for your survival in power.
And so people will, you know, swear blind that they’ll reform after you’ve given them some more money to pay off their debt. But the moment, of course you’ve paid off the debt they can pay off who they need to, and the problem goes away. And why would you then implement reforms that are going to make it harder for you to stay in power?
So we’re very killjoys. Is one of the nicer things we’ve been killed at times. You know. It’s the one time leaders are on the hook when they desperately need money.
If we had a policy proposal, one of the things we would say is, you know. So give me the reform, and then we’ll give you the money. We’re not going to give you the reform on the problem. We’re not going to give you the money on a promise of a reform would be one of ours sort of recurring themes we have. If you can’t pay your coalition, you’re going to be in trouble.
Going to have to change institutions. You’re going to have to change policies that put you in political jeopardy. If you have the money to pay off supporters, then why worry
fantastic. So I have a couple more questions, and maybe we’ll get back to those towards the end. But I wanted to give the opportunity to the audience, both on zoom and and here in person to to ask a few questions. So if anyone has a question, we’re happy to share the microphone with you.
Hi, Thank you so much.One question that I had with for this framework is, how do you think an exogenous shock of something like a windfall to make up for current government services would influence that provision long-term for different types of winning collisions. Say that you know outside organization starts providing transfers for low-income peoples in a country.
Would that incentivize countries with low? It was small minimum collisions to stop providing those services, and instead divert that revenue towards our collision? Or would that eventually have a different type of impact?
The short answer is, it will disincentivize the government from providing better policy. So governments provide small coalition governmentsprovide some quantity of public goods, because they need people to be capable enough to produce, so that they can keep the leadership and their coalition in the money and in office.
So if you have it on now on the nature of the windfall, if you have a windfall in the Your. A small coalition regime, you have a windfall in in the form, for example, of the discovery of natural resource.
So the pressures in that case are the resource. Curse. It is to provide less. If you have a large coalition exactly because you’re past this cut point, you can’t provide less. So in this understanding of the discovery of natural resource models. For example, once you pass this point, you’re just going to produce more public goods, because
And you have to. Otherwise you’re going to have people oust you. So it’s about. What do I have to do to in anticipation to prevent the people from rising up, or the coalition from rising up one hundred and fifty.
So there are some shocks, some exogenous shocks that work the other way. I mentioned briefly, and we’ve done papers on this health shocks are kept secret to the extent that you can, they are more likely to be discovered by people in the winning coalition than by the general society.
Health shocks from the perspective of the coalition a signal that that flow which was important in their calculations about staying loyal is going to dry up so to offset that threat,
I expand the coalition. So there are shocks that will lead me to buy off the threat positively, and an awful lot of shocks that lead me to buy it off negatively
Thank you. I’m extrapolating the legal term to mean parties in power in a functioning democracy.
I think that’s a very reasonable way to go. We we’ve just from A. Because we game theorists, so we we really like to keep the number of actors nice and small. We have a leader.
But I don’t have a problem with interpreting. Is this Ah! In a broader sense, that there might be two very important positions, or that at some extent political parties may be more of an actor. I don’t I don’t have a problem with that interpretation as a game theorist. I’m never going to model.
They’re just adding, that’s just making my life harder. Sorry with my question that you know for me proper nouns are Alpha leader and people’s one through, and I mean that that’s my idea of how we should be proper now, and research but keeping the assumption oh, like I come from India, and we have seen that large coalitions are actually unstable,
Because there are too many competing demands that the Government is not able to satisfy. So where is that tipping point where a large coalition goes from being welfare oriented and stable to unstable and just generally a failure. Oh, you have to tell me, Okay, Bruce is an Indian. Bruce is actually an area specialist in Indian politics. He wrote his dissertation. I know it was many, many, many centuries ago, but he wrote,so we we need to keep So, if you remember, in the first slide I had this little thing blocks, and I said, Well, i’m going to talk about them unless you get pressed. So you just press, although you may not realize it. So when in a nominally democratic society, when people vote as in blocks.
So the the true size of the winning coalition is smaller than the apparent size of the winning coalition, because there is a block leader, an entrepreneur, a village head, that whatever who controls have a block votes, India is a much smaller winning coalition system. Then the electoral structure might lead one to infer. It’s also why it’s more corrupt than one might infer.
Block Voting does a lot of things. It also goes to your earlier question. We’ve written several papers on on block formation, and so forth.
So when you move to a world in which there are are voting blocks, so now you have to move to a world where leaders, instead of doing revenue applicants in private goods, they do revenue publicly private goods and club goods.
The club goods are things that are public for those in the in the block, and ah! Those not in the block are excluded from them. Ah, so so it distorts the economy in more complex ways than that. When there aren’t blocks, and India is a classic block voting society, so it just muddies the water. The math is just so much harder, so much more complicated. One hundred and fifty so cast could be a block. As I mentioned, I started my career as an Indian, as my first two books were in India, and I pretty much got driven out of Indian studies by suggesting that was not nearly as important a variable as Indianists thought it was because there are many other forms of blocks. Ah! And in particular, when you get down to the local level of elections. Ah! In any given electoral district the competing parties have generally worked out, which is going to be the dominant cast. And so all the candidates from the different parties are from the same cast. So it’s irrelevant. Then what’s relevant? Are other considerations, occupation which is correlated with cast, but not a variety of other sorts of things which makes it complicated.
Thank you very much. My name is Teres I’m. From the Drc. So thank you also for mentioning King Leopold and Mobutu, and the interesting transitions I’d be very interested to know from you, if you have from your studies um any insights on the reasons why leaders do leave power. So when we look at the African continent. We have cases like Ghana Senegal, recently in Kenya, where we have transitions of power according to the legal framework, but we also have where one it just doesn’t seem to want to end. So what what motivates certain leaders to actually transferring with them, carrying along with them? Is there a coexistence of coalitions that you know, provide some kind of protection for these former leaders. I’d be very interested to know if you have any.
With regard to term limits. Term limits are endogenous. They are strategic consequences of the institutional structure in a large coalition system. They are a way to ensure that other people can get rid of you and come in and smaller coalition systems. So among the work that the two of us have done on blocks is that even in a one party state with a strong leader.
Ah! The leader has incentives to create factions within the party, because essentially people will free ride if there are no rewards for making effort on the leader’s behalf. If there’s no faction competing with another faction, there’s no reason, you know, you get the collective action problem, a consequence of that factionalization is the emergence of rival leaders
Who then try to endogenize firm limits? Do leaders leave office absent, and institutional structure to lead them to leave office. I supervised a a master’s thesis a few years ago by a student who was sure that this theory was crazy because he was sure that leaders are not that keen for power, and they leave office. So he he studied hundreds and hundreds of leaders. He asked Democratic leaders. Another student did not democratic.
Yeah. He has a set of simple questions in a democracy
in expectation. Were you going to lose re-election if you were not term-limited? If you were going to lose, so the party wouldn’t give you the nomination. They’d push you out. So you were out. It wasn’t that you chose to be out. Now, you might have announced. But you didn’t have a choice leaders who say i’m leaving office for because of ill health which we generally treat as dismissal dismissive. It turns out they die much sooner than leaders who don’t leave office, Having said that they are sick, they, in fact, are sick.
Anyway, He went through all the the reasonable alternatives. Out of the hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of leaders he found four who left office without there being an obvious pressure that led them to leave. Well, one of them became the President of the European Union, or whatever the right title is. So maybe that was a move up. One became Ceo of one of the world’s biggest corporations. So maybe that was so. That left, too, who left office for no apparent reason. Leaders don’t leave office. They want power. Take a look at Donald Trump.
So i’m I’m going to move to a question from the audience on zoom, and and i’m going to compliment it a little bit. So the question is, How does electorate theory explain democratization in Europe in the nineteenth century, and and just to complement it right, like a a lot of the conversation on that particular period of time has focused on this idea of, You know, Communism and the threat of revolution as a factor that invited elites to to democratize one hundred and fifty.
Eh? But I wonder if you know, because electric theory focuses a little more on, on, on elite dynamics. And who’s in and who’s out among the potential, you know, around within the real selectorate? Right? A a one hundred and fifty.
How does that talk about about about the you know the population, the possibility of revolution and collective action at the and yeah and communism in that period? So we need to know nineteenth century, or we do. You want that? Maybe if you, if you ask me about the concrete out of verbs eleven, twenty, two. I’m going to do better. But okay, we’ll give it a shot.
So the the fear of revolution should not be lightly dismissed.
I go back to this Mr. Marx, who didn’t have the benefits of this theory, believed that revolution was most likely up here in this tip.
The advanced capitalist societies on the soul which were, and being democratic. So it turns out, if you’re according to selectorate logic, if you’re above this cut point, you are essentially immune from revolution. Mr. Marx had exactly the wrong places as the candidate’s revolution. So if leaders anticipate feared and anticipated the risk of revolution, the way you buy off revolution as opposed to coup is to expand the coalition.
The nineteenth century is a period of intense revolutionary ferment in Europe, so i’m winging it because I don’t know, you know, not an expert on the period, but but that’s perfectly consistent that the threat of revolution dominated the threat of crew in the nineteenth century in much of Europe when the threat of revolution dominates. This is the current book we’re writing when the threat of revolution dominates the solution. To staying in power is to expand the coalition. So buying off the threat, so creating what Lenin later called trade union mentality, making people content. So when you move past that cut point you’ve secured yourself. So I think that’s a
It’s a story at the moment. I Haven’t tested this, but it seems like a perfectly plausible explanation within the logic of the theory of why so much of Western Europe became democratic. Now there are other reasons which we don’t have time for, which do, in fact, have to do with the conquered out of firms. Ah! Which created a an altered incentive structure. Ah! In the competition between the church and monarchs.
I recommend everybody read the invention of Power, Pope’s Kings, and the birth of the West, and your thousand closest friends will want copies.
You’ll get the answer there and fantastic. So one question I I also had has to do with the with the topic of technology and democracy, right the to. You know, the the book is not super optimistic in general, but towards the end, towards the end, there’s this argument on on the role that technology could play by enabling, you know, aa transparency, but also by enabling a participation right two. At the same time, you know it’s. Perhaps perhaps this is a developed country logic, right like. Maybe this is not the case in in developing countries or more authoritarian settings, but it’s hard to look at The state of like one hundred and fifty super positive role in in in this, in the health of our democracy. So so yeah, So I I was just wondering how you’re thinking about about technology in the context of selector theory, and and perhaps in this like deep end of the I should. We should probably preface this by Bruce and I have, like the worst social media presence ever. If this doesn’t involve like children or grandchildren at a barbecue Generally we don’t have anything to do with social media That, said thinking sort of ten years ago, people were very optimistic that this would allow groups to coordinate. It’s also a technology that allows. You know, technology allows high levels of social surveillance.
So you know, under the under the guise of Covid awareness, China has basically found a way to monitor the interactions, the travel of every single person. So technology bites both ways. I personally think we’re a little obsessed with this idea of the Internet. And social media. It’s probably not a lot different from the advent of television or radio or the mass printing press it. It shapes things up. It gives people a different set of tools, but it hasn’t changed the fundamental incentives that people have the disenfranchised on a more inclusive society, because, even if they don’t become part of the elite, the society is going to generate public goods for them.
The leader would like to be beholden to as fewer people as possible, and pick those people from as large a group as possible, and The the sort of super interesting thing is the coalition could be really happy in a mass Democracy like i’m going to say South Korea, and they could also be pretty happy in a very tiny winning coalition, something like North Korea. I think we shouldn’t underestimate how materially well off the The very few elites are in North Korea. So there’s the the coalition can go in various ways, and technology is just a tool that people can use to coordinate. Ah, to push through the agendas. But our focus is not on that sort of tactical. How do I get people to turn on the streets? It’s It’s what incentives do people have to get on the streets? So we we’re, and we’ll get a false a teeny piece of other optimism. So in in the second edition of the Dictator’s Handbook. We’ve added a chapter whose title is is Democracy fragile, and the answer is, No, because if you’re past this cut point,you’re not going to have successful coups and revolutions, so there is reason to be optimistic, and there is an incentive for people who live just below the cut point to try to push their society over it.
Fantastic. So we have probably time for two more questions.
So I read the book a couple of years ago, and I was very, and Venezuelan, so I was very bullish on. You know the impact of sanctions on reducing the availability of funds to buy people off, et cetera, and we might argue that the impact of that that they sort of cost a recomposition from public goodies to club and polygoods one hundred and fifty.
But it also didn’t catalyze the coup, and we had Chris Blackman here not so long ago, and he he has a paper that shows that you know negative shocks, commote commodity, price, negative shops, Don’t necessarily increase the probability of a coup one and i’m very puzzled by that conclusion, and I wanted to know your your opinion on on erez agmoni. Whether the the reason why there’s less availability of funds, matter in terms of how the the people who need to be paid off decide to to defect or not what one hundred.
I think we want to be a little less optimistic about the way sanctions work. So i’ll talk case. I know a little bit more about that sort of sanctions against Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s regime.
So one of the concept that the nominal reason was, we’re going to restrict to access. We’re going to drive the Iraq economy into the ground. There’ll be less money, but it turned out for the elite. Smuggling became an incredibly lucrative business,and if you all happen to be in charge of the borders you get to choose who gets to smuggle goods, medicines, baby formula, luxury, items that have now massively increased in price, and and you get to control who gets to bring those across the border.
And so it was actually a way of funneling resources into the pockets of Elites I.
But that doesn’t necessarily mean the access to rewarding elites is the same. I I don’t know the hugeest demand about Russia, but I worry that a lot of the sanctions we’ve had have been completely ineffectual.
There’s chasing down financial assets and stuff two consequences. Well, we Europeans have refused. They haven’t given up buying Russian oil and gas, and the price has gone up. So the revenue from that has actually gone up, not down, and to the extent of regular economic activities it’s made the elites more beholden on the centre, on the regime on Putin, because that’s the only place there are actual resources coming through, because the rest of the economy where they might have made, might have enjoyed some privilege, but could make money with some independence has disappeared.
So it it’s made everything, you know. We always like to think of it’s better to It’s It’s better to have a small pie and choose Who’s who gets to eat than have a big pie that everyone can feed themselves from right the the early. The latter is better for society, but the former is much better for the leader, and that’s so, i’m. I’ve never been a big optimist on sanctions working.
That was fantastic. Thank you very much. I’m i’m the car of the house one. Um I wanted to ask you. You. You mentioned Ukraine and and um the Arab spring, and I saw that sort of like the model predicted the outcome, but I didn’t understand why. What, what in the model predicted the outcome. I know a little bit about
in my mind. In some sense a Mubarak was trying to widen the coalition in the last. Take it’s a liberalized sum, but
And in the case of Ukraine I was thinking, and and there was. Maybe the leader wanted to keep it in the but I didn’t know how to think of it in terms of the selectorate theory, so well let me give you the just the real sort of quick how how we go about doing those predictions. So we anticipate that a leaders context, their age, their financial situation. The institutions they have are going to shape, the policy choices that they have.
So i’ll I’ll give you the real quick. You know. Two minute recipe for how to do this. So we run a regression and think about how much public goods are you, providing? How many private goods, how much freedoms are you providing two?
And then what we’re really interested in is, how are you off? So if you just to think of this, i’m assuming everyone does regression Here we’re just in in some sense thinking of the residual.
To what extent are you off shooting
policies that we would expect you to have then from those policies we can see the kind of
you might think in in terms of how the policies differ from what you expect lead us to too many private goods are going to increase the risk of coup. Too many freedoms and not enough private goods are going to lead to an in ah mass uprisings and a likelihood the institutions are going to liberalize, so that that sort of where those numbers came from. The?
And then you asked this question that had something to do with proper nouns. So I got very confused. But that that’s the sort of secret source is, if that’s sort of helpful.
But Bruce, No. Bruce has heard of proper noun. One of the things that, as this picture shows us, is, people tend to to look at what a government is doing
as opposed to what a government is doing relative to the size of its winning coalition and relative to the size of its selectorate, which we’re not spotting here because they think of governments in categorical ways. They’re democratic. They’re autocratic, so it’s it’s not in some absolute sense that Ukraine was producing. Ah, two! If they were producing. Look at the list Here they were producing too few public goods,and two thousand coming into the period running into two thousand and nineteen, not for the size of their economy, not for um, their location or the nature of their economy, but relative to how big a coalition they had to keep loyal.
So once you look at it, which which inherently means you’re looking at it in a selectorate way. Once you look at what they’re providing. Not in some absolute sense of. Are they making people well off or not, but relative to what an equilibrium keeps their coalition loyal rather than defecting at this size of constraint on coalition and selective size. Then you see whether they are vulnerable because they’re not doing enough. I mean, in in the case of of Ukraine.
But if we go back here, so if the coalition, if they’re providing exactly what they were providing, but instead of the coalition being at around seventy something. If the coalition had been down here to around Point Six they would have been fine.
That would have been an equilibrium provision. If they had looked more East and actually done what their Eastern neighbors were doing. Smaller coalition,and you know they could have also done more. But it’s it’s. This picture is exclusively in the view of a selectorate framework and my not Am I producing good social welfare? Am I producing the right amount to defeat rivals.
What we’re not showing on this picture is what the mix of goods is.
So without looking here at sort of the sum of how much stuff could be a little we could argue about whether adding up the value of different policies is a good plan, but that’s that’s sort of how we did it because we had to do something. But we these pictures don’t show the mixes and off the top, My, whatever. But this is very sweet to simple cut at it. We have much more detailed cuts, but
(Jose) So I think we could spend the day asking questions and trying to understand the world much better. We’ve thrown the view of the electoral theory, but in the interest of time you just join me in thanking professors. One of the mesquite dance meets for today’s stuff.
#DevTalks: Culture, Psychology and Economic Development
Joseph Henrich is the Ruth Moore Professor of Biological Anthropology in the Department of Human Evolutionary Biology at Harvard University. Dr. Henrich’s research deploys evolutionary theory to understand how human psychology gives rise to cultural evolution and how this has shaped our species’ genetic evolution. Using insights generated from this approach, Professor Henrich has explored a variety of topics, including economic decision-making, social norms, fairness, religion, marriage, prestige, cooperation and innovation.
