Scientific and Technical Innovation in the UAE: A Capability-based Approach

The success or failure of the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) mid- and long-term growth strategy will, in large part, be determined by innovation. The country aims to continue transitioning from its past focus on oil and gas, energy-intensive products, and re-exporting services to a future economic model increasingly relying on high-value, knowledge-intensive goods and services. A successful transition will necessitate importing and adapting frontier foreign innovation, but also creating a world-class innovation ecosystem at home.

Part of this effort will entail developing further the country’s Research and Development (R&D) capabilities. While significant catch-up is already visible, much remains to be done to bring the UAE’s R&D output in line with the ambitions assigned by its leadership. The production of scientific publications and patents has been rapidly increasing over the past few years. However, the current level of scientific publications and international patenting activity remains below that of aspirational peers, such as Singapore and Norway, but also fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

One of the reasons may be simple: there are not enough researchers in the UAE. The proportion of researchers in the UAE’s workforce is below what is expected for such an advanced economy. While the UAE has been successful at attracting foreign students and skilled workers, including in STEM fields which underpin R&D activities, this has not translated into a higher density of researchers in the labor force. Determining whether that results from low current demand for R&D skills due to the country’s current economic structure or from difficulties in producing or attracting R&D talent is difficult, although both likely contribute to the issue.

Inputs for Policy Design: Tools of Economic Diversification in the UAE

This report examines how the United Arab Emirates can leverage three key policy tools to accelerate economic diversification and transition to a knowledge-based economy: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Free Zones, and Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). While the UAE has successfully attracted substantial FDI inflows and diversified its export basket over the past two decades, the country continues to underperform in economic complexity and faces challenges attracting knowledge-intensive investments, particularly in research and development activities. The analysis reveals that Free Zones have evolved beyond regulatory arbitrage advantages to become mechanisms for public-private coordination and specialized public goods provision, though their contribution to broader knowledge spillovers remains limited by restrictions on mainland business interactions. Similarly, while the UAE’s SWFs have increasingly pursued domestic diversification objectives through strategic acquisitions and partnerships, their impact could be improved by better aligning foreign investments with domestic capabilities and leveraging multiple channels for knowledge transfer beyond firm relocation. The report recommends a quality-oriented approach to FDI attraction focusing on innovation and R&D activities, adaptive Free Zone management that responds to evolving firm needs, and strategic SWF investments guided by economic complexity metrics, emphasizing that successful diversification requires intensive public-private and public-public coordination across all three tools to provide the necessary inputs for new, complex activities to appear in the UAE’s economic and industrial landscape.

Pandemic-era Inflation Drivers and Global Spillovers

We estimate a multi-country multi-sector New Keynesian model to quantify the drivers of domestic inflation during 2020–2023 in several countries, including the United States. The model matches observed inflation together with sector-level prices and wages. We further measure the relative importance of different types of shocks on inflation across countries over time. The key mechanism, the international transmission of demand, supply and energy shocks through global linkages helps us to match the behavior of the USD/Euro exchange rate. The quantification exercise yields four key findings. First, negative supply shocks to factors of production, labor and intermediate inputs, initially sparked inflation in 2020–2021. Global supply chains and complementarities in production played an amplification role in this initial phase. Second, positive aggregate demand shocks, due to stimulative policies, widened demand-supply imbalances, amplifying inflation further during 2021–2022. Third, the reallocation of consumption between goods and service sectors, a relative sector-level demand shock, played a role in transmitting these imbalances across countries through the global trade and production network. Fourth, global energy shocks have differential impacts on the US relative to other countries’ inflation rates. Further, complementarities between energy and other inputs to production play a particularly important role in the quantitative impact of these shocks on inflation.

Catalyzing Green Growth in the UAE: Growth Opportunities in a Decarbonizing World

The world is rapidly shifting towards a lower-carbon economy, drawing a new map of comparative advantage in the process. As the global economy decarbonizes, it will bring about profound changes in the landscape of production, giving rise to new industries, markets, and pathways for economic development. This transformation will manifest through changes in global demand and prices for existing products but also through the emergence of novel technologies and industries, many of which will replace older, carbon-intensive practices and production methods. These trends will have a significant impact on the fundamental competitiveness of every economy. Therefore, it is crucial for national economic policies, including in the United Arab Emirates, to include a well-designed green growth strategy to harness the global drive towards a decarbonized world economy.

This report aims to identify green growth opportunities for the UAE through a structured approach and suggest concrete policy ideas to seize them. We analyze green growth opportunities along the following four pillars: (1) make the enablers of decarbonization; (2) make green versions of energy-intensive products; (3) capitalize on carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS); and (4) export decarbonization-related know-how.

