Search Growth Lab

Tanzania’s manufacturing puzzles (and frustrations) seem to be a natural outcome of their policy choice. The Tanzanian economy experienced a significant acceleration over two decades, growing at a compounded annual growth rate of 6% between 1998 and 2018: Largest rates were recorded and sustained by the super commodity cycle (2005-2014). Within that growth trajectory, manufacturing’s share of gross domestic product (GDP) has lingered for 30 years below 10% – well below the 23% target established for 2025 in Tanzania’s Industrial Development Strategy (2011). As stressed by Diao et al (2021), the bulk of manufacturing value added is created by a few capital-intensive firms, whereas informal manufacturing has increased employment but without significant improvements in productivity/wages. Manufacturing exports surged in 2011 and remained steady since driven by subsector basic metals (gold & unrefined copper). If these are excluded, the curve mirrors the commodity price boom (likely a price boom rather than a volume boom). Looking only at exports conceals the fact that the bulk of the manufacturing output in Tanzania is sold in the domestic market rather than exported: exports are equivalent to less than 2% of GDP; domestic sales are seven times higher. While Food and Beverages make up for the largest share of manufacturing value employment and value-added, basic metals are the ones accounting for the vast majority of Tanzania’s exports.

The most binding constraint to investments in manufacturing in Tanzania is the availability and quality of electricity supply: Access to electricity is the lowest among peers, with large disparities between rural (22%) and urban (70%). Electrical outages are frequent and expensive for the manufacturing sector; firms even plan their production schedules and decide on plant locations based on power reliability. And yet, when we analyze the share of value-added against energy intensity at the sub-sector level, the negative relationship to be expected if electricity is indeed the constraint is there, but too fragile and noisy. Why? The strongest evidence points to the role of trade protection in compensating firms for other constraints, allowing existing manufacturers to capture large shares of domestic value-added while remaining uncompetitive in export markets. Large manufacturing subsectors of moderate to high energy intensity and more capital intensive enjoy higher tariff protection, creating a wedge that allows these industries to thrive in the domestic market. Despite joining numerous free trade agreements, Tanzania remains one of the most restrictive countries from a trade standpoint, eased by filing exceptions that shield individual products and entire domestic industries from competition. We have also found that effective taxation in Tanzania is relatively higher on labor (lower on capital, materialized through massive tax holidays granted within SEZ), skewing returns away from the country’s relative labor abundance. Failure to address the binding constraints creates a rationale for upholding protection, which reinforces biases towards capital and energy-intensive sectors. These policies go a long way in explaining the Tanzanian manufacturing puzzle.