Eliana La Ferrara, Professor of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School, moderated a discussion with Prof. Henrich on November 8, 2022 at HKS.
Transcript
DISCLAIMER: This webinar transcript was loosely edited and there may be inaccuracies.
Eliana LaFerrara: Hello, everyone, Welcome to Dev talks. I am Eliana LaFerrara, and I’m a professor of public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School. It is a great pleasure today to be welcoming Dr. Joe Henrich from Harvard University for a session that will largely revolve around his book, titled the weirdest people in the world how the West became psychologically peculiar and particularly prosperous.
Joseph Henrich: Thanks to the Growth Lab for having me and for being flexible on the format. So in the the initial there was going to be more discussion. But one of my goals here, and and why I’m. So excited to be talking to a diverse group with policy interests and interest in economic development is that I come from the field of cultural evolution, which is a a kind of newly emerging discipline, and I think it can provide a valuable framework. But most of you are probably unfamiliar with cultural evolution. So I wanted to do a little bit of groundwork and kind of lay some of that out, so i’ll be drawing on both books, and we’ll spend some time on the weirdest people in the world. But this book really provides the framework for thinking about culture and cultural evolution one.
Now, I thought, since the group is maybe half economists, I would make this my outcome variable and just start thinking about the things that influence economic growth, and my kind of ah prelude or preamble is going to be based on a new paper where we just try to establish a simple and robust connection between family structures around the world, traditional family structures and economic growth. So i’m, drawing here on a a paper with Duma and Barani, Rod Jonathan Beecham and Jonathan Shilts.
And we’re going to argue that we should think about kinship norms as kin based institutions so cult fully transmitted social norms that shape things like marriage, the organization of family. Some societies have clans, kindreds, different marriage systems, and different forms of customary inheritance.
I’ll be talking about this more, But the key dimension we want to try to measure is kinship intensity. And this is actually a concept from anthropology. So we’re going to combine an economic problem with an idea from anthropology, and see if we can look for a link here.
Ultimately I’ll be arguing that economic growth is generated when there’s a fit between informal institutions, like kinship and the psychology, that they produce the kinds of social networks they produce in larger scale impersonal institutions, things like democracy or the organization of business firms.
So, as a as an outcome measure as an initial outcome measure, we’re going to use this nighttime satellite luminosity which has been widely used. Now it’s. Ah, you know, it gives us a fine-grained pixel level measure of economic prosperity that correlates strongly with other measures of economic growth and prosperity, and in the paper I’m. Referring to, we also use regional Gdp measures from genioli, twenty, fourteen, which gives us over one thousand five hundred different regions in eighty four countries, and we perform a bunch of analyses linking these two in the paper.
Now, kinship intensity, As I mentioned many of you. If You’re from societies that are Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic. A lot of this talk about kinship may seem strange because those societies are at the extreme end of low kinship intensity where the family has been suppressed and doesn’t play an important role in distribution. Consumption networks, all kinds of things like that.
So we’re going to measure kinship intensity by looking at the presence of Clans cousin. Marriage rules about post marital residents where you live. After you get married you live near uh the bride’s family, or the grooms family. Uh, do you have polygeny? And what kind of inheritance system do you have patrilineal matrilineal inheritance by Testament.
So we’re going to measure this kinship intensity from this anthropological data source composed in the nineteen sixty S. Um. Which is going to has a whole bunch of information about kinship, and when I first went to graduate school I was like, Why are anthropologists so obsessed with kinship?
and then I went to do research in the South Pacific, and i’m like Oh, because the people are obsessed with kinship. And so they write about what the people obsess about. And So there’s lots of data in the ethnographic atlas on that the year which most of these observations refer to as one thousand nine hundred. So it’s going to precede our satellite observations, our nighttime luminosity measures, which are two thousand and ten we’re; also going to be drawing this kinship intensity Measure from a a paper by Jonathan Schultz, myself, and others. Actually, it’s the same Co. Authors uh that we published in science. So in that sense we’re going to tie our hands right. We have to use the exact same measure that we use in the science paper, so we can’t kind of fudge around with the index at all.
Ah, and we’re also going to take data from genetics. So my colleague, David Reich, who’s over in the department of Human Evolutionary biology, has put together the largest data set of human genetic data, and these kinship practices leave an imprint in the genome, which is one way to kind of assess that what these anthropologists report is actually affecting things because it’s going to shape the the lengths of runs of homozygosity, both polygeny and cousin marriage and other kinds of endogamous marriage preferences should do that. So we’re going to use that, and we’re just going to substitute this in sometimes for that.
Okay, So a standard issue economic regression table. Hopefully, at least half of you are familiar with these. I’ll just walk you through some of the key insights. So we’re trying to predict this pixel level luminosity. So the logarithm of pixel level luminosity we’re using this kinship intensity index from the anthropologists in the nineteen sixty s that we’ve used to assign ethnic groups all around the world a measure of of kinship intensity.
And so, by putting this here and noticing that this is about one, this coefficient. Here we can interpret this as a as a prosperity per capita, so it’s luminosity per capita.
So that’s that, And then this is our coefficient here. So a one standard deviation increase in kinship, intensity across societies results in a forty percent decrease in luminosity. So if you buy that as a measure of economic prosperity. There’s a relationship there now. We estimate a whole bunch of different specifications, different models We always. We put in country fixed effects. So we’re comparing only ethnic groups in the same country.
We can’t. We control for a whole bunch of the standard geographic controls political hierarchy and malaria index stuff from other other work that could be leading us astray.
And then we take that out. We use the exact same model, and then we stick in our f value, and we’re able to show that that gives the same result. And then we do the same thing with our satellite luminosity. We take that out same specification plug in the G, and only regional stuff.
You have to make a few adjustments. But you get basically the same. Answer. So that’s that’s suggesting that There’s this robust linkage there.
There’s some details about how we match the ethnographic Atlas that i’m going to pass over for our purposes here.
Now the other thing we did that helps us, maybe think that this is. There’s really something to this: this ancestral kinship intensity affecting contemporary economic outcomes.
We do what’s called a spatial regression, discontinuity, analysis. So we look at the borders between our ethnic groups, and we only focus on groups within countries, So there’s no country level differences here, and we compare, and we look at what happens when we move from a a population that has a low kinship intensity so small, maybe monogamous nuclear families to a group with clans or something like that, some intensive group.
And what we find that you can see pictured here is that there’s a drop in ah in luminosity. So you have less economic prosperity as you move from groups with hot, with low kinship, potentially to high intensity. So that’s consistent with the other results.
We can, you know, do the full analysis. And that’s the basic answer. We get these coefficients here are just the Ki when you cross that uh the effect there.
Okay. So that suggests that there’s a linkage here. Now, why is that the case?
Lots of economists and others have argued that. Well, it has to do with differences in innovation, specialization, political institutions, trade. And so there’s a causal relationship there. Potentially. I leave that to other people. I’m. Interested in how these affect this.
So in the weirdest people in the world, I make the case that different kinship norms create an environment that leads to different ways of thinking about the world, and then that leads to more or less innovation, specialization, different functioning, political institutions, and more or less trade.
These can also be seen in social networks. So these have a huge and direct effect on your social networks. And so these two co-evolve.
Where’s my arrow? Okay, there it is now. I’m also going to think about where kinship norms come from.
So there’s a lot of reason to think ecology matters, and that’ll pop up at one point, but I’m. Mostly interested in the historical effect of religions. Religions have been very opinionated about marriage in the family, especially as you move through time over the last few millennium, so we’ll get into the Catholic Church. But other religions also have opinion, so we can think about how different religious traditions may have affected things through kinship. Mars.
One of the challenges. If you look across the social science, I think, is how people think about culture.
When I first started in anthropology. Culture felt like this sort of murky thing, that sort of looms almost like a haze around people. It’s hard to get, you know my my background is aerospace engineering that I was an engineer for a while before going into this business, and so I want things to be concrete and measurable.
So I found this work by. Ah, yeah, I ended up working closely with Rob Boyd and Pete Richardson, and also there’s other work by two biologists, cavali, sports, and feldman. And they said, Well, culture is this stuff that resides in individuals heads, and it gets transmitted from one person to another.
Why, you’re growing up, but also why are an adult? So it’s about how you learn from people. So you can build models of cultural evolution by understanding how people learn from each other and then cobbling up thinking, Okay, people interact, They learn, they do stuff, they interact again. And how can that get us to explain sociological phenomena, and what we know from a lot of research now is people automatically and unconsciously learn all sorts of things. So they learn motivations, valences, ideas, beliefs, and values. They also learn decision, making biases and heuristics and the kinds of things that directly affect people’s decision making.
So culture Here is information stored in people’s brains that got there via social learning. And so with that definition, technologies fall into this. Languages fall into this fertility, preferences, or any traits that influence fertility. I’m just throwing those out there, because often some people try to carve those out of culture.
So anything we socially learn from others we acquire while growing up. Of course, institutions are shaped strongly by social wars.
So now, where the evolution comes in, and why, I think that’s really important is, How do we decide how people learn from each other?
Well, I mean, when I talk to economic theorists who think about this, they’ll just make an assumption or or assume people are rational. What we do in the cultural evolution field is, we recognize that we’re a kind of ape, and that natural selection has shaped our minds to be good at learning from others.
So, more than any other species, we’re awesome at imitation. We’re awesome at inferring the underlying ah motivations and strategies that others have, and we copy those all the time. And outside of conscious awareness we’re particularly tuned into copying some kinds of people and not other kinds. So we use cues of shared dialect or prestige to figure out who to pay attention to.
So we can use evolutionary theory and build formal models that tell us what this should look like. And then, of course, we have other features of our evolved psychology that are going to affect behavior, and this is going to be really important for kinship.
Now, the product of this cultural evolution creates things like complex tools, rituals, and practices, but also social norms at institutions as well as languages. And this is the world in which kids are evolved in.
And so the argument that’s in the secret of our success is, we have these big brains, and we have a great deal of plasticity, because we need to learn how to navigate the world built by cultural evolution. And of course, cultural evolution has built lots of different worlds, and it’s been doing it for hundreds of thousands of years, so our minds have evolved to figure out how to navigate these worlds and some things we know. We know that the illusions that people see across societies vary. So if you read a look at a textbook on cognitive psychology, you might see something like the molar allusion which has the arrows in or the arrows out well, and if you’re in Chicago you’ll you have to see. One line has to be twenty five percent longer than the other line before people perceive them in Chicago as the same length. If you study hunter-gatherers, they don’t see the illusion so basic. Visual perception. Depends. On the world you grow up on. Self. Regulation is affected by religious devotion. People who engage in daily religious devotion have greater self regulation. It’s cultural practice, same thing with the others. I could go into secret of our success gets into something.
all right, and the last thing i’ll mention is that we’re at the stage, and the evolution of the social sciences where we have to get rid of the the dualism, the you know, culture. On one hand, biology, on the other hand, when we grow up in these worlds it changes our brains. So you can take genetically identical twins. Raise them in two different societies. They end up with different brains.
So that’s just that’s just a fact.
Okay. And then my interest is actually, I think this has been going on for a really long time. So i’m interested in how this has shaped features of human psychology.
All right.
Okay. And i’ll just make a comment on the culture and institutions question. Just because this seems to be an ongoing issue in economics from the perspective that I’ve tried to lay out here There’s no Is it institutions, or is it culture? Because institutions are a product of cultural evolution?
So people learn from each other, and this gives rise to social norms. What are social norms?
So they are. Ah! You acquire both the behavior. Don’t, eat pig, and the rules for judging other pig eaters or bad news. And so then you get a social norm that prevents some group from eating pig. It’s it’s enforced. It’s self-reinforcing, and you can build game, theoretic models it’ll remain stable that sort of thing, so that gives rise to norms collections of norms that govern a domain or institution.
So marriage societies have had marriage institutions, for as long as we can figure, and marriage is governed by where the where the couple lives after they get married. Who pays bride price or dowry? There’s all these rules surrounding marriage. It’s an institution so formal institutions. The only difference is there you can write stuff down, and then future generations can interpret it all right now. Kin based institutions, i’m going to argue are special as institutions go, because we have an evolved psychology that we share with other animals to preferentially be altruistic towards those who are genetically related to. So those who have a probability of sharing the same altruistic genes.
It’s quite a bit of research on that. But kinship systems extend that so lots of societies will call cousins, brothers or sisters, and you’re supposed to treat that person like us like a classicatory sibling. You’re also not supposed to have sex with them, if you call them sister, and you’re a male, or and vice versa mit ctl and um. We also have a pair Bonding instinct, and marriage builds on that so like gorillas, who also have a pair of bonding instinct. We form long-term emotional bonds for the purposes of child rearing and protection. And then marriage formalizes that reinforces it et cetera, one hundred and fifty, and then finally incest aversion. Like other animals, we have to avoid inbreeding with close relatives. So we have an in a diversion that we develop towards siblings. People will grow up in the same household with, but that can be extended and created an incest taboos, and apply to in-laws apply to cousins other other members of the group,
and even hunter-gatherers in the Kalahari would, if you asked him about sex with a cousin they’d be like. Well, that’s like having sex with my sister, and they’ll they’ll actually make the link, and everybody knows what that sounds like. The sibling of what that feels like.
So Anyway, these structure human social networks, and they’re highly variable across human societies. It’s good to ask why. And that’s one of the things I want to do.
And then, finally, one of the arguments and the weirdest people in the world is that the emergence of pre-modern States were really built on the logic of kin, based institutions so lower strata and upper strata. Think about kings and queens, and marrying cousins and lineages, and all that stuff, and of course, the lower strat. It worked as a productive unit. They’d re, you know, arranged marriage, that kind of thing, and it was really this thin layer of, and in personal institutions sandwiched between two versions of complex kinship that made pre modern states work mit ctl. And and it’s hard to get to modern states. If you have all this complex kinship operating in the background. So part of this is an argument about where modern states can come from one hundred and fifty.
Okay, Now, all of this talk about kinship and clans and stuff may seem unusual to at least some of you. Ah, because you come from these weird societies, and just to give you a sense of how unusual it is. These are a set of kinship traits that vary around the world and bilateral descent. So tracing descent through Mom and Dad. Most societies Haven’t had that they’ve had something else. Patrilineal descent, matrilineal descent. So that’s rare cousin marriage seventy five percent of societies have some form of cousin marriage. In some places it’s preferred monogamous marriage.
Eighty five percent of human societies have allowed high status elite males to take additional lives. Nuclear families rarer yet ninety two percent of societies. Haven’t had nuclear families. They’re organized in some kind of extended family and near local residents. So that’s when the bride and the groom lives separate from either the bride or the groom’s family, and that’s even more rare if we look at the world as presented in the ethnographic Atlas.
Most societies have none of these weird traits. So fifty, one, fifty point, one percent of societies have zero. If we look down at other societies that have five. They’re either European descent societies that appear in the ethnographic Atlas, or they’re places where usually Spanish missionaries have arrived early.
So I actually found there’s this island of Sebu, which has weirdly five of these, all five of these traits. So I went and did research on it, and I went to Antonio Pig fed his journal of Magellan’s Chronicles, and he records polygeny like crazy and cousin marriage, and all that stuff in Sabb. But then the Spanish Dominican missionaries got there, and by the time the anthropologist wrote stuff down, the Spanish missionaries had done their bit, kay, So families are a great place to start, because they’re where children are born into. So they’re the first institution kids encounter, and they’re historically the oldest institution. So everything we know is that some societies only have kin based institutions.
All right. So where did they come from? A common assumption is that these come from wealth? People get rich, and then they start living in monogamous nuclear families. That’s what everybody wants to do. Right?
Um. But there’s good reason to believe in. Historians and anthropologists have long argued that it was actually the action of the Roman Catholic Church, one branch of Christianity that dissolved the complex kinship networks of Europe into monogamous nuclear families,
And one fun piece of evidence is that you know all of us speak English. We know the term for affine, so that’s the anthropological term. But if you where does the in-law come in? Sister-in-law, or brother-in-law or father-in-law, it comes from in canon law so every time you say sister-in-law you’re channeling the Catholic church’s taboo on sex with your sister-in-law or sex with your brother-in-law, because that was supposed to remind you treat her like a sister you can’t marry her.
Important, because even in the Bible there were forms of marriage, where, if your husband died, you’d marry his brother so like Leverett marriage so oral marriage very common across societies. Church does away with it.
You’re also, maybe familiar with the common thing in marriage ceremonies. Oftentimes the priest or preacher will say something like if any one here can show just cause why this couple should not be lawfully joined together in holy matrimony, let them speak now or forever to hold their peace. That comes from the caroling gene. Empire’s effort to root out incest meaning marriage with cousins, and you get everyone together, and you say, Ok, are these two related in any way? Does anybody know how they might be related? And that’s essentially what that is?
Ah! So eventually the church begins in late antiquity bands first cousin marriage, but it eventually goes out to six cousins, and then it contracts a bit in twelve, fifteen. Ah! Down to third cousins, but still pretty broad incest taboos, Remember, most societies have cousin marriage. Seventy five percent of them.
Polygamy also is banned. Europeans had polygamy like crazy secondary wives all that kind of stuff before the church.
Um no arranged marriages so very common cross-culturally the church required bride to the the Christian marriages still have. The bride has to say I do. At one point Most societies don’t ask the bride her opinion. Ah, but so the church forces that, and the priest is supposed to be checking. Right? Okay, you’re good with this right?
And the church also discourages corporate ownership. So they wanted people to be able to give the church land, and if the uncles can get a hold of the land after their brother dies, the church can’t get their hands on it, so they they try to confine ownership to the individual and prevent collateral inheritance.
So the a great book to read about this is Jack Goody’s development of the church and family and marriage in Europe.