One of the most promising opportunities identified lies in the development of green industrial parks. The UAE should consider establishing such green industrial parks to attract energy-intensive industries aiming to switch to low-carbon production processes. These parks provide the necessary inputs to low-carbon industrial production in a concentrated geographical area. These include dedicated low-cost renewable energy, but also clean, high-temperature heat, low-carbon hydrogen, as well as carbon capture technology and other services necessary to certify the green nature of the production. A net-zero world will need to make things like steel, cement, chemicals, aluminum, and glass without emitting carbon. It will also need to develop fuels for ships, planes, and heavy-duty transport that have near-zero life cycle emissions, a large proportion of which are expected to come from renewable energy that is used to make hydrogen and liquid fuels. Low solar energy costs make the UAE one of the best places to develop low-carbon energy-intensive industries. Additionally, the UAE has a low cost of capital, which is an important comparative advantage since many of these industrial activities are highly capital-intensive. As the world transitions towards a decarbonized global economy, green industrial parks will drive high-value green economic activities to locate in the UAE, resulting in stronger exports, more value-added, and a future-proof economic model for the country.

As developing green industrial parks is complex, this is an opportunity to accumulate valuable know-how that, in turn, can be monetized. For instance, nobody yet knows how to build, manage, and operate a multi-gigawatt green hydrogen production facility. In the process of building green industrial parks in the UAE, the UAE will have to learn how to optimize a very complex renewable energy system, balance electricity, heat, and hydrogen across multiple energy users with different load profiles, and deploy multiple new technologies together that are still in the pilot phase.

The UAE should consider monetizing its domestic experience by developing and exporting green industrial parks in other countries and developing a business model around these activities. Such a strategy could involve (1) owning the Engineering, Procurement, and Construction Management (EPCM) contractors and other related businesses that develop and operate parks; (2) where possible, having as much of the high-income knowledge workers who provide these services live and work in the UAE; and (3) helping UAE industrial companies that wish to expand abroad (such as Emirates Global Aluminium, or Emirates Steel Arkan) make profitable foreign investments in green industrial parks in other countries.

There may be another opportunity in critical minerals processing. A mining boom is required to provide the world with enough critical minerals to build a clean energy system. Currently, China is dominating the critical minerals processing market, but many countries are looking to diversify their critical minerals supply chain. Given its low cost of capital, strategic location, and good trading infrastructure, the UAE is well-positioned to take advantage of this opportunity. The country already has nascent strengths in mineral refining to build off, in the aluminum and, soon, in the lithium value chains.

Other promising policy ideas are centered on accelerating the creation of green growth knowledge in the UAE and encouraging high-potential business applications. Given their potentially large implications for low-carbon industrial processes in the UAE, we recommend that the government consider establishing applied research hubs in the areas of electrochemistry and thermal energy management & storage. Our research has already identified leading actors in this area that may be attractive partners for collaboration. Additionally, to ensure the close monitoring of the innovation and technology developed abroad, we recommend discussing the establishment of a green technologies working group within the Emirates Scientist Council. This working group would continuously monitor advances in green technologies and their impact on the UAE, reporting findings to the higher levels of government to inform strategic decisions.

Pretending to be the Law: Violence to Reduce the COVID-19 Outbreak

Did the COVID-19 pandemic create an opportunity to earn population control through illegal violence? We argue that criminal groups in Colombia portray as de facto police by using mass killings to reduce the COVID-19 outbreak. They used massacres as a threat to enforce social distance measures in places they considered worth decreasing mobility. Our results from an Augmented Synthetic Control Method model estimated that commuting to parks fell 20% more in areas with massacres than in places without mass killings. In addition, we do not find a decline in mobility to workplaces and COVID-19 deaths after the first mass killing. These findings are congruent with the hypothesis that illegal armed groups used fear to enforce mobility restrictions without hurting economic activities and their sources of revenue. However, violence slightly impacted the virus’ spread. Treated areas had a decline of 35 cases per 100,000 inhabitants four months after the first massacre.

Food for Growth: A Diagnostics of Namibia’s Agriculture Sector

This growth diagnostic report analyzes the economic constraints that explain the underperformance of the agriculture sector in Namibia. Section 1 starts by showing why Namibia’s agricultural challenge is unique when compared to the rest of the world. We then describe the sector’s key features, recent trajectory, and growth potential across different relevant dimensions in Section 2. In Section 3, we provide an adaptation of the growth diagnostic framework to the case of agriculture in Namibia and a detailed analysis of its economic constraints. Finally, Section 4 presents policy guidelines for addressing the challenges described in this report and prioritizing policy interventions accordingly.