Oh, gosh! What happened to this slide? Um. Okay. So this is just the same thing I was showing you before, and i’m going to focus on this link and this link, all right. So the first thing that I may need to persuade you of is that there’s a lot of psychological variation around the world, and if you didn’t know about this, you’d be forgiven. Because if you take a course in social psychology, there’s a social psychology text which presents it. As if this is how people think, when actually it to how weird people think uh. So just to give you a sense. This is a measure of individualism around the world. Ninety-six percent of psychology studies are with European descent populations, the Us. Primarily. So they’re studying some of the most psychologically unusual populations around the world. Similar things with differences between trust in your out group versus trust in your in group.
This affects beliefs and preferences. So here i’m thinking of economists. But if you’re a cognitive scientist, it also affects attention, memory, perception, reasoning, decision, styles, and and a challenge. I have yet to find a decision-making heuristic, prevented by the found by the behavioral economist that doesn’t vary across societies. There’s either no evidence or I can show you there’s a variation.
And I’m going to focus on individualism in personal trust conformity and and patients which, at least to an intuitive first approximation, might affect economic outcomes.
Okay, Now, one thing I have a caveat, which is that people from societies tend to think traits that promote success in their society are good. Ah! And so they tend to negatively balance things. And some people think you know. Why are you saying bad things about these people calling them conformists?
You know it’s thinking of a more conformist society. But in those societies being a conformist, is good, so um conformity is well-studied. So if you show Americans parents with their child behaving in a conformist way in a Nonconformist way. The American parents like the non-conformist They’ll be like that Kid’s smart, you know, we we like that kid. Whereas if you go to other societies and show a conformist and a non-conformist child you know same videos, they pick the other kid Mit.
Okay, Now, I want to give you a sense of why our psychology would vary. So i’m going to think about an intensive tin based society and a weak kinship society.
So in an intensive kinship society you get your relationships at birth, and a lot of life is about figuring out how to navigate those relationships live up to your responsibilities.
You can form to the roles and obligations of this society might be. Why, conformity is good? Because you’re trying to. You know not shame anybody Now, in a weak kinship. Society, you don’t have very many family connections. You have to find your ah mates and friends and partners and all that kind of thing by cultivating a set of attributes that make you interesting to other people. So maybe you want to be creative or trustworthy or honest mit seek. Others based on attributes and mutual interests, seek new relationships based on existing network connections. So in lots of places you’re not worried about whether someone has a trustworthy disposition.
You want to have a lot of social connections to them, because if you do, you know, they’ll behave in a business relationship, say, and and other kinds of relationships. It’s the linkage between ah people. So trust is based on embedded embeddedness and trust, based on dispositions.
Ah, these these tend to be shame oriented. So you’re trying to not violate social norms. If you do, other members of your family could experience shame so social standards here. Here. Guilt is often your personal standards, so I might feel guilty for not going to the gym, because i’m trying to stay in shape. But my neighbor doesn’t care about that. And if they find out my brother’s not going to experience shame. But i’m feeling guilt, something like that.
And here your identity is based on relationships and network. And here it’s that set of cultivated traits on the scientist. I’m a kayaker, that sort of thing.
Okay. Now, empirically, the case we set out for ourselves in the science paper was we needed to connect the church to kinship. We need to be able to connect kinship to weird psychology, and if both of these hold we should also be able to do this.
So. Ah! We have the kinship, intensity, index, which I told you about. We also got a lot of data on cousin marriage. We can do that within Europe based on dispensation requests. And then we also have measures from this biologist in bittles, and then we have measures of the duration of the church’s marriage and family program which we can calculate globally or within different European regions based on the diffusion of bishoprics.
I’ll say more about that in a second. So this just gives you a sense of cousin marriage around the world. One in ten marriages even today, is between cousins, the pashtun in in Afghanistan, fifty, two percent cousin marriage. That’s the Taliban as a pashtun organization.
So I want to avoid doing. I can show you I can show you seventeen different plots like this for seventeen different psychological variables cross nationally.
But let me summarize all that, and it summarizes nicely by this plot more centuries under the church for a population less cousin marriage. The same would be true if I put kinship intensity as measured from the ethnographic atlas, so that link holds cross nationally, more cousin marriage, less individualism and impersonal psychology. So people are less individualists more relationally oriented. And then, finally, we can go this way, and in all of our analysis we always do. The Eastern Church, which had a kind of a soft, less enthusiastic version of the marriage and family program that the Western Church imposed to dismantle the family structures in Western Europe. So you often see a weak but positive correlation with the Eastern Church, and then the strong result with the Western Church. So with the crossnet we see lots of variation cross nationally it roughly seems to pattern how we think it might pattern.
But we want to dig in and see if we can get closer to you know, build more confidence in that. There’s really a relationship here.
So my collaborator, Jonathan Shilts, created a database of the diffusion of Catholic bishoprics through Europe. So we have a Gps location and a year, and so we can use that to assign a dosage to each place, and this is actually spiraling through time. So it just started. You’ll see certain places turn gray.
That’s because that part of the of Europe was under a political power unfriendly to the Bishop of Rome. So the Pope in Rome you’ll see. Southern Spain deal is so Sicily. Well, Sicily’s under Islamic powers.
Okay. So you get this variation in dosages. We have the Carolingian Empire here, which which may come up later, and we have also the the Iron Curtain, both of which we have to deal with in the analysis.
But just ah! To to measure psychology. We use questions from the European Social Survey. Um, I won’t. Go into the detail, but they asked about conformity and obedience, individualism, independence, impersonal fairness, and in personal trust. So we get variation around through hundreds of thousands of Europeans. Ah, contemporary, and we see if we can explain the variation, and what we find is that regions. So we have four hundred and forty, two European regions that had more exposure to the Church mit ctl, and have greater impersonal fairness, greater impersonal trust, less conformity and obedience, and greater individualism independence. So we’re only comparing Europeans and Europeans. Here we’re just doing it within the same country. And so we’re comparing different regions of the same country two.
We can hold individual demographics, so sex, age, h squared income and education are important ones. They don’t seem to do much work at all.
Geography, climate, the influence of Roman roads, initial prosperity. We also put in medieval universities, monasteries, and the Carolingian Empire. One of one of the most persuasive analyses for me was when we threw out Western Europe, and we just do this analysis on Eastern Europe, and we find we can explain this variation in these aspects of psychology within Eastern Europe.
Okay, Um. We also managed to get some cousin marriage data. And so this is the percentage of cousin marriage on a log scale, and that’s conformity. So more cousin marriage in Italy, Spain, France, and Turkey, we get greater conformity and obedience, less impersonal trust
and less individualism, independence, and less impersonal fairness. So interestingly, Turkey, which actually has a very different history right from places like France, they fall right where they should be on the plot. Once we know the rates of cousin marriage, so one of the differences could be this shift in kinship.
Um, i’m actually going to just really short-circuit this because i’m looking at the clock. But we did this trick, which is a fantastic trick from economics, where we look only at second-generation immigrants. So these are people who grew up their whole lives in Europe, but their parents come from somewhere else, and we can actually tag them to an ethnic group.
We tagged that individual who grew up entirely in Europe with a kinship intensity, or a cousin marriage rate from where their parents came from, and then we can predict aspects of their psychology and control for their income and all that sort of thing all right.
Okay, Now, one of the things I wanted to explain in the weirdest people in the world was that industrial revolution simple topic, because it shouldn’t take long. Ah! And i’m interested in this idea of the collective brain which I develop in the secret of our success. And there the idea is pretty simple. It’s that most innovations are recombinations of different ideas. So the things that should feed into that you want larger populations. You want more cognitively diverse populations, and you want more free flow amongst individuals. So we can get together and swap ideas.
So that’s the basic idea of the collective brain, and I apply it to you, fluid social interactions among cognitively diverse individuals. And I look at the institutions, and I also look at the psychological relationships between innovation and and those psychological traits, but something like the journeyman phase. And an apprenticeship means You’ve apprenticed under a master, and you’re probably he’s probably not your father, which is unlike many places or another kin kinfolk, and then you have to go to somewhere far away. It’s. Like a post-doc, go somewhere far away and hang out with a bunch of other people who apprentice under somebody. It seems like a perfect environment for creating recombinations of diverse ideas one hundred and fifty.
But in elsewhere. If you look at India, you read the literature on apprenticeship. There you look at China. Their clans wanted to keep secrets, or there were regional specializations. Nobody wanted to share information.
And then, finally, the psychological factors that’ll create this recombination. Of course, the crucial here is is tolerance.
Okay. So to try to put this to the test. Uh, I started working with Slava Savinsky, who’s in the crowd, and Jonathan Schultz, uh former postdoc in my lab, and we took the patent database from uh one thousand nine hundred and eighty to two thousand and fourteen, and that gives us a Let’s see. This gives us a measure of patents across Europe, and the idea is, is, we think, that you know, the social networks which allow people to swap. Ideas are going to promote more patent and greater individual, is a nonconformity and impersonal trust. Those same measures that I just told you vary around Europe should lead to more patenting. So does all this psychology stuff I’m talking about on this survey, which you know just could be a bunch of survey answers, but as a cash out and more patents, and we also have the same measure. So again, our hands are tied right. We already tied our hands in the science paper.
So these are the new patent database that Slava put together. You can see It’s these very small nuts, three regions in Europe, so over one thousand four hundred regions, and then we have our measures of ah trust, fairness, individualism, and conformity. And the basic question is, is, Can we explain the patents using those as a first step, and what we find is that we can take each of these pieces of psychology, and each one of them will explain patents in a regression holding the country constant and and other stuff. So a standard deviation increase in weirdness, or in in any of these four traits, will lead to between a point two, seven, and point four, three increase in patents. So that’s a pretty good increase in patents and patent. Here is my measure of innovation. There’s lots of interesting arguments about how good a measure that is. But it does seem to have some some value if we do a principal components on these four pieces of psychology and get a single dimension. We get over half a standard deviation increase in patenting across these different regions. So just a quick look at the standard economics table. So this is each of the four, and the weird psychology with the principal component um country fixed effects, so only comparing people in the same country all the standard battery of of geographic controls and things like that, so that suggests that innovation might be related to psychology. We can do the same thing with our nuclear families. They still vary across Europe, and and we have a measure of that. Or we have this measure of Facebook friends. So what percentage of Facebook friends are over one hundred miles away, And we use that to explain the patents. So, just to give you an example of the kind of result a one standard deviation increase in far away Facebook trends increases. Ah! By a quarter of a standard deviation. Patents per capita across these different regions. So this network thing seems to hold, and we think they’re co-evolving with the psychology right? So so those are correlated. But can we go from the church. So this is our medieval church exposure. Bin scatter plot. So each of those dots is a combination of of dots and patents per capita. So it’s a partial regression plot, more church exposure, more patents per capita.
Okay, and just the the long arm of history here. So patents per capita is the thing we’re trying to explain. And medieval church exposure is Ah is we? Can. We can still pick up that long arm, and i’m making the case that this is due to its effect on psychology and families.
This holds even when we use small administrative regions. So these are subnational regions. So we’re really only comparing people that leave which in some small part of Germany rather than all of Germany and all of France, those kinds of things.
Okay, um. I took this out, but somehow I must have not saved that version of the Powerpoint. Ah, so this I just find it amazing, and i’ll just mention it here because it’s the slide is here, but we have our centuries under the medieval church, and that predicts patents.
But then Jonathan Shilts had gone through the records. You know some historians had helped them a lot, and he found that at these different Bishop Bricks they took attendance when they had a big meeting, and we know all the issues. They talked about. The church keeps good written records at the meeting, and we know who attended. So we have an attendance list.
So Jonathan was able to put together a data set that has, whether the bishops in different parts of Europe actually attended the meetings where incest legislation was discussed, and that picks up some additional variation in patents. So the idea is, the Bishop goes to the meeting. He gets fired up about stamping out incest mit Ctl, and people believed it was causing all kinds of problems, right? So people were marrying their cousins, and God was angry. And so he was sending plagues and ah, economic hardship and things like that. So it’s like a public health campaign. So we had to get rid of the incest one.
Okay, Now this. Uh i’m always nervous when I present Iv regressions in front of economists.
So here here the idea is, we think that there’s a case that can be made that medieval church. The Church is kind of expanding ideosyncratically wherever it sees a a chance to to kind of get a foothold, and wars are one in law, sometimes by a single battle due to luck. So maybe this is exogenous. But so we use medieval church exposure to predict aspects of psychology which it does nicely. I already do that from the science paper, and then we use the predicted values uh to predict patents per capita, and it comes out. It comes out very nicely.
Maybe there was the ah, maybe this fits the required restriction. Um, exclusion, restriction. Maybe it doesn’t, but we did that, and we can show the same thing if we do it this way, where we’re looking at the social network data, the Facebook friends or the um nuclear family households, so that seems to make the connection there and then. Finally, I’ll just very briefly touch on this.
There’s a bunch more analyses in this paper, but One of the things we did was that Carolingian Empire. The historians tell us that the the Carolingians So this is Charlemagne, eight hundred Ce. He. He teams up with the Church and the Popes, and they really try to impose the marriage and family program within the boundaries of the Carolingian Empire.
And if that story holds, we should be able to find that there is a drop off in patents when you cross the border of the Carolingian Empire. So if we can do it for the full sample, but we can also do it for different parts of the Carolingian Empire around Europe, and we get the same result in each piece of Europe.
Um. And again, you know, keeping country constant, at least for those first.
Okay, All right. So that is the basic picture. So there. I’m. Making the case that events that happened with how the Church transformed the family led to differences in psychology and social structure that have implications for innovation today
in the weirdest people in the world. I try to look at different places as well. So kinship intensity varies a lot within China, and even among high Han Chinese and researchers. I’m. Here I’m. Drawing mostly on Thomas Talhelm, but but others have argued that Patty Rice, agriculture, and also environmental risk based on monsoons has affects the presence of clans, and these lineages that spread after one thousand Ce.
So Paddy rice leads to greater kinship intensity, and Thomas has shown by collecting data all around China that that’s associated with ah, greater analytic thinking, more individualistic self-concept and less in group loyalty. So it fits the same pattern of psychological variation. If you just look at Han Chinese within China, and it’s based here in kinship variation, but not due to the church due to ecological factors that affect kinship, intensity since the book. Ah, Augustine Bergeron, an economist who who graduated from Harvard economics. He has looked at the way in which he’s looked at the democratic Republic of Congo, and he has people living in the same city of Conanga,
and he traces them back to their natal villages, and then he asks how close those Natal villages are to historical Christian missions, and the closer the Natal villages are to the historical Christian missions, the lower the kinship, intensity of the individuals, and the higher they are on moral universalism and lower on in group loyalty. So to see the same pattern just analyzing populations within the Drc. Where here it’s through Christian missions.
And then, finally, this recent paper by the folks at the University of British Columbia, Goshen colleagues.
What they do is they look at State law. So European populations are expanding across the Us. And some of them are isolated. Their cousin marriage crops back up because the Protestantism didn’t embody the same taboos as the Church. Uh cousin. Marriage spreads a bit, States imposed laws that banned cousin marriage, and he’s able to show that that reduces the amount of cousin marriage, and then that leads to a greater income and urbanization in the longer run. So that’s the ghost paper.
Okay, so ah, final take-home messages is that i’m making the case that we can think about culture systematically. It’s something We can measure shapes, economic and political outcomes.
What I actually presented is not a story of historical, of historical persistence, but is actually a story of historical change. So the Church gets these different peculiar views about marriage in the family, and they then use that to T, or that ends up, leaving them to transform the families of Europe, and that change, then leads to different cultural evolutionary trajectories and economic growth.
Um, Okay, Crucially, here is the idea that institutions and psychology co-evolve. So our minds have all that plasticity because we’re a cultural species, and we’re responding and and learning ways to better navigate the cultural worlds that we confront, and it affects lots of features of our our psychology.
And then, lastly, ah! You know the the place where we’re coming from takes evolution very seriously, so you can’t get kin based institutions correct. Unless you realize we have pair bonding, We have kin based altruism, and we have incest avoiders which gives incest taboos their power psychologically. And it also means that kinship institutions will always reassert themselves. So they’re somehow more natural than anonymous and personal institutions where you have to be nice to strangers and things like that one.
A Fast Green Energy Transition is Likely to be Cheaper than Business as Usual
J. Doyne Farmer is Director of the Complexity Economics program at the Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, Baillie Gifford Professor in the Mathematical Institute at the University of Oxford and an External Professor at the Santa Fe Institute. His current research is in economics, including agent-based modeling, financial instability and technological progress.
In this presentation at Harvard Kennedy School, Prof. Farmer shares new research that shows that wind, solar, and other renewables would deliver energy security to the world and save $12 trillion by 2050.
Transcript
DISCLAIMER: This webinar transcript was loosely edited and there may be inaccuracies.
Farmer: It’s great to be here. The work I’m going to talk about today grew out of a visit in two thousand and eight by the Director of the National Renewable Energy Lab, Dan Arvizu, who came to SantaFe Institute to ask us if we could help them think out of the box, and what were they missing? And during the course of that visit, and a workshop, it became clear to me that the costliness, and the correct path to dealing with climate change really depended on not what technologies cost now, but what technologies will cost twenty years from now. So that set me on a path of trying to understand, to try to produce reliable answers to that question. And so that’s what this talk is about.
Now, just to provide a little context, energy makes about seventy five percent of emissions. So, if we can make the green energy transition, we’ve made most of the transition we need to make to deal with climate change, or at least to stop increasing Greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
And the punchline that I’m going to deliver is that we can, and I’ll come back and discuss what “can” means, make green energy transition quickly in a profit, and I’ll throw out a scenario at least a possible scenario for doing that discuss a little bit about the possible roadblocks to making that happen. Now, most of the story is in this plot that I’m showing here, which is giving the history of the evolution of the global energy landscape over the last one hundred and forty years.
And so, we see in the panel on the left, where we update on the x-axis, and cost measured in standard units on the Y-axis we see the price of various forms of making energy through time. For example, here’s the prices of coal prices of oil, coal fired electricity. And so, you see they’re kind of bouncing around, and one of the striking things about this is while they wiggle, there’s no overall trend. In fact, I remember at this meeting in two thousand and nine. Dan saying, well, solar energy prices are coming down. And Dan saying, well, how do you know that coal prices aren’t going to do that, too? And that actually ended up with a paper that James wrote on the cost of coal-fired electricity, showing that yes, it did actually come down for a while. But then it went back up, decomposing that and finding the causes. And you know the main cause is that ultimately cold, for electricity is going to money about coal, which, as you can see from here and comes down in mathematical tests, is essentially flat over time.
These be a very different week than these. So, you see solar energy, wind batteries, electrolyzers. And so those have been coming down quite systematically through time.
And at present we’re in a peculiar state where we have many different sources of energy that are all competing around roughly the same cost. So, you can see it’s very unusual. This over here shows history of energy, so you can see traditional biomass remaining roughly constant, coal becoming dominant, oil and gas rising through time, nuclear power rising and then flattening out, and then once again solar energy when batteries, electrolyzers all shooting up and race where they’re being deployed at around forty percent per year.
So solar energy has been increasing deployment at forty percent per year. For the last thirty years it’s been dropping a price in ten percent per year for the last thirty years, which is something unique in terms of historical energy supply. So, the question is, what are these going to do? Are they going to just flatten out and remain around the same price level with the other ones? Or are they going to continue to drop? And so that’s what this talk is about, and then putting that together to think about the whole green energy transition. And, by the way, stop me at any point, if you have questions.
So, I’m just going to make a few observations about technological change. So, these are empirical observations, which is that first of all technologies, improve at very different rates, rates that are technology specific.
These rates are highly persistent, and this only becomes clear if you look at granular data, so you can really identify individual technologies and there’s an identified identification question. We can come back to say more about if people are interested. But for now, let’s say there’s a such thing as a technology that you can track the cost of through time.
I’m going to argue we can use this to make predictions in one of several ways. One is to just note the trend. So here we take a span of over twenty years. The price changes in goods ranging from hospital services to television sets all starting at some standardized zero point, and we see that over those twenty years hospital services went up by two hundred and twenty five percent. The quality adjusted price of televisions went down by ninety-five percent. So, in other words, by a fact, television has dropped in price by the fact of twenty over those twenty years hospital services went up by a factor of two or two and a quarter, and so this illustrates the point about diversity. It also illustrates my point about persistence. Hospital services went up every year. Television sets dropped every year. So, these changes were quite persistent through time.
This illustrates the point about heterogeneity from a different point of view. So, we take the price indices for us, goods relevant for us, manufacturing from one thousand nine hundred and fifty, eight to two thousand and eleven. Group them by type, and what you can in this re-plot. Now make a histogram of the average annual growth rate set for the price, and you can see that most things like here is a valve middle that most things sit on, and most things are not too far away from just going along with the herd, the herds moving at the inflation.
But then there’s some set of things. In this case, all computer electronics related things that are dropping in a cost in a much higher rate, suggesting that the heterogeneity of rates of change is a highly skewed distribution with a heavy tail on the positive side. We’ve done some other work that’s not yet published that reinforces this point of view.
It’s not just computers that do this, though they were one of the main things to do. So how do we take advantage of this? Well, we’re going to make use of empirical laws for forecasting technological costs based on historical data. The most famous of these is Moore’s law, so more in one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five made a pronouncement that semiconductor devices increased in density, on chips and identity, increased roughly, became twice as great every two years.
He later on, adjusted the timescale that I always mix up which way the adjustment went. But it’s been a remarkably accurate prediction now over a seventy-year span. There’s another, even older author, who is a very interesting figure. He is the brother of Seoul Wright, who is a famous evolutionary biologist, and Theodore Wright, who was considered one of the founders of political science, but he was the black sheep of the family who went off to World War. I became a flying ace and went to the aviation business, and in one thousand nine hundred and thirty-six he wrote his one academic paper, just mentioning that the cost of producing a specific airplane from a specific factory drops by twenty percent every time the cumulative production of that airplane doubles just an empirical observation.
And so this is an example of that actually, that I think James prepared for me a long time ago, and since then there have been a thousand papers written about Wright’s law looking at all kinds of other technologies, and demonstrating that they did this and the law is also moved from being about a specific item from a specific factory to being about much broader items like solar photovoltaic cells rather than globally, rather than solar and photovoltaic cells produced by a specific factory. And that’s the sense in which I’m going to be using here.
Wright, by the way, went on to become the head of an aircraft manufactured during World War II. And used its own law to successfully forecast the cost of aircraft production during World War II. And I’ll come back and say a little more about.
So, Wright’s law looks like this. If you put it magnetically, it says that X is the cumulative production that the cost of a good or positive technology drops its X to some power omega where omega is technology-specific and omega would be a positive number here for meeting. The cost goes down.
Now, here’s an example with four different technologies, transistors global takes Art describes in ethanol where we plot the total cumulative production on the x-axis and the average unit price and dollars on this axis and notice the plots are in log scale. So, the power law turns into a straight way, and this gives you some feeling abruptly. It’s not perfect. It varies in how well things stick to these curves depending on the technology. That also seems to be technology specific, but the pattern is pretty clear.
Now you might ask, where does Wright’s law come from? So, I would say it’s not very clear. But the best explanation is due to James McNerney and me and Redner and Trance. And so, we built on a model actually by John Muth, who, if for those of you who are economists, is the original, the original architect of rational expectations in economics. So, but he also did in those days non-rational thing, like ass ing that engineers just go dart to the dartboard, and what engineers are capable of doing is picking out which dark foes are better than which, and taking going with the best solution they found. And so, it turns out this gives you something like it also actually makes a prediction about how Omega scales with the complexity of the design of the device. As devices become more complex or less modular, then improvement becomes more difficult because you have to coordinate improvements across more pieces.
But let me just say I don’t think we fully understand Wright’s Law and Wright’s law. Certainly, also it’s a proxy in that cumulative production is presumably just a proxy for level of effort. And so cumulative production is much easier to measure than level of effort.
We took this, and actually several other laws like Moore’s law, and acquired a Library of Technologies, History of Technological Costs through time, and tested this and tested actually several other laws. We tested seven candidate laws, and we did this by, pretending to be in in the past, that, as we pretend to be at a given time in the past. We forecast each future date from that point in the past. If we didn’t know anything about the future, we repeated, after all, past days, and we scored the methods based on their forecasting errors, and we made an assumption that the improvement process is the same for all technologies except for parameters.
We’ll see more about that in a minute, so that allowed us to test our forecast. Now, the data set we tested on is shown here, and, as you can see immediately. It’s a bit of a monthly data set. There were fifty different technologies, chemical processes shown in black here, computer hardware shown in red. Actually, that day we got reward and more of a stop con er goods like beer energy related data sets their genomics.
So, we have several different data sets. The data was acquired by just basically grabbing every data set we could find where we had the cost versus time for a specific technology. And the data was put together by my postdoc, Bayla, Naj. Together with that help of some high school students, we wrote a paper actually testing this testing these different laws, and we showed that basically Wright’s law and Moore’s law came in with roughly a tie in this data set.
And we also did some things to try and understand how large the errors were, but for various reasons we couldn’t properly test this. Now, the side anecdote I can never resist telling is that, well, one of the things we showed was an equivalence between Moore’s law and the Wrights Law, and that if costs are dropping exponentially in time and deployments increasing exponentially in time. It’s easy to show that Wright’s law will haul under those circumstances, and that was the case for these fifty technologies.
This was originally pointed out by a fellow named Sahat Sahel, who wrote several books on technological change in the Eighty’s, and who mysteriously disappeared. One day the hell just vanished, and nobody knows what happened, and Bala became obsessed with Sahal, corresponded with his brother, and then, about two years later, he mysteriously disappeared. So, I’m sorry. I just can’t assist telling this. I was, you know Hope Vale is out there doing something good somewhere.
I’m not planning on mystery. So, I’m not obsessed with this. But anyway, thanks to Bailey’s work that we managed to put this data set.
Now, how did we model technological change? So, we rewrote Wrights law, which you would write just said, there’s a deterministic law that people have historically said, using regressions. We instead turned it into a Time series model. So, we rewrote it as a geometric random walk with drift.
That depends on where the rate of the drift depends on cumulative production of the good. And so, if y now is the logarithm of the cost, so the difference between the amount that the cost drops in, say, a year, is proportional to some constant omega times, the logarithm of the ratio of the accumulative production in here t plus one to your plus a noise term that has some scale.
So, this expression has two free parameters, Omega and S. And we ass e that all technologies follow this process. We take the data, and we fit Omega and pass from the data and on past data. And then we use that to predict future data.
Now, the key thing that we did was to derive expressions. For how accurate the forecasts are that is, let’s ass e the world really does follow this process, and to make things even simpler, Let’s say that this noise process is an Iv normally distributed.
I thought of the time that was going to be heroic assumption, because I ass e that this would be entail for the structure breaks and so on, but at least for the data step that we applied it to. To our surprise, it fit amazingly well, and we were able to derive expression for the normalized errors. That is, if this epsilon here is the absolute value of the squared error, and this K. Hat. Excuse me, that should have been s in the previous slide. I don’t know my slide’s consistent, so that’s the same as big as there, then, the ratio of these scales like this,
The normalizing constant that determines what the error is, has a term that’s proportional, to which is the forecasting horizon end of the future. So, because this is a diffusive process, then there’s a there’s the squared error goes according to scales, according to Tau, and actually, you know.
And then there’s another term that goes according to Tau Square, which has to do with the Estimation error. Where M. Is the number of data points in the data set that you’re fitting this okay. So, in other words, you take some data, and you do your best job to fit the parameters.
Then the error you will find a basis expression where this is a student distribution with M one degrees of freedom, so you can just derive this by from saying that the world follows this kind of process. And so, this clock over here shows what happens. The green line is the T distribution. The
The black line is what happens if we just ass e the simple geometric random walk, and the red line is what happened when we ass ed a random walk with put a little bit of correlation in positive correlation. So, in other words, what we found is to make this work. We had to ass e that the improvement rates are correlated from year to year.
And so, this is the result of making six thousand roughly forecasts for all horizons up to twenty years, and then taking all the data from fifty different technologies and twenty different horizons, and a bunch of different forecasts, and putting it all into one bin, and seeing whether it followed this law that we predicted a prior hold, and I should say, if I don’t, this is with Francois Hollande.
Well, we’ve actually showed this first for Moore’s law, and then there’s a paper with a bunch of authors led by Francois that chose it for my song, because Wrights law was a bit harder to juice. So, what we found is that we could not reject our null hypothesis, which surprised us.
Audience Member: Did you try with opening data and using the datasets to test by making predictions about this?
Doyne Farmer: That’s exactly what we did. So, we went. We did this process here. So, we pretended to be in the past, using only the data we had up to that point in time.
And yeah, and we actually did things like systematically look if we only use the five most recent points. We always saw that you always want to use the most data you can. Processes are surprisingly stationary.
Yes, you’re treating wars wrong and right. It’s all in some sense sort of in people handed way. And there, you know, right conceptually, you’re very, very, very different. Yeah, one of them is really the learning by doing deal.
Yeah, if the factory just takes a break, it because of a labor strike for years. One of them is you’re marching along the other. See that you’re just chilling out for a while. Yeah, I totally agree. And so, this has been debated in the literature which works better. And so, to try and resolve this question Francophone, Diana Greenwald and me.
I wrote a paper where Diana managed to acquire lots of data from World War II, which is a good natural experiment for us, because, unlike these other technologies here, that just, you know, are coming down smoothly over time and are being ramped up exponentially over time in World War II. The Us. Went from the eighteenth-largest military to producing two over three of the military, both sides. By so we got data on the costs of five hundred different types of military equipment. The data was crude. In other respects, we really only had started endpoints.
We did have the whole time series for maybe a hundred and basically what we were able to show by a lot. And let me say the key thing there is that the deployment ramped up enormously, and then it went back down, plunged out as the war was ending, so from that we could see that two things one is, the causality flows from. There is a strong element of causality flowing from cumulative production to cost, that is, and there was also an overall trend. Everything came down during that period.
And so, in other words, there was an exponential trend. But it we ass e the same exponential trend. For all of them there was, but there was also a significant, very significant Wrights law component.
Yeah, we are doing and the exactly right. So that suggests that there is the causality there, and that’s why, in what I’m going to show you in a minute. We’re going to use Wrights law rather than north long.
No, there’s some problems with that, too, that maybe I can come out and talk about it, you know. Then you get these miraculous things. If you don’t continue
Well, I mean you do even better if you have wars law.
So, it’s even more miraculous in that case, and a key clarifying remark in the study. We had to war, too. We ass e the same exogenous trend for all five hundred technologies to make this work for individual technologies. You really have to ass e very different trends for different technology.
And so, the exogenous trend that we saw in World War II Doesn’t really seem to explain more as well. Here, I think Moore’s law is really explained by the fact that lots of technologies happen to have exponentially increasing production exponentially driving across. Let me just emphasize again that different technologies improve at really different rates. Here is coal. Here’s the price of the coal in terms of, you know, lots of electricity you can generate what call. And here’s soarable political takes. And here’s nuclear power.
So, technologies behave really differently. Now we’ll move to talking about climate change. How long will it take for technologies to mitigate climate change? What’s the right investment strategy which technologies should we support, and how much will it cost?
So let me just show what happens when you apply the kind of thing to extension to four key technologies for dealing with climate change. So, we have in the Solar Vaughan able tanks. We’re plotting a logarithm of cost versus the logarithm of an experience. It’s just a shorthand for cumulative production. The same for wind and lithe batteries and p two x electrolyzers p two x means power to something, so that you start with electricity. You make hydrogen, and you use hydrogen and make a fuel like ammonia, or one of several other possible lyrics here for forecasts.
So, the Black Doc should the historical values through time. And if you stare at this for a while, you can see that it works pretty Well, that is, things tend to stay near the center of demand that were forecast, and they never actually straight outside of the ninety five percent confidence maybe one point two and you would expect them to do one time and twenty-Two x electrolyzers. You can see our regions are a lot sooner, because we have less data, and the data is noisy. Remember, there’s two technology-specific parameters one for the rate of improvement and one for the so this is just to give you a flavor for how this might apply to energy.
I also just want to remark that, you know. Now this isn’t so surprising because over the last fifteen years people were very aware that solar energy has dropped to be competitive. But back in two thousand and ten I actually made a forecast nature, and we predicted that it would. Its cost would follow all that of nuclear energy or call. And just to illustrate that at the time, like in two thousand and fourteen. The economist was still saying solar power. It’s by far the most expensive way to reduce carbon emissions. So we were, I was moderately successful in forecasting in contrast, the integrated assessment models and the International Energy Agency have done an extremely bad job of forecasting both deployment and cost of renewable energy, and consistently getting pessimistic about it here’s a plot where we’ve taken the data here plotted it in semi-log scale And so you see a rough, noisy, exponential decline, and you see forecasts made in the past that all go out of the slopes that are quite different from the historical slope. Here we made a histogram of about three thousand different predictions by various integrated assessment models that reported in two thousand and fourteen for the cost, for the rate at which solar would drop between two thousand and ten and two thousand and twenty. And this is the histogram of the forecast the most optimistic ones. This is what actually happened.
And similarly, if you look at integrated assessment models, they typically put in what are called floor costs, they ass e that there’s some cost where that the technology can’t go below. So, in these models they ass e they’ll follow Wrights law for a while, but then they’ll hit these floors and flatten out. They do this because otherwise, and that the answers become unstable. And this just shows historical floor costs compared with historical costs, showing that it just plunged right through the forecast as they then put up. And my forecast.
These models, by the way, also have deployment constraints. They put in constraints in the rate of deployment, and one of the problems with these
The evaluation of the scenario depends strongly on these two things, which have been more or less arbitrary. We’ve never seen any evidence for floor costs, so we don’t put them in to what we’re doing now.
So, we’re going to provide an alternative, just doing something very simple. We’re going to forecast technological costs conditional on the point. So, we’ll throw out some scenarios. We can debate whether they’re plausible or not, and we’re going to make a few representative scenarios, and we’re going to Ass e that sector by sector useful energy demand continues to grow as it has been growing historically at two percent a year. So that is, we ass e that there aren’t any dramatic changes in lifestyle or anything like that, apply the methods I just mentioned, and then we just add up the cost of the technologies needed to make the energy sector work.
We say that our fast transitions in our other and key technologies are solar global tanks with batteries and P. And we are picking these well, we’re picking these in part, because we think they’re good horses to bet on, but also because they have extensive data. There are other things that might may prove to be very important, like just moving power around and transmission lines which we don’t put in there because we don’t have good historical data, or how the cost will.
So, we use Wrights law to extrapolate, but we extrapolate existing deployment terms in this solution. I’ll show you a moment. We phase out fossil fuels over the next twenty-five meters, and we rely heavily on Power Dx fuel for energy storage. So, we ass e that we actually make so much P. Two x fuels that we can run the entire global energy system for a month, even if there’s no sunlight or no wind, which is pretty conservative.
We also use pfix fuels for liquid fuels, for heat, shipping and air transport, and usages like that.
Now, in the fast transition, let me actually show you what we do in all three of the scenarios. We investigated these three four key technologies.
So, we shall hear the historical data for the deployment now with solar energy. So, the average, the annual generation in terrawy hours for each year we put a dashed red line through it, just to show the trend. And then this is our fast transition scenario. This is our slow transition scenario, and this is our business as usual.
So, I’m putting this up here hopefully to convince you that we’re not doing something that’s crazy. We’re extrapolating an existing trend. In fact, we begin falling off of that existing trend by the way, as solar reaches maturity, and starts to flatten out. But at this rate it does solar energy and wind. You can see here become dominant after about ten years, and the cut, and completely displays fossil fuels in about twenty years, twenty, five years.
So, this is the same thing for batteries, showing what we ass e for batteries in these three scenarios and p-tax tools, where we ass e for p-text goals that we do see on the existing historical tread for another decade, noting that this is a much less mature technology than the.
And by the way, this is standard and technology literature to ass e that you have s curves. That is, technologies tend to grow exponentially for a long period, and then they flatten out when they reach saturation. So that’s what we’re doing here. You guys have a question
I’m: a bit of course.
Yeah. Our original business. As usual, we more or less flattened this out to make it a straight line, and the referees complain that we were. We were that that wasn’t realistic. So, we saw that our business-as-usual scenario. It didn’t matter very much.
They’re only price projections for. Yeah. So, we are saying these are assumptions, and we’re then going to predict prices. It’s true that integrated assessment models try and predict both of those in tandem. I think that’s one of their problems. They’re doing something they can’t really do.
And if you were going to do it well, because these end up, depending very sensitively on the assumptions that I mentioned before through time, which is shown down here for the three different scenarios, and so that when we’re doing it for useful energy, which is the energy you actually use, the amount of work that actually comes out vital energy, which is saying one energy would be, How much gasoline we have for our useful energy is, how much, How many joules of work do you actually get out of your car, and this shows the requirements for electricity, for electricity, generation, and storage, and which is then showing that we are talking about ripping the rhythm quite substantially by about a factor of four in order to make this happen.
These show the forecast for some of the key technologies. I should mention that what you can use Wrights, law for oil and gas, and actually because for those for those technologies the omega parameters effectively zero. And so, you just get a random walk if you, if you use Wright’s law, Random Walk turns out to be too diffusive. That is, overspend of time longer than about twenty, ten years. Prices just scatter around too much. There’s some mean reversion, so we add in for fossil fuels. We probabilistic nature of our forecasts and maybe I didn’t stress that enough that that the generalization we make of Wright’s law isn’t just making point forecast. It’s predicting the probability of outcomes at different cost levels at different points in time. And what we tested was that probabilistic prediction. I think these are the one standard deviation and the two standard deviation error bars in the forecast you can see the uncertainty going through time and as we’re also comparing to forecast and existing integrated accessible models are making about what the class will be at points of time, just to illustrate that our predictions are still substantially different than those of the other models.
And so, this is kind of the punchline it’s showing that if this is under the three scenarios, so fast, transitions flow, transition, no transition. These are we get already right here. Fossil fuel expenditures are coming quite negligible. This is a graph of the media expenditures on energy in each of the years shown so two thousand and twenty to two thousand and seventy, and then looking at the non-fossil fuel expenditures versus fossil fuel expenditures. So, the white is non-fossil fuel expenditures, and the shaded is fossil fuel expenditures.
Here we show the net present cost so we ass e a discount rate, and to put all the different years together. For the investments we ah bring all the costs back to the present by discounting them. And this is what happens if you use a two percent discount rate.
And again, you see the fast transition, the slow transition, and the no transition illustrating the uncertainty, but also showing that the fast transition is on average cheaper than either of the other two cases. This shows the mean cost as a function of a discount rate, illustrating that we don’t need to argue about the discount rate the amount we save changes, but the fast transition is the cheapest regardless. And finally, these are mentioned sort of for the vast composition of the time, and compared with the slow transition, or for no transition.
Maybe I’ll just make a remark about technology investment portfolios. We have a paper where we look at investing in technology as a generalized process. And one of the things we showed is that you can’t use intuition from finance. One hundred and one mark. Markowitz’s portfolio theory doesn’t work at all in this domain, because you know it in Markowitz’s portfolio theory, says that if you have a bunch of assets, and if you have a positive return on all the assets, if they’re not perfectly correlated, then you should diversify by scattering your bets across all the assets.
But if all these assets are following Wright’s law, there’s something very different, because to make progress down the learning curve you have to invest in them. And so, if you really knew which one had the best characteristics, you should just pick that one in with all your money.
But if you have uncertainty, then you need to spread your resources across the assets. And so, with a situation. You’re in a technical technology investment case shows you don’t want to put one egg and every basket you don’t want to put all your eggs in one basket you want to decide. You want to put Ah, most of your eggs in a small number of baskets, depending on how much uncertainty you have, and what the situation is, and it also shows that you get a lot of extreme sensitivity in these kinds of portfolios.
No, this is. This is a good time you asked about direct to your capture directly or captured with fossil fuels.
Yeah, and that would be additional. So, you would integrate. Put that in with an additional ranch law thing that you have. Yeah, So I can. Of course, we don’t have enough data to estimate anything.
Yeah, I mean. There is some historical data on direct air capture, and it doesn’t look good. It hasn’t come down. The other thing is direct. Air capture depends on fossil fuels being competitive without direct air capture, we predict that we’re going to reach a point where that’s not going to happen where that will be true fairly soon. So, if fossil fuels aren’t competitive without trick or capture, they certainly are competitive with it, and you know also direct. Your capture has all their kind of characteristics that make me think it’s not going to come down very much, but that’s more of a subjective judgment.
Now, that’s different from asking. The question of, are we going to need to use? Direct our capture to just pull C O. Two out of the air in the future? And that’s another story. And you know here again what we’re predicting. It helps that because we’re predicting electricity should become very cheap, particularly if you don’t need to deal with storage, and so, so, you know, you could easily imagine that the cost of direct air capture is going to come down quite a bit, using solar electricity.
Now, of course, what I’ve been talking about so far relies on extrapolating technological trends. And you know, one would like to go to something more fundamental and understanding this problem. And so, we’ve been thinking about.
Excuse me, different ways of doing that., for one thing, let me just say a little bit about Wright’s law. You know Wright’s law is a crude approximation at best, because if you pick a given technology, say take solar formal tags. Well, it’s composed of different things. There is the cost of building the cell There’s a cost of putting up the frame that’s going to hold it in place. There is the installation cost, the distribution cost, and these things all behave differently. So generally, you want to decompose things as much as you can, and look at the scaling relationships separately.
This actually relates to a paper another paper of mine with James that James’s elite author on where James showed.
If you take industries and you ask what is driving the price index of an industry that most of the improvements in the price. Sixty-five percent of the improvements on average in the price index ministry come from price improvements, and the inputs to that industry.
So, to really do this better. You want to think about the economy on a more fine-grained scale, and you want to think about the interaction of the different technologies with each other. So, we’ve been working on trying to do that, making more disaggregated models, and maybe just lift the discussion up a little bit. We’ve been pursuing a method of sort of modeling climate economics in a distributed way with on one that we have our energy systems model, which, as I, you know, Virgin, I just described to you. We’re like, for example, making this be the regional instead of law, which already gives significant improvements in terms of providing better advice.
Trying to extract information. We have about technological change. For example, coming from analysis of the patent space where we see interesting patterns like,
Go back and look in the fifties nuclear power. If you do a page rank for Patents nuclear power, it sits in the middle and fossil fuel. Sit in the middle. If you do that now? Renewables in the middle and nuclear power and fossil fuels?
We work on green industrial strategies that is thinking about imports and export stuff that overlaps with the work. Ricardo’s group does think about production networks. So, we have models both at the level of industries and of firms going beyond traditional input output of ah models to make dynamic models which we may use up through a comment because it’s sort of a sign day. We’ve been talking about hooking this up with agriculture and land use models more sophisticated models of household. In fact, we have a model of occupational labor, diffusion.
And so, we’re doing work. Now we’re coupling together our forecast for what’s going to happen in the production network when we rewire from fossil fuels to solar power and wind and batteries and electrolyzers.
And then how does that play out in terms of occupational labor, and then thinking also about treaties and government, and how that interacts with all of this. So, we’re basically pursuing independent projects each of these pains, but also starting to think about how to paste them together, at least pairwise or triple-wise to make improved forecasts, and put in more fundamental information.
I think I think this suggests that doing the things that we need to do to support this.
Yeah. So well, that’s an interesting question in that. When you go back and stop start looking at raw materials like things, your things you mine out of the ground. It’s a quite striking, not well appreciated fact that actually James was the first person to introduce me to. James went, looked at the Usages data, and observed that that century of data for more than one hundred different and ah, he fit some time series models to those, and what you see is once you adjust for inflation, They’re all flat except one exception. Ah, industrial diamonds! Now, industrial diamonds aren’t something You might out of the ground they’ve dropped by a factor of one hundred. Everything else. Nothing has changed by more than a factor of ten in price over a century.
Now that suggests what so raw materials? If there are things you’re mining out of the ground. Why? Because they aren’t going to get much cheaper. What gets cheaper are the processes, for you know making them into things, and that’s where That’s where the progress
I mean. The other thing you might have asked about is shortages of essential materials.
My impression, Yeah, there may be some shortages of essential materials, but when you go back through the history of technologies, shortages of essential materials. Whenever there’s a bottle of actuative essential material. Another material is found that provides a workaround, and there are quite a few historical examples of that chlorophyll carbons for refrigeration, and many others.
So, to wrap up, I think. What are we shown? Well, first of all, I think it’s important it we’ve been. It’s been clear for some time that renewables were getting cheaper and cheaper, but people were still viewing the renewable energy transition or the green energy transition getting rid of greenhouse gases as a burden. Who’s going to take on that we’re saying, Actually, no, it’s going to be cheaper than going on the way we are now. So even if you’re a climate denier, you should be willing to j p on board to make this happen. And it also, I think, reframes the whole discussion from having climate change be a burden to have it being an economic opportunity, and the players who get involved. The firms and the countries who get involved are likely to require the expertise to be players in the economy in the future. And so, I think it really reframes the whole discussion.
Now we also, you know, as I said, we were just throwing out the scenarios as assumptions, not as something we’re driving from first principles, so we try to make them plausible by extrapolating from existing trends.! But stuff has to happen to stay on those trend line in particular, I think the biggest one is the grid. We need to expand the grid globally by a factor of four, and that’s a pretty big change. It’s expensive. But if you look at paying ah, you know a grid even. Let’s say the grid cost was five hundred billion per year. I think that’s higher than the number we’d settled on now, but because we’re already paying four trillion a year for energy.
So, if we can reduce energy costs by, say, a factor of two. Then that dwarves the cost of building out the grid. But we have to worry about the political roadblocks to building out grids and doing that stuff. My son works for the Federal Energy Regulation Commission, and he said that there’s enough proposed renewable energy projects.
Sitting in the pipeline. We not approved yet, but having been given to the Commission, if they approved them all, we would more than double the electrical capacity in the Us. They can’t approve them all, because there isn’t a good capacity to put them all on. So, we really have to deal with that
We did look at stranded asset issues, by the way, and we found that that’s not so bad because you replace a gas station every twenty-five years.
We’re turning over our infrastructure all the time. So, we have to do is let the old infrastructure in the spot expire and replace it with infrastructure for renewables, and we, we pretty much get there without spending that many assets we do need to push on storage technologies. We need to stay on that trend for twenty years if we’re going to make it. And. And, as already said, we reframe climate change as an opportunity. And you know I found myself. I was sailing along the North African coast this s mer. So, this is a photo I took from my phone call. This would have been in Morocco, and, you know, dealing with the bizarre police states in Algeria that have to do with you, have a military government that controls the key resource oil and keeps the whole country under an iron fist.
Oh, I think there are going to be substantial geopolitical changes as a result of this transition. Twenty years is pretty fast, and countries like this are going to have serious problems dealing. So, I have a question, you know, but some large-scale Princeton study of a dead zero. Economy said, you have four and X: Yeah, that’s what we’re saying to it. And the course of keeping that I think it’s important to remember, though, that today in Massachusetts, I suspect in Brooklyn it’s not. A better generation is about forty five percent of our electricity. It includes some storage and some,
or back on capacity, or whatever you want to do, a factor in the overall price.
So that makes me wonder whether you just because solar and wind get super cheap balancing, it is maintained. And then it’s sort of like, well question, you know, module cost versus balance of systems.
Yeah, but burning cards are harder to see on the transmission, And the same is true for hydrogen. And right now, the electromagneters are about twenty percent of the cost of one thousand one hundred now so well, and the other cost, and you know the stuff where learning birds are. They happen? But that is obvious that giant storage tanks are going to come down and roast around, and that’s not even including the distribution of that.
And so, I just. I just wonder what you think about that tension. Yeah. Well, so we you know, we agree that the grid is going to be expensive, and we ass e we spend a lot of time researching. You know what the literature says about what it cost to install red new grid capacity, and there’s of course, a difference of whether you’re talking about transmission or distribution, and there’s a difference of whether you’re putting more wires in an existing line, or when you have to build a new line,
but we made pretty conservative assumptions. We ass e there’s no learning that the costs remain the same as they are now. We just scale them up because we’re doing a factor of four more. So, we increase the cost by a factor of four or five, what I think the people you’re talking to Don’t realize is if the other cost comes down.
Then, you know I mean, you know, if you can, you can get an upper bound by just asking What if the generation were free? Right? So yeah. So, we try to do that now, whether I mean we’re very open to seeing whether our numbers are, you know, having people go over our numbers and see whether they are correct or not. So, I agree. The devil’s in those details.
It’s also true that you have to. It’s very tricky. You see, when you get to fossil fuels, there’s no meaningful statement about cost of fossil fuel production, because you have places like Saudi Arabia, where it’s, you know, a few dollars a barrel, and shell oil in Canada, where it’s fifty dollars an hour, and so the price of fossil fuels depends on what the marginal cost is for whatever the marginal supplier is at that time, and that’s why it’s so valid.
That’s why I think one of the big side benefits of renewables is that we’re going to see much less volatile energy costs as a result.
Because there’s no reason to believe we’re going to have that kind of mechanism where we have such a radically different set of costs. You’re moving up and down the marginal price point all the time based on fluctuations in supply and demand that curves going to be a lot. Cloud.
But yeah, sorry I’m trying to remember. I’m killing. I did. Did I address all of the things you brought up a pretty small percentage of the concentrated.
Well, of course, you know, in the in that plot I showed with the different technologies, there are a bunch of lack of chemical processes, and one of the things you see is chemical processes. All tend to behave about the same way. So, it’s one of the more understood classes of technologies, and there are big economies of scale. From things like tank size, we get surface vol e, relation, surface, vol e relationships help.
So, I think electrolyzers will come, I mean, from looking at related technologies. I’ll be very surprised if they don’t come down in price as roughly, we would expect from the industry we have so far.
But time will tell. So, she thanks for everything That’s another way to answer Dan’s question in that, if you know solar, if you become so cheap you can just paint it on the roof of a building, and then the building is collecting solar energy.
Then you have a lot of possibilities for decentralized generation. You still are going to need to deal with storage
now. Electric vehicles already are going to increasingly provide an example of decentralized storage, and the costs we were looking at were caused for
ah industrial installations. There is a shift for a localized, ah decentralized generation, but if the costs come down enough, then that shift won’t matter much.
I would like to understand connection between different technologies. Evolution, of course. Or
Yeah, you really have to go technology by technology. Now, there is a question of what is a technology? you know, there’s twenty or thirty different flavors of solar photovoltaics, and it’s not clear if all of those follow the same scaling, many of them likely to, because there’s somewhat similar processes.
You know, a technology is always evolving through time. So, the technology is always changing.
Nonetheless, what the data suggests is, you can sort of designate something as a technology and look at its costs through time. Now, coal-fire electricity is a good example where up until the eighties people didn’t care too much about sulfur emissions, and then people started caring about it.
So, you might think a joule of energy is a joule of energy. But there’s dirty jewels and clean jewels. There’s intermittent jewels and steady jewels. So, there’s dangerous jewels and Saint Joules. So nuclear power suffered from that problem. So, your designation of the technology can shift, and the cost can shift if the requirements are placing on it, change as they did it with coal and nuclear power.
But this goes back to what I was alluding to with this plot I showed back here for our attempt to try and take a more holistic view of the economy, and use that to think about climate economics, because we really, we would like to be able to track all the technologies comprehensively and think about the ecology of interacting technologies and use that as the framework in which we think about things, rather than using what might be an inappropriate level of aggregation. And that puts noise on what’s happening, because you expect things like distribution scale very differently than technology parts.
So, we’re increasingly moving towards trying to find the right levels of decomposition and then combine things, often splitting things into their inputs. In the paper James wrote a paper on coal. Ah, in I don’t know. When was it? Two thousand and thirteen or fourteen back there somewhere, and what two thousand and eleven where, you know we decompose coal-fired electricity into operating and maintenance. The cost of building a plant, and we saw that those three things really became different and useful to split that.
So, it’s a tricky question that requires a lot of case-by-case judgment.
I don’t even trip from the very back a lot of the investment in these technologies. There’s been, you know, public investments variable of refinement, and we found that that investment makes a difference as the rate of change.
Yeah, so it’s a bit hard to say in a rigorous way. It certainly seemed like there’s in Germany. There were massive subsidies for solar energy that did correspond to a significant drop in price. This is usually called feed in Terrace. And when you think about when you actually go back, if you think about these curves, I’m showing here. Okay, you know, how did solar get solar is very expensive back at this point in time, and its cost keeps dropping well the very first toll ourselves in one thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight, Bangladesh.
Then people started using it, for you know weather stations at the South Pole places where it cost wasn’t a big issue, and then it got more and more in ex uses, so that the essential thing for a technology to roll out like this is that there be a set of niches such that it can keep advancing along, and as it does, its costs can drop, and so it’s important to keep that going, and I think the cost supports the price supports were important in keeping that happening.
But I Don’t haven’t seen a good study that really teases that out, and shows cause and effect, and it’s probably pretty hard to innovation is tell, you know that’s critical, and you know there’s Marian I’m, at Matsicado. But others have done studies, too, showing that public investment and technology has played a major role in seeding these things.
You’re essentially paying for the material and, the input energy in the house of when you,
I think we will evolve in the new technologies. We don’t we’re agnostic about that. But what’s predictable is the future costs what is not predictable, and the solutions that deliver those costs. I once heard of fascinating talk by a guy who was a chip designer. This was at a meeting in Sfi maybe fifteen years ago, and they were talking about Moore’s law. So, you guys all ass e Moore’s law is just inexorable, he just, and he said, having been a chip designer that wasn’t the way it felt to us at all. We felt like we were looking at a brick wall.
We couldn’t see any way to get to the next step, and then somebody would come up with an idea, and we would break through and find a solution. And miraculously that happened over and over again, and Moore’s law has sustained through that whole period.
You know. Some people say Moore’s law is just a self-fulfilling prophecy. That’s clearly not true, because, for one thing, when Moore wrote the law down. Nobody else was aware of it, and it is true that it has been useful for people to plan right, and I mean a great example of this is my friend Emily Ray Smith, who was in better of Ah CGI graphic techniques for Pixar. And he said they basically had it already to go five years before it actually got rolled out.
They didn’t know they just had to wait for Moore’s law. They had all the techniques down, and They waited five years, and sure enough then, and then then toy story was the result.
So, it does allow you to plan, but it’s not like it’s a done deal, or that it makes itself happen
But if the technology is predicted using silicon data that you were saying to keep it going?
The prediction can come from any.
And you know, you see this if you look at, say information technologies where we made a transition from mechanical information devices to vacumtubes, to discrete transistors, to integrated surface.
So, each of them has its own curve, and but the envelope that they followed is quite smooth, despite the fact that you’re leaping from technology and technology.
Why do you think we’ve here? It hasn’t it the grades more as well, because this also involves the technological.
Yeah. So, there’s It’s a mystery. I don’t think we have a good understanding. Now people have speculated that certain properties like modularity matter. Actually, our theory with James has something like modular, and we called design complexity.
And if you go out and test that you do see that? And there’ been a couple of tasks from our theory. Ah, that indeed, as the as the design complexity goes up, the learning rates tend to get worse.
But it’s very noisy, very noisy, and it’s like one of the facts that I think is amazingly strong. Is this one about stuff you mine out of the ground.
But you know, if you look at the way you extract oil now, it’s radically. It’s incredibly sophisticated compared to what was done a century ago.
Now there’s been there. A trade-off between the whale gets harder to find because we pulled so much out. Technology gets better to find it. But it seems very surprising that for one hundred different minerals you discover that those two trade-offs are just balancing each other across the century, you’d expect U-shaped curves that it would drop, and then it would go back up, and that’s not what you. See? So, there’s something else going on there, and you know, nuclear reactors are.
Well, a couple of things. If you actually, if you read an account of what they have to do to clean up a spill in a nuclear reactor. It’s pretty complicated.
And so, they’re complicated pieces of technology. This the French have maybe had a little bit of success in standardizing it so to make a cookie cutter. But it Hasn’t really paid off. French nuclear power is very expensive, too.
There’s a school of people very strongly advocating for making modular nuclear reactors. Small nuclear reactors not going to fly, because they’re fighting a big scaling law. To begin with, there’s a reason why they made them big to start with, and you have to make that back up, and there’s just no way they’re going to do that. But! But there’s a mystery. There’s still a mystery. There’s no way to predict a priori which technologies are going to improve quickly. And which are it’s a big problem. It’s fascinating problem.
Yep, Sorry, he hadn’t said. Had a chance Yet it might be that it’s general. Yeah, I know. I see your arg ent now, and There’s certainly an element of truth there at the same time, you know. If you look at, say the Danish experience with windmills. The Danes were early adopters of windmills and acquired expertise in windmills, and then they ended up becoming designers of windmills and have an industry around one else. As a result of that, this goes back to what Ricardo always stresses about dawn.
So, you get the know-how by being there early on and if the technology.
And so that’s the flip side of the argument for the concern that you raised.
Well, so we did a study of geographical variation in solar and wind prices, and a couple of things strike you. First of all, you might think that countries that have good solar and wind resources would be the one to install the most it’s roughly uncorrelated. It really has to do with politics, and there is a significant geographical variation due to things like how often the sun shines and institutional factors about installation costs in country A versus country. But, roughly speaking, if you look at solar energy the ins in the course of a decade at a ten percent per year improvement rate, you move from the ninety fifth percentile to the fifth percentile in the course of a decade. In other words: If you’re the place to have the most expensive energy in the ninety fifth percentile, then by a decade later, you’ll have the same energy cost that the people that were in the fifth percentile had,
So that roughly gives a scale of the geographic variation versus the temporal variation that said, we are trying to build out a regionalized version of our model to deal with that kind of thing.
Ricardo. Yes, and we said it was correlated with the information rates, or and you know the sunshine for free,
you know.
No. So please the stuff we’re going to do a variable cost right? So, when you work out the cost, the interest. Yeah,
Our purchase agreements out there,
you know, twenty dollars, and they have one hour soldier,
you know. You know the and it doesn’t. Generally, it could be that we didn’t look at interest rate. So that might be. =
No, I don’t yield.
It’s all right.
Yeah, one of the interesting things that people didn’t anticipate. That’s boosted solar.
The rollout has been that people have been willing to offer very low interest rates for solar projects, just because, in contrast a to nuclear power projects, they’ve been very reliable in terms of. If the project gets going, it tends to be delivered. The uncertainties are much smaller than ah in other domains, so Solar has benefited. Certainly, it’s benefited from the fact that we’ve had low interest rates now for two decades,
but it has among energy. It gets low interest rates because it’s reliable with us.
It’s substantial, and you know, I haven’t looked into that in as much detail as I would like, but the studies I’ve seen Don’t suggest that it’s, and they suggest it’s doable, and that the you know there was a review article in Pts. Six eight years ago, comparing the environmental impact of different technologies and solar, even when you take into account the need for rarer minerals and so on. It still gets the best rating relative to the competitors.
But I’m not thinking of investing in my yeah, you, okay? Well, yeah, well, you know, and I think that, by the way, I think part of the reason mining has this property of being so volatile, is because it requires such long-range investments. I grew up in a mining town, and you know, when the price of copper goes up, everybody goes to work, and when the price of copper goes down, they get laid off, but it takes five years to start up even to start up. An existing wine takes years of preparation.
So those big lead lag effects.
Yeah, one question about the fifty-six of investments,
You know the everybody is going to the cable for this
Well, yeah, so we’re not arguing there. There might not be bottlenecks that would not this top half. I think One thing that you know that I reflected on in doing this is that we’re very bad at thinking about exponential rates change in their mark. So, extrapolate this roll out. You hit the other curves up there.
So, we’re really at a critical point. Right now, we’re you know, solar energy is still just a percent or something of global power, but it’s about to burst forward on the stage, and then the question is, how far can it go before it starts any?
I mean my guess is that this won’t be a It’ll be a little b p, but it won’t be a long-term change in the trend. You know one of the reasons why I think renewables are going to have one of the positive side effects or energy security, which, with Ukraine, we see, is pretty important. It means, if you know, maybe, that if you’re in England, you have to pay more for your power than you do if you’re in Arizona. But if you’re willing to pay for it. You can get energy security, regardless of the natural resources you have regarding as we do now.
So, I think that’s going to be a big factor of pushing countries toward it. And so, we may even benefit from this isolationism in that regard, because it’s yet another incentive to go renewable.
Well, so one thing to realize is that renewables come in third when it comes to subsidies. So, fossil fuels get the most subsidies nuclear power against the second, and then and then renewables, even adding them all up. Yeah, so to do this, I mean, when I was talking to my side, I mentioned where it’s. The Federal Regulation Commission said promptly. Don’t quote me on this.
Thank you. Good set of questions. I really enjoyed the discussion. Thank you.
#DevTalks: Mobility and Economic Outcomes in the Age of Mass Migration
Leah Boustan, Professor of Economics at Princeton University, discusses her work, including her new book Streets of Gold: America’s Untold Story of Immigrant Success, on the mass migration from Europe to the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The discussion also addresses the prevailing narratives about the effects of migration and what that might suggest for policy design and debate.
Growth Lab research manager Nikita Taniparti moderated a discussion with Prof. Boustan on September 21, 2022 at Harvard Kennedy School.
Transcript
DISCLAIMER: This webinar transcript was loosely edited and there may be inaccuracies.
Nikita Taniparti: Today I am truly thrilled and excited to welcome our speaker, Professor Leah Boustan, Professor of Economics at Princeton University, where she also serves as the Director of the Industrial Relations Section.
Her research lies with the intersection between economic history and labor economics and her first book, Competition of the Promised Land, Black Migrants and Northern Cities and Labor Markets, examined the impact of the great migration from the rural south of the United States during and after the World War II.
Her recent work including her new book, Streets of Gold: America’s Untold Story of Immigrant Success is co-authored by Ran Abramitzky and is on the mass migration from Europe to the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Professor Boustan is also co-director of the Development of the American Economy Program at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and she also serves as the co-editor at the American Economic Journal of applied research.
She was named in Alfred P Sloan Research fellow in two thousand and twelve, and won the ICA Young Labor Economist award in two thousand and nineteen. And very recently she was also named fellow to the Econometric Society. Very importantly for us, we’re welcoming her back to the Harvard campus, because it’s also the one place that you called home when you were doing your PHD in economics here.
So we’re going to start, we are presenting some context, setting data points to kind of get us on the same page. And then hopefully, we’ll have a conversation with some questions from the audience as well. But we are over to you.
Professor Boustan: I’m really delighted to be able to share some of the findings from my new book Streets of Gold here at the Kennedy School, which, in addition to the Economics department, the Kennedy School is my Alma Mater. I was part of the inequality program here when I was in grad school, in two thousand and two and two thousand and three.
So I wrote this book with Ran, my long-time collaborator, and we were inspired to write the book, because we believe that national conversations about immigration and immigration reform are driven mostly by myths rather than my fact and data.
And so we set about to share some of our findings to be part of this conversation.
One of the myths inspired our title, Streets of Gold. This idea that anyone can come to the U.S. with just a few dollars in their pocket, and they can quickly make it here. But the truth is a lot more complex.
So I think it’s well represented by this quotation. It’s painted on the wall of the Ellis Island Muse, and it’s attributed to unnamed Italian Congress, saying, “I came to America because I had heard that the streets were paved with gold. But when I got here I found out three things: First, the streets were not paved with gold; second, they weren’t paved at all; and third, I was expected to pave them.”
So we ask ourselves, how would American history change if we listen to these millions of unsung migrants. Note that this was an unnamed background we never know is full story. So we use data on millions of such immigrant families, both in the past and today, to rebuild what we know about immigration from the ground up. That’s our goal.
So where do these findings come from? In the historical case, we’re using the U.S. Census records which become a following after seventy two years and has been fully digitized, and we can use these to follow an immigrant as he lands in the Us, and then spends more years in the country over the course of his career. We also can see children living at home with their parents and then follow that child into the labor market.
So you can think of us like curious grandchildren who are using ancestry.com, the genealogy website. And in fact, that’s where we started with our work, and from there we build algorithms to follow more than just a few family members to really scale this up to thousands and then millions.
What I’m showing you here is one of the sense of manuscripts not selected at all at random. This is my grandfather, Matthew Flatt, who’s circled at the bottom, living at home with his parents, who were immigrants to the country, and his seven other brothers and sisters in the one thousand nine hundred and twentys census.
It turns out that my family’s story is very representative of what we find in the broader data. So my great grandfather, the immigrant generation never moved up the occupational ladder. And that’s something that we see very commonly in both the Ellis Island period, and today that the first generation, the immigrants themselves, move up pretty slowly. So where they start ends up determining when there is a their trajectory will be – if they start with a lot of skills, and they come already Seek a Phd, then that determines one path. If they start coming from a country with less opportunity for education, and they’re entering into a low scale of profession, that determines that path.
But the second generation, the children of immigrants rise. And you can see this with my family. The older kids in the family enter into white-collar positions in offices, or retail jobs and stores, and the younger kids, my grandmother and his younger brother enter the professions.
So what i’m hoping to do today is reassess some immigration myths. Is it really true that there’s an unprecedented flood of immigration today, and the answer is, no, we’ve been here before. Did the Ellis Island generation rise quickly with rags to riches and immigrants today are not as successful in moving up? The answer is, No, and we see this from my family. But we also see this when we scale up, and our immigrant families, their children today stuck in a permanent underclass.
And of course the answer again is not so just freely delay the groundwork for discussing these myths
to start off with. Are we in the midst of an unprecedented flood of immigration? We can see here the long history, one hundred and fifty years of immigrant entry into the country, and recently that fourteen percent of the population is foreign born.
If you ask Americans on surveys, they’ll tell you that we’ve never before had such large numbers of migrants. But of course that’s not true. We had fourteen percent of the population foreign born one hundred years ago, and in between we see this immigration valley. This dip which is policy-driven with the border closing in the nineteen twentys, and bottoming out at four percent.
Of course these waves are very different, and I wanted to show you that the earlier wave immigration, one thousand eight hundred are primarily immigrants from Europe. That’s the yellow part of this graph, whereas today immigrants are coming all over the world.
So there are many reasons to expect that there might be a quite different path today for immigrants. The past doesn’t necessarily have to represent, and so, when we end up finding that there is a common immigrant experience. It’s really quite surprising, contrary to some of our own expectations going into the research.
So second myth, did the Ellis Island generation rise from rags to riches? This myth is wrong in two different ways, kind of interesting. First of all, a lot of the Ellis Island generation migrants were not arriving in rags. So what we’re looking at here the zero line would be earning the same amount as the U.S. foreign born.
And if you see above the zero line. That means that you have immigrated from starting more than one, and the black arms are recent arrivals. The white bars are after we follow these migrants for thirty years. You see immigrants from many Western European countries already earning more than the Us.
So this would be the equivalent of the skilled engineers from India, China, Japan, from Germany. Today we also had many immigrants arriving in poverty, and four of arrivals did not move up to riches within one generation. So the black bars that are below the zero line we see There’s some progress by the time you get to thirty years out, but no one is converging to the earnings of the U.S.
Finally, our immigrant families stop at a permanent underclass today. What I’ll show you is what happens to children and immigrants for children of white U.S., for parents who are raised with similar resources, similar finances to our childhood, and I’ll show you patterns for the twenty fifth percentile of the income distribution. But this pattern is the same If you look at the thirty bit from the fiftieth, and what we’re going to find is that the children of immigrants, raised at the same point as the children of the U.S. – born and achieved more economic mobility over their lifetime.
So this is the picture for today. Each one of these dots I know it’s very hard to see the collections, but the point is, each one of these dots were black children’s parents were born in a set of different the purple dot with the honor our children, whose parents are white and we’re in the Us.
And those kids raise a twenty fifth percentile reach around the forty fifth percentile and adult. On average, children of immigrant parents reach the percentile. And you can see the dispersion around that average with with with kids of income parents from some sending countries reaching the sixtieth or sixty fifth percentile, even though they’re raised in China.
Same patterns in the past is our kids from one thousand eight hundred and eighty on the left hand side kids from one thousand nine hundred and ten on the right hand side. The Us dot, which is the purple dot, is always for the bottom of the picture, and we see the children of immigrants rising.
Nikita Taniparti: Thank you, Leah. I actually wanted to start with that graph and the idea of where do these myths come from, and what consequences do these myths have? Right? So we all live in the U.S. Many of us are immigrants. Do we hear the narrative of immigration that’s unreasonable?
And also in a way you’re telling us that that influence is policy where the tension between immigration patterns actually influences the policy debate and the policy decisions in the mid, when you’re actually influencing the ability of migrants to actually enter. So can you tell us a little bit more about some of those patterns and the underlying causes of how those two things talk to eachother.
Professor Boustan: So I believe your questions is where do these myths come from? And starting with the myth of an unprecedented flood of migration. Where do we get this within the lifetime of everyone who is in the country today? What they have experienced is a rise from the bottom of the immigration valley There were people who were kids in the nineteen, sixties, Nineteen, seventies and they looked around and saw four percent of the population foreign born. In many parts of the country that meant very close to zero percent more and more so.
And now they look around when they see fourteen percent more and more depending on where they live, and that seems like a first up to some people a frightening or dramatic change.
So we don’t have anyone who’s really, you know we can from their whole life experience. We’re back back on the one hundred and fifty years, and I think we have a lot of amnesia about how extensive migration was during the Ellis Island period.
We also have a lot of focus on what’s going on in our southern border, and the discussion of the prices as our quarter. The numbers that we regularly seem scary. Two million contact points at the southern border over the course of this year to date were only in September.
Those long-term points does not be individual. Sometimes there’s going to be more than one, or, you know, up to ten, up to fifteen contact points for a single individual, especially under Covid, under Title Point. But that number seems quite frightening as well and contributes to this sense of crisis. If you think about the other myths, the the ragged to richest idea that that’s actually very widely shared. I mean, there’s almost nothing that we can agree on in the Us today, and that’s around you.
But what we can agree upon is that the Ellis Island generation was good.
You hear President Trump talking about this when he talks about why, we have more migrants from Norway, and that sort of targeting back to one hundred years ago, saying the miners were better back then.
We also hear President Obama talking about this, not in contrast to immigrants today, but just really holding up and valorizing immigrants of the past. So this it comes from our families, you know, the selective memory of.
I remember my grandfather. I don’t remember my great grandfather. He’s the one who struggled didn’t. You know we never really spoke English. I never moved up the occasional matter. But I remember my grandfather became a doctor, and that’s the stories that we tell. It’s the stories of great success in our own family. We also hear this in high school there are many cases that were pulled out from the records selectively anecdotal cases of people who came with nothing, and eventually became CEOs,
and we often hear the story of history high school as well. We might explain something different when we tell it to each other and what we actually see. So zooming into this wrath to rich a story where you differentiate between It’s not really the first immigrants who come to America who experiences immense and quick ladder of growth, but it’s the their children. What does the American dream mean to us just in general. And then how do we understand the American Dream for immigrants?
Well, I think the use of the term American dream is very contentious. We perceive our book as teaching us that the American dream is not dead. It’s just as alive today as it was one hundred years ago. We can understand it as the idea of moving to the country to provide better opportunities for our children, even if we, as the immigrant generation might have to sacrifice and suffer in order to do so. But other people have very different and interpretations and meetings of what the American training means. So while we do embrace that term in the book, and if you see the cover image that I showed you on the very first slide, It has a very optimistic, a depiction of immigrants sort of in gray scale in the front, looking forward to what might be New York harbor, and seeing a rainbow above the country.
So there’s a very optimistic take that we embrace in the book. At the same time we recognize that the term American dream is very contentious. It means different things to different people. It might be something we can, you know, discuss further. People have a particular reason on that.
Nikita Taniparti: I’ll just kind of go over a quick question. So. Ah, we are looking your book. This book looks at immigration from out of the Us. But a lot of your other. One looks at internal migration. It’s hard to study that, but we also see a lot of mobility happening even in that valley of immigration, the twenties. So how has your other research trying to understand how mobility and economic outcomes were reshaped in America? How many in economic outcomes were reshaped in America. How many in economic outcomes were reshaped in America? How many in economic output structures change? Is it about agglomerating people as well?
Where people went? What are some of the factors at the beginning? What we observed?
Professor Boustan: Well, one thing that’s really interesting about our predators on the children of immigrants is the underlying mechanisms behind them.
You if you chat about this at the dinner party people will tend to say, well, that’s not surprising to me, because I know immigrants work harder, they have a better work ethic, and more persistent, and they care more about education. So people have in their mind a sense of immigrant values that they think would then be their kids. What we found in the data is that there’s another aspect of being an immigrant that matters a lot and can explain everything that we find in the past, and it’s still an important contributing factor today, and that is where immigrants choose to settle.
Immigrants move to the parts of the country that are the most dynamic, and provide the most pathway for upward mobility to anyone.
So what that means is, if you compare an immigrant family to a us-worn family living next door. The children actually don’t do any better in the immigrant house? What How immigrants do better on average is that they tend to find themselves in those places that provide a ability for all in the past. It’s quite simple.
Immigrants avoided the U.S. South almost completely so at the time that fourteen percent of the country was foreign born. Only two percent of the population in the South was born, and the sound was an animal’s whole region, and cotton growing did not provide good upward mobility for either white or black Americans.
But even if you’re living outside the South immigrants went to particular states and cities that had a lot of upward moment industrial jobs, and that provided pathways for their kids. So when you think about what is that special about immigrants? It’s that they reveal themselves willing to leave their homes in order to seek opportunity. They’ve already broken family ties. They’ve already left their home country, and once they get to the Us. Then they end up seeking out places that are very dynamic.
But there is a set of American us foreign who also do the same, and those are people who move across state lines. So if we look at us, foreign parents who are living outside of their state of birth.
Their kids look much more similar on average, to the children of immigrants. So really it’s this willingness to move. Crossing borders matters a lot. But even internal migration matters as well.
Nikita Taniparti: And how do we think about moving for economic goals? But then, social integration, How do you create a sense of home in a new place, whether it’s moving from Texas to Massachusetts or India to Boston.
Professor Boustan: Well, a couple of things there, I mean. First, I didn’t mention anything in the really short presentation about some findings in our book about cultural integration. So we’re economists. We started out by looking at how our commitment is sharing the labor market, and what’s going on with their earnings. But when we talk to people they said,
Well, it’s all very well good, you know. Immigrants move up in earnings, children, immigrants, children, the children, and your parents do well know our immigrants really ever becoming American, and it’s hard to define what that means, but the there’s a whole set of practices that we can observe in data that will give us some clues here.
So we looked at everything that we could that we could measure both in the past from the present, and that includes food immigrants. Mary. What neighborhoods they live in? Are they surrounded by other immigrants in their neighborhood? Or are they living in more integrated areas? Do they learn English, and what names do they give to their children.
And along all those dimensions we see that immigrants do take steps to change the norms and behaviors as they live in the us, and they start. They end up at the end of their life, or even more like the U.S. born than they do than they did when they first arrived.
So that’s how we think about integration, is. It’s a very empirical question. If there’s no values based upon it not better necessarily to choose names that look like the names of he was born. But let’s just watch and observe what immigrants do, and we see that immigrants do start to change their behaviors as they spend time in the Us.
And at the same pace now as they did in the past. So I mean, this is one of those cases where my priors were really changed, I thought, Oh, in the hill this island period there was a lot of pressure from Normandy, and also immigrants were buying for a bureau, which is sort of more similar in cultural dimensions. So immigrants sort of became American very quickly in the past. They’ve jettisoned their whole language, They, you know, told their kids. Let’s only speak English at home, and these days it’s very different. Well, these days. It’s actually not that different in the data.
But there’s another interesting part of this question, which is sort of like underneath the surface, and I just wanted to to mention it. There. There could be trade-offs here where you know, for example, I mentioned immigrants moving out of neighborhoods with high foreign war, and share that some mitigated good, you know, for an immigrants who leave what you know what people would call on-splayed neighborhoods sometimes that comes along with earnings, but it also comes along with cultural loss.
And so we were able to look at this in a really interesting way. With one particular community, we were looking at Jewish immigrants who were moved out of the city of New York, around one thousand nine hundred to cities and towns all around the country through a volunteer self-health program to disperse the Jewish population.
Many of those immigrants did very well, leaving, but also many of those immigrants chose to move back to New York, and the immigrants that chose to move back to New York were different.
Initially, they had more Jewish sounding first aids they had more to resembling last days. So by at least that measure we could see, they were maybe more connected to the whole set of cultural and religious amenities that they would have received in a large immigrant area. And I really want to just make sure that I emphasize that point as well that you know there is going to be an element of loss and trade off when we see immigrants changing their behavior as they spend more time.
And I think that’s a really interesting note of optimism that you present in the book, which is how much people actually integrate. And then you say a point of not not so much. Optimism is segregation of African-american communities or Mexican and hispanic communities.
Are there some lessons that you’ve learned about from a policy perspective. What can you do to facilitate it? A little bit more to a valer to be support convergence of that upward mobility for these left behind communities.
Well, I was thinking about this. You know the connection between my first book and this book here, and you mentioned competition in the Promised Land. One of my main insights in writing that and getting started on the research that led to that book was that African-americans in the us are also an immigrant population. So in one thousand nine hundred around ninety percent of African Americans lived in the South by one thousand nine hundred and seventy. It was more like fifty over fifty, and in order for that rebalancing to happen across regions that represents the movement of millions of people.
And so, If we start to think of African Americans as an immigrant population, we can apply the same lens that we would use in thinking about the various immigrant groups that I showed you on this slide, and in some ways the African-american migration produced very similar results. And In Some ways. It produced very different results.
I would say that the first generation experienced a pretty similar pattern, where, by the meaning of the those black migrants who moved from south to north, doubled their earnings, and that’s the same as the European migrants in the Ellis Island period doubling their earnings by beefing Italy by leaving Norway and moving to the us.
When African-americans arrived in industrial cities in the North, they did not earn as much as the existing black population.
And there was convergence over the course of their lifetime. So it wasn’t complete convergence. But there was movement in earnings for the first generation. What’s really different?
So has been the experience of the second generation, the children of the great black migrants,
and I didn’t realize this how profound this was, until the work of a Laura Drennan or my colleague at Princeton, who was able to look at the second generation of children who were being great, of, of course, or in the early nineteen eighty S. In cities that had high or not as high inflows during the great black migration period. And then the children that were a part of that second generation. who lives in high grade black migration areas did not aspire as much upward mobility at all. So that’s where the difference really lies, and you dig below the surface. It’s the boys from that generation, and not the girls that were really experiencing this damper on Hubble mobility.
Now put that in touch with what we’re finding in the dot box that I was showing you. I showed you a dot plot for the sons I called them the children of, but they were the sons of foreign-born parents. We have a similar plot in the boat for the daughters, and we see a very different pattern for . The daughters of immigrants from the Caribbean from majority black countries than we do for the sons. It’s quite similar to what a lure is found for the second generation of the great black migration. So here i’m starting to see some echoes.
It’s not true for all majority of black countries. We only have five of those sending countries in our data and due to privacy restrictions.
But for Nigeria and Dominican Republic the sons are also doing very well what I’m thinking about. Here are the data for Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad, and tobacco there. The sons are the one exception to this role that I told you that the children of immigrants out reform the children of white us for the children from those whose parents came from those countries. The sons are around to connect with the white Us. Form, but they’re not out remarkable.
The daughters are doing spectacularly well. So there is intersection here between race and gender,
and it’s showing up for whether your parents are foreign born, or whether your parents are part of this internal migration wave from south to north and I, you know certainly there’s some suggestive evidence. And all this paper that is incarceration and policing.
How is the earnings of someone who is incarcerated measured in our data?
If you’re incarcerated, you’re still in the dataset. But you’re if you have essentially zero learning, and that’s really pulling down the average, and we were able to take that group out now. I’m not saying we should, because they’re a meaningful part of the average.
But if we were able to take that group out, my guess is that the sons from those three countries I mentioned Jamaica Trend at to Vega and Haiti would be helpful for the Hawaiian restaurant. And so there is this over-policing and incarceration in Caribbean neighborhoods, as well as in the Neighborhood of the initial of great black Migrants, and that is something that primarily affects the sons of outdoors, and that’s one more question that I know the audience of questions, too. But so you’ve told us about how everybody’s trying to point them to the Us.
You sacrifice everything for your children. You really really try to make it, and then people leave and go back home. So migrants return, and I think the folks that both put it at about twenty, five to thirty percent.
Why do people return home? How do we understand what they do when they return home. How can you amplify the positive benefits of return migrants?
So we had just talked about how some people, some Jewish migrants, were sent to cities and towns around the country, and returned back to New York City. Part of what they were attorney for is a sentence of cultural and religious amenities in this large Jewish economy.
So now not to find that find your home country versus the United States. Some people are returning home because of the full of their home country. But they’re not moving to the Us. Necessarily, you know, out of some kind of misunderstanding or mis oppression of what they’ll mind here. I think the term migrants are often very strategic.
They understand that by moving to the Us. Like I said, you can double your earnings. And today, actually, in many cases it’s more than double your earnings.
So doubling your earnings was for the internal migration south to north that didn’t face any mobility barriers as well As for the Ellis Island period, where there were very few migration restrictions today with so many migration restrictions, the return to migration is actually elevated, and you might even trouble or quadruple your money.
So imagine that in the long run you do want to live in your home country. But you know that there’s this opportunity to move to a place, take it for three to five years. Earn a lot, and if you come home you end up deep frogging over some of the people from your from your local area that did not be. You can use the money that you’ve saved up to buy land. You can use it to build a house, you can use it to start a business. You can import some of the knowledge that you have that you’ve ah acc ulated and acquired here in the Us as well back to the whole country.
So we actually have seen this in the case of the Princeton area. We have a large Guatemalan community, and there were there was a a a guy who went to bed through our public schools, Princeton High School, and while he was at Winston High School. He was working at the local pizzeria, and he learned about bring up and pizza, and he brought and imported some ovens from New Jersey back to Guatemala,and he started the first, for out of Korea in his whole country, and it spreads around the country. And so That’s the kind of local knowledge that you might get. And i’m not only talking about, you know the science technology like the high skill you may be able to import a problem of knowledge across. And in many industries. So people come to gay knowledge also to gain savings and intentionally.
No, that’s not everyone. Some people return because of employment shops, health shops, family , unexpected events when they need to return. But for many people return migration is part of a strategy, and really has always been around twenty five percent of the term migration in Ellis Island period and around twenty, five percent today.
I think we’ll take a few questions, but maybe for honest, you can have a hand the mic to people. And as you’re doing that I would really love about the focus, how it talks between data and these stories. So it will. The average story, not the Elam. . I don’t think there’s a question over here first, that okay second room a registered name, and you
Hi My name is Karissa. So i’m wondering if you managed to identify whether the upward economic mobility and information between Tommaker and Joe Taylor, because there’s a notion that migrants are taking American jobs, and i’m wondering whether it’s true.
I mean this is an enormous question, so I could go on at late. I want to make sure we have time for everyone else, but it’s,
I think, very hard to differentiate and put a label on someone as a maker or a jobmaker. Certainly we have this sense of high-level immigrants are creating jobs for others by opening businesses by patenting and invention and science, and that’s one. But we also have for low, skilled immigrants all sorts of ways in which more skilled immigrants are contributing to job creation and expansion of industriesSo I’ll give you a couple examples. One is markets that just simply wouldn’t exist if we didn’t have immigrants here working in those areas. People often say, Well, if if immigrants weren’t here, then the wages would rise, and us foreign would take the job, and we would just continue as always.
I’ll think about how this works in agriculture. For example, in the one thousand nine hundred and sixtys, we had a strong guest worker program in Mexico called the Brassero Program. President Johnson ended it, and his thought was, Well, if we don’t have the restaurant workers, then we’ll have to agricultural jobs for investment. Kay was around a dollar an hour at the time, and farmers started to raise pay a little one dollars twenty five. Us home workers still did not come to the field, and so farmers decided well at that pay dollar twenty five. It might be worthwhile to be instead to invest in new machinery, to harvest or awesome. They shut down the production of these crops that have to be tended by hand, and instead, i’ll shift into crops that could be harvested by the machine, so that market the market strawberries, asparagus, micro greens, avocados, those you know, free soapy and vegetables that we enjoy today. dried up, and the types of fruits and vegetables that we had in the late sixtys early seventys for the types that you could easily harvest by machine, so that industry just simply shut down and shifted away from hand-harvested for sessions. Think about what would happen if we didn’t have immigrants entering in hair salons and managing.
I would simply paint our meals at home, and that is what I used to. I mean. I’m like a child in the seventys. We didn’t have really an iceberg wet and frozen fruit and vegetables. We painted our nails at home, an idea that you would go and like get a manager was just
like something that only the very rich would do. And now it’s an enormous industry that’s available to many people. And so that is the kind of job creation for others that even lower skilled immigrants can provide by creating markets that said they were not there. Think about childcare. Many, many people would want to pull out of the core, pay market work in order to care for their own day full time and with childcare, and we now have an expansion of job opportunities for others, because we thinking the same.
Thank you so much for having me. My name is Carol. Let me see if I must be better so. One of my questions was around using saving engagement as a key indicator of integration is wrong. There’s sometimes a notion that you parents. Don’t like to get involved in seven, five
But I actually used to work for the city of Boston, and we were at the Civic Academy, for I mean grandson.
We’ve always got applications for it, right? So i’m just really curious to see if you use that as a key indicator of integration, you know, around the country as well.
That’s a great idea. I have not, and thank you, though, is also asking me a little bit about immigrants and patriotism. And I’ve actually thought to myself, Well, it’s really hard for us to measure such a thing. But in the past hand today, today we have really good surveys, surveys of trust and institutions and attitudes towards American ideals and immigrants were higher than the Us. Warrant on all of the development. So immigrants are more patriotic Americans than us four, and J. But I have no idea what this would have looked like in the past. We don’t go back and do attitudinal surveys. But then I was thinking about it in more detail, and I was like, well,
I mean we can look at registering and enlistment for World War, One World War II. We can look at registering as a border, and that’s something that I actually supervised a senior basis for someone who was working on the Cps voter supplement on both Asian, American and Hispanic American voter registration. So there’s a lot that we could have done. We didn’t do by I’m Kate Jenning, who shared the growth up, and I was wondering do you immigrants who come to the Us as children and They look more like first-generation rooms for second generation.
So that is a really good question. The one point. Five generation are included as children of immigrants in our data. And so they’re contributing to the n bers that we see.
So if you break them out of in the data, they sort of look halfway between the the first generation and the second, but they are included in our social mobility N bers There tends to be sort of a rival Age cut off, after which the ah first the one point. Five generation looks more like the first generation, so they do face more barriers, and that tends to be at around like twelve years old, and so it has to do with learning English fluidly. And spending more time in American schools and public schools. And so they you can think of them as sort of in between. So if you’re interested in what the social mobility of the second generation, purely like people who are born in the country. Then you would have to script those folks out, and my guess is that what we would find would look even more startling in terms of we’re mobility that the and but I was wondering if it then in the add to the diversity of the place, for would there be reverse consolidity, et cetera, or some self-sustaining process, that if you look at all into that and the second one is I.
After I read your book. I saw another woman that we reached coming with a little bit of the idea that you know immigrants bring a lot of Ah, I don’t know what to call it main to the trains, and so on. Heard that, and and I mean that has been used by in some papers. By. I think about this and others on on, you know, attitudes towards their ability or marriage, or whatever that that come with immigration. And I can Guest done, thought that all Catholics were drunk, and it imposed restrictions on alcohol and whatever. So I was wondering, What can you say about this concerning the you know values being, you know, the challenge.
Oh,so on the first question. I think you’re really undoubtedly right that if there weren’t immigrants in those places, and those places wouldn’t look as dynamic as they do in terms of the density of industrial jobs. Let’s say nineteen, ten or twenty. There’s some decision on the parklands where to locate, and they’re from located places where they have access to a strong and robust labor force. So what we’re saying here is morally descriptive, just in a very mechanical sense. Once we account for geography, the advantages that we see for the second generation children dissipate and think of it, just as I described that if you compare the next door, neighbors, we don’t see this immigrant advantage anymore. But there it is.
It’s certainly possible that one of the elements that makes those markets more advantageous is because they have immigrants in them.
Yes, it could be so. Connor and Michael Stewart had a paper of pnas a couple of years ago, where they tried to understand in the past what makes a market more dynamic? What makes for all remote, and they basically do a horse race between public schooling and industrial jobs. And in the past, at these industrial jobs mattered a lot more and interestingly, the children of immigrants that we’re looking at in the past have fewer years of education than the children of the Us. Born, raised at the same point in the income distribution, despite earning more
So they’re earning more, even though they’re acting at the educational Spanish. So they’re in markets that had a lot of industrial and manufacturing job opportunities. And therefore, if you’re thinking about the opportunity, cost of staying in school for an extra year, i’m losing out
on the possibility of starting work. So people tended to leave school a little bit earlier, and in fact, it was in some of these more rural areas where public schooling really began and took off as sort of the work of.
So, at least historically, these areas were not necessarily the places with good public schooling, and they were, instead places of with really industrial powerhouses, possibly also with immigration, and the diversity of place contributing to that advantage
On the second question about bringing negative traits, whatever the trade might be, that trait disappears very quickly. And so it is not entirely clear from the question or the the work that you’re citing, which trades people have in mind. But whatever it is, they see that immigrants are race around half of the gap between their own behaviors and the behaviors of the Us. Born in the first generation, and by the second generation those gaps are almost entirely closed, if not entirely so. There are newspapers by R Kel, Fernandez, and others that show that there is some long term vestige of the country that your parents came from.
It’s a long-term vestige in terms of you can pick up as a a statistically significant effect of where your parents had been born. But it’s not important in an our spirit sense. It doesn’t explain very much of the difference between behaviors according to where your parents were based. So if you have enough data, you can certainly pick up this association, whether it’s women’s, labor, force, participation, or fertility, behaviors, or what have you? There are some immigrants coming from countries where women are less likely to work where it’s expected that you would have five or six children instead of two children, and you can pick off vestiges of this in the second generation. But it doesn’t explain very much. The overall pattern is really one of.
I think that it’s also interesting because I mean when people talk about we should only allow high-school workers, or and say no it always sense, because a lot of your findings are about it. Actually doesn’t matter, because, you see, it has been all of that kind of converging to this integration of our mobility, and really just positive followers.
I want to. You just say one big thing on that which is, there was a really truly excellent piece, very much engaging with the ideas and streets of gold by Raymond Salam, that just came out in Foreign Policy Magazine, and I don’t know if you guys have great han. He’s the president of the Manhattan Institute.
He’s often on fox news. We don’t agree on everything.
But there’s a lot of scope for overlap and places of agreement where we disagreed was really on this question of how selective immigration should be, and the way I see it, it’s a question of how many slots we have available right now. We have seven hundred thousand visa slots and around a million if you count direct spaces that come in without being part of that quota. So around a million interests a year, sure if we cut that number to one hundred thousand. I don’t think we should, but if we did, and that’s what happened during the one thousand nine hundred and twenty four to closure, Maybe we would want to prioritize the response to the scientists and engineers who contribute a lot in terms of economic growth in the first generation.
But if we have a million slots, or if we have a million, three hundred thousand songs, which is what some think tanks in Dc. Are suggesting, we need to keep up with the demographics and the slowing down in population growth, you know, like adding three hundred and about slots. We’re not talking something incredibly dramatic here. But we’re talking about one point, three million slots. Well, then, let’s think about what the labor market means are currently.
Do we need agricultural workers? Do we need child care? Do we need elder care construction? Do we need other personal services? There are many ways in which immigrants who did not get a chance to even go to high school, or did not get a chance to finish high school in their home country many ways that they contribute to the economy today, and then what we’re adding in streets of gold is to say that their children are not always going to be doing the same job, same occupations as their parents. The children have the opportunity, once they are educated in the Us. And fluent in English, to move up above the Median.
Thank you very much. I have a follow-up question on the discussion that we just had a record also on cultural assignation.
So following what you explained earlier about how my word is to let into more dynamic communities. And how does kind of someone observe over time? I wouldn’t expect that these communities culture also?
Ah simulates more to an international culture in a way right, so that the effect isn’t necessarily only driven from migrants as stimuli to Americans. But the Americans becoming more international in a way, right? And so along these lines.
I wonder if there is some observed pattern of polarization, cultural polarization, where, on the one hand, you have this culturally diverse environment where people, you know, immigrants move to, and then kind of the opposite.
I think that it’s very profound, and that’s undoubtedly going on. We do talk about it around the edges. It’s about about the different contributions that immigrants make it’s, not just economic contributions. It’s also bringing their foods, their music, different aspects of their culture with them, and the opportunity to live in a state like New Jersey, where I live, which is one of the most immigrant densities in the country, and you know to me it’s a really incredible set of opportunities for cultural exchange.
And that’s a preference that I hold, but not everybody. And so there may be continued sorting along those lines geographic sorting, or even if you all live in the same area, there might be my overall sorting where you go to different churches where you go to different restaurants, and I think that that’s like Seems like it’s certainly going on at an anecdotal level. But I think it’s okay.
I think it would be great to get a handle on and measure and , and and have some ways of getting out of quantitatively the way that we talk about it. And I think that makes sense to me is that assimilation is a two way street. You know that immigrants change to become Americans, but us foreign also change when immigrants right for course, migrants or minders that are going to be distribution on the basis. But do you see the success? That because it’s lower the barrier of my patient because that area so do you see any success?
So are you talking about refugees? And yeah, they used to display right?
So I mean, this has been really fascinating. There is good work done on refugee population in the Us. And also around the world in the modern data. But no one has ever come back to think about people who would be classified as refugees. One hundred years ago our refugee system was established in one thousand nine hundred and eighty. Before that we had some refugee act that designated particular populations as refugees going back to one thousand nine hundred and forty eight. But before that we had an
There were many immigrants from Europe who arrived due to a flight of persecution. So we wanted to look at that group as well, and we were able to do this, using some world histories of immigrants, who arrived between one thousand eight hundred and ninety, and one thousand nine hundred and fifty; and we found that these immigrants classified as refugees by us, according to the stories that they told for their reason for moving, were ah assimilating more fully into us Society, as measured by their details of their ability to see English.
We had one hour’s speech of these folks like that. When we had a audio tape we could classify their accent. We had a transcript. We could classify their vocabulary, and we found that refugee immigrants were more successful at integrating, and can think about the economic explanations. For this it makes a lot of sense. If you have no expectation that you’ll be able to go home.
You talked about the twenty five percent, which for migrants, then you have a stronger incentive to start investing in learning English, embedding yourself into labor market adwords, social networks.
We also looked at this in today for the modern data with using the new immigrant survey, and we see the same matter.
Other people have done similar work on refugees, modern data and find that refugees might start out with working staff, but they move up very quickly, and so I think all of the evidence is starting to line up that immigrants who feel like they have no home to go back to are those that actually is similar to that.
Thank you. Thank you for the talk, and uh for the very nice Ah, Kevin session, my question is related to Ah, what used to work in the past that may or may not be working today. And I can think of several, just you know, listening to you. One is the role that industrial employment has played in the past.
If the factories now are either in China, or at least in Alabama and rural parts.
Other things also that we go wrong or may have. But we are maybe, uh, just have of housing in these particularly dynamic places, and and so as an immigrant to have access to these places today. And the third thing is maybe the cost of education.
So we have limited ability to really answer carefully, because our historical data is incredible. We have millions of people exactly where they’re living or their neighbors. , We know their education level and their industry and their application. The modern data that I showed you comes from the opportunity, insights lab, and when we’re lucky enough to get attitudes from them of how children will raise a different income distribution there later in life according to their parents.
But we do not have the money or data, so we don’t know education. We don’t know occupation. We don’t even know exactly where the schools are living.
Which is a lot smaller and doesn’t. Have good geography, anyhow, and we found that geography matters today, but not as much as a day of the past, which means a lot of scope for other explanation. Just because we see similar matters of over mobility doesn’t mean that the mechanisms have to be exactly the same in the past. Geography was just overwhelmingly a factor that mattered today. It may not matter as much, but we still see that it does matter, and I think that housing markets are somewhat of a key here.
The most productive areas in the country are now obscenely expensive to move to,
and immigrants seem to have a comparative advantage of moving to these high expense places relative to the Us. Born in part, because they’re willing to live in smaller housing units and double up in part, because they actually send some of their budget back at all through remittances or saving to go home. And so they don’t spend as much of their budget on the high cost of living location, whereas the Us. Foreign are spending their money almost entirely locally.
And so these reasons immigrants are sort of on this edge and getting into the most productive places still today. But I think there’s probably going to be a lot more scope for education mattering in the modern data than it did in the past. And we just we love to be able to work with the micro data. Maybe one day we can, or maybe that will be another source that will allow us to do that.
I think I’m going to actually go ahead, and i’m so sorry to be able to ask the questions. Maybe you didn’t come to the ah right now. If you haven’t read the book, or any of the s work. We’ve focused on one of our characters book around people. So you can be tested on what you learn today, but kind of reframing. As a lot of countries are in political type of ideological models of a very complex multi-passeted thing, or As you were saying, you might see similar trends, but the nineteen essence can be very different.
So there’s a lot of things I think, for us to be into, as there are policymakers of people who work policy papers by doing research. So I really want to say thank you for starting the conversation here today. And hopefully, we can really about to continue this.
Thank you, Nikita. Thank you to everyone for your questions. I really appreciate it.
Betting on Green: Namibia’s Green Hydrogen Agenda
In this seminar, James Mnyupe, Economic Advisor to Namibia’s President, discussed the country’s commitment to green hydrogen, its strategy for securing foreign investment, from the private sector and Germany and the EU, the feasibility of the hydrogen market, and the risks.
Daniel Schrag, Director of Harvard’s Center for the Environment, moderated this session on September 26, 2022 at Harvard Kennedy School.
Transcript
DISCLAIMER: This webinar transcript was loosely edited and there may be inaccuracies.
(Mnyupe) Hi guys thanks a lot for coming out to listen to our conversation. It’s really good to be back. The last time I was here physically was in 2019, I took a class actually with the Harvard Kennedy School. I did an infrastructure and markets economy with a really cool lecture and I had a really good time so it’s good to be back.
As Ricardo has said, he together with the Growth Lab essentially the Namibian government sort of retained the services of the Growth Lab to help us think about economic complexity a little bit and this is where this journey started to a large extent as well.
So I started working for the Namibian government in in September 2020. To give you some context, Namibia’s GDP is anywhere between 11 to 12 billion US dollars on a good day our annual budget is about 2.77 billion. What we spend is about 3.3 so you definitely have a deficit of 500 million US dollars or more. I’m giving you all of those numbers to get context of who we are. Countries around two and a half million people the size of the country is about two and a half times Germany’s size so it’s about 824 a thousand square kilometers, being shared by two and a half million people and that gives us the dubious honor of being the second least densely populated country in the world.
Which before, this it was really hard to sort of see the utility of that particular statistics but it’ll start to come to light. So when we started trying to look at increasing the economic complexity of our country this is basically something we were going or we were looking to do with the growth lab. You know, what sort of new exports we could put together currently, maybe a sort of export minerals to a large extent, so you’d think of diamonds uranium some meat some fish so nothing too complex we’re not exporting Nokia cell phones just yet and then at the same time services or tourism right so that was it there may be an economy in a nutshell.
And then we got approached by a big green hydrogen developer I think it was October 2020 and we started looking into this whole green hydrogen thing. I started working with the world bank and they started saying to us, look, you are actually, potentially very uniquely positioned to do something very special in this space. You have some of the best wind resources on the planet we checked that with various tools that we were able to access through the Bloomberg new energy Finance tools and we saw that the capacity factors we could generate in Namibia.
55 percent or more than eight meters per second of wind meant you had a really interesting world-class wind resource especially in this area the solo was pretty good as well easily north of 30 capacity factors in selected areas it just so happened to be in the very same area so typically Namibia has started to build some renewable energy potential around the country but like small plants right so Namibia produces, or we consume about four and a half terawatt hours of electricity and we import 60 to 70 percent of that.
I know right pretty sad, and we input a lot of that actually from South Africa right here and they produce a lot of that using coal-fired Power um our biggest generation asset is up here in the north in the ruachana area. And it’s Hydro right and then half of our population are certainly a working population work in the agricultural sector so you can imagine you’re very exposed to climate change right if you get hit by a big drought you don’t get enough electricity half of your people unemployed and you have to pay very high prices for emergency power you’re importing from qualified power stations which is that’s the right climate change um so that was sort of our reality and then we tried to turn our reality into this so after doing a lot of work in this area we essentially put together a fairly robust governance structure that I can talk to you to you guys in some detail.
We went out to the world we put out a global um RFP a request for a proposal and we invited private sector developers to Envision a future um that had green hydrogen as a big part of that and we got nine proposals from six developers, and I’ll show you one such project. But essentially, as we embarked on this economic diplomacy, we started actually getting a lot of interest from people who wanted to build projects everywhere.
We started unlocking interesting grants and funding from larger economies such as Germany and the EU that wanted to partner Namibia on this particular journey and this is where we are at the moment we’re envisioning about three hydrogen valleys we’re putting together a green hydrogen strategy and we’re going to launch that at cop27 um, and this is being done by McKinsey and this I think was a big part of the secret Source I think a lot of international players did not expect the government to organize itself as quickly as we did there’s a technical committee full of technocrats that essentially reports to a green hydrogen Council you could see my one of my roles is a green hydrogen commissioner which essentially entails project managing this Vision.
And then of course we’re reporting to cabinet and that’s the out ultimate decision-making body and so once you started creating a certain amount of clarity but also robust sort of governance structures it just engendered a lot more confidence and a lot more people were willing to come and take the risk of developing in Namibia so that got us you know going on a really exciting Journey this is um the project that is envisioned um in the southern part of Namibia actually the developers are online as well so if you get that really cool technical questions for them we can ask them um but essentially this in the beginning this was envisioned as a 9.4 billion US dollar project we’re now looking north of 11 billion closers to 12.
You must remember the size of our GDP when you’re thinking about that number and it essentially entails almost seven gigawatts of renewable energy assets three gigawatts or so of um electricity about 700 megawatt hours of battery 70 kilometers or so of transmission lines some pipelines that are at the industrial site with desalination at the front ammonia synthesis at the back and ammonia storage tanks you liquefy the ammonia, and you then bring that off to a ship this is a floating a floating boy Mooring system get that into a tanker and then that goes off to you to your client at the moment.
Our clients are predominantly envisioned to be German so two weeks ago we were in Germany in Berlin working closely with their Ministry of economic Affairs and climate change and there was a Business Roundtable where essentially, we were introduced to prospective off takers this particular company hyphen is 35 owned by a German company as well called nit rag and so Germany and Namibia are working very close through economic diplomacy trying to make this project um come to bear and I think Dan and I will get into some details around that as well.
Some interesting features that obviously are really important for Namibians full-time jobs about 15000 90 of those should be Namibian employees now you have to know that the town that is to host this project probably has a population of about 30 000 people ums so if you imagine that these full-time employees have two or three um dependents and most of them are coming from not and they don’t live in the in the town you could double the town’s population right and these are some of the challenges I think that we would love to be working very closely with Ricardo’s team to start really thinking about why this project actually means on the ground what are the anthropological issues socio-economic as well of course as techno economic.
But you know for example what does Namibia have to do um with our immigration policy as well Do all of these skills exist um and what would it take to bring in skills but also accommodate them in a manner that they Thrive as well big local content about 30 local content a big part of that is other local companies balance sheets big enough right um I think one of the examples the developer was giving was that the largest develop the largest construction company in Namibia their order book is typically about 70 million US Dollars and um this project might have an order book of about seven billion rights so we’re going to need many of those Namibian construction companies to actually absorb all of these um all of this capital.
I think this is another very interesting one – the idea is that the project will produce about 18 terawatt hours possibly more actually, because the project has been growing in size since then um about four to five of those terawatt hours would actually be curtailed energy and so we’re looking into the possibility of capturing some of that and actually, feeding that into the Namibian grid possibly with a bit more of a dispatchable profile.
And obviously that would require unique Investments strengthening the grid, a new connection battery storage as well possibly green hydrogen re-electrocution units as well and all of that will then obviously determine the price of this electricity relative to the Imports that we get from South Africa. We think they should be cheaper but we’ve commissioned two studies to do that we think this project can easily produce electricity at two cents a kilowatt hour we pay nine to twelve cents a kilowatt hour for our Imports so there’s an interesting opportunity there to get Namibia to be energy independent. At the same time, if this is the first of many projects you might actually be able to become an exporter of electricity let alone the molecules of to Europe.
Growth Lab Development Talks: The Role of Business in South Africa’s Future
The Growth Lab’s Development Talks is a series of conversations with policymakers and academics working in international development. The seminar provides a platform for practitioners and researchers to discuss both the practice of development and analytical work centered on policy. This event is co-sponsored by Harvard’s Center for African Studies.
Speaker: Ann Bernstein, Executive Director, Centre for Development and Enterprise, South Africa
Moderator: Soraya Mohideen, Harvard South Africa Fellow, HKS Mid-Career MPA ’23
About the speaker: Ann Bernstein heads the Centre for Development and Enterprise, South Africa. An independent think tank CDE is South Africa’s leading development policy centre, with a special focus on growth, jobs, education, cities and the role of business. Member of the Transition Team, then the Board of the Development Bank of Southern Africa (1994 – 2001). Fellow, National Endowment for Democracy, Washington DC (2005). Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC, 2013. Board member Brenthurst Foundation 2007-2017. In 2008 and 2009 invited African faculty member, World Economic Forum, Davos. Invited Fellow Bellagio Center, Rockefeller Foundation 2016. Her book, The Case for Business in Developing Economies (Penguin 2010) received favourable reviews in South African media, the Economist, Financial Times, Forbes and elsewhere. The book won the Sir Anthony Fisher Award 2012, Atlas Research Foundation, Washington DC.
Development Talks: Economic Policy in Albania after Three Crises with Etjen Xhafaj, MP
EN VIVO: Debate ambiental, con los candidatos a la Presidencia de Colombia
El tiempo se agota y el planeta está en riesgo. Los candidatos presidenciales respondieron a expertos sobre la crisis ambiental que vive Colombia y los efectos que genera para la humanidad. ¿Cómo proteger los bosques? ¿Cómo salvar las fuentes de agua? ¿Cómo producir sin causarle daño al medio ambiente?
A New Pathway for the Amazon Basin
With global leaders promising to end deforestation by 2030, the Amazon has the potential to become the world’s largest bioeconomy, strengthening local livelihoods while restoring and conserving ecosystems.
How can governments from across the region further pathways for collaboration with scientists, ecopreneurs and businesses to contribute to the Amazon’s sustainable development?
The World Economic Forum is the International Organization for Public-Private Cooperation. The Forum engages the foremost political, business, cultural and other leaders of society to shape global, regional and industry agendas. We believe that progress happens by bringing together people from all walks of life who have the drive and the influence to make positive change.