Housing in Wyoming: Constraints and Solutions

Quantitative evidence supports the contention that Wyoming’s housing market is constrained, to a greater degree than many other parts of the US. Prices are persistently above expectations given economic fundamentals in most parts of the state, and the supply of new housing in Wyoming is on average less responsive to price increases than in other US counties. This has undermined natural population growth and contributed to a low amount of population density close to city centers in Wyoming, as compared to other US cities with comparable population levels. Importantly, this phenomenon is not simply the result of pandemic-era economic frictions. The evidence shows that these constraints have durably persisted in Wyoming. 

This housing constraint weighs heavily on the broader Wyoming economy, and chokes off growth in new industries that could add to the Wyoming economy beyond its natural resource base. Businesses consistently report a lack of access to workforce as a leading problem that ultimately results from a lack of housing. Some businesses have even tried to create their own housing for employees, and news reports abound of teachers and nurses who secure jobs in Wyoming communities but then have to leave because they cannot find housing.

Key problems behind Wyoming’s housing constraints include excessive regulations concerning housing density and insufficient investment in arterial infrastructure. For example, there is evidence that over-regulated minimum lot sizes in Wyoming are blocking the creation of supply to match free-market demand for houses with smaller amounts of land. Other areas of over-regulation include those concerning allowable housing types, building height, parking spaces per dwelling, and the housing approval process itself. This may be seen as surprising given Wyoming’s reputation as a low-regulation state, but Wyoming maintains restrictions that other states and countries have discarded as outdated and highly counterproductive. Besides outright restrictions on housing development, we find that the most common cost driver undermining the housing development has to do with low public investment in needed arterial infrastructure, especially water systems. Land supply as well as material and construction costs are not primary constraints to housing development across the state, but may matter for select communities.

We suggest a portfolio of policy changes for the state of Wyoming to explore in order to solve its housing constraints. One category of changes is regulatory, and focuses on deregulation, reducing bureaucratic overhead, and shifting from veto-cratic to democratic housing approval procedures. Another category is focused on investment on infrastructure to support housing, and exploration of state-local funding structures to facilitate continuous infrastructure improvement. If implemented, these changes will not only help to solve Wyoming’s housing constraints but also facilitate housing development in a way that combats urban sprawl, and in doing so protects open spaces outside of cities that Wyomingites value.

Related project: Pathways to Prosperity in Wyoming

Gravity with History: On Incumbency Effects in International Trade

We introduce incumbency effects into a tractable dynamic model of international trade. The framework nests the canonical Melitz (2003)-Chaney (2008) model as a special case. The key novelty is that fixed costs of market access decrease with tenure. As a consequence, there is less market exit and entry in response to a shock. We derive a gravity equation and show that, ceteris paribus, countries that liberalized their trade relationship earlier trade more today. We provide supporting evidence for the underlying mechanism and derive an augmented ACR formula (Arkolakis et al., 2012) for the gains from trade that accounts for incumbency effects. A quantitative analysis suggests that our mechanism can explain up to 25% of countries’ home shares and that the gains from trade are, on average, 10% larger when accounting for incumbency effects. The analysis further reveals novel distributional effects of trade that benefit real wages but reduce profits.

Growth Diagnostics and Competitiveness Study of the Manufacturing Sector in Tanzania

Tanzania’s manufacturing puzzles (and frustrations) seem to be a natural outcome of their policy choice. The Tanzanian economy experienced a significant acceleration over two decades, growing at a compounded annual growth rate of 6% between 1998 and 2018: Largest rates were recorded and sustained by the super commodity cycle (2005-2014). Within that growth trajectory, manufacturing’s share of gross domestic product (GDP) has lingered for 30 years below 10% – well below the 23% target established for 2025 in Tanzania’s Industrial Development Strategy (2011). As stressed by Diao et al (2021), the bulk of manufacturing value added is created by a few capital-intensive firms, whereas informal manufacturing has increased employment but without significant improvements in productivity/wages. Manufacturing exports surged in 2011 and remained steady since driven by subsector basic metals (gold & unrefined copper). If these are excluded, the curve mirrors the commodity price boom (likely a price boom rather than a volume boom). Looking only at exports conceals the fact that the bulk of the manufacturing output in Tanzania is sold in the domestic market rather than exported: exports are equivalent to less than 2% of GDP; domestic sales are seven times higher. While Food and Beverages make up for the largest share of manufacturing value employment and value-added, basic metals are the ones accounting for the vast majority of Tanzania’s exports.

The most binding constraint to investments in manufacturing in Tanzania is the availability and quality of electricity supply: Access to electricity is the lowest among peers, with large disparities between rural (22%) and urban (70%). Electrical outages are frequent and expensive for the manufacturing sector; firms even plan their production schedules and decide on plant locations based on power reliability. And yet, when we analyze the share of value-added against energy intensity at the sub-sector level, the negative relationship to be expected if electricity is indeed the constraint is there, but too fragile and noisy. Why? The strongest evidence points to the role of trade protection in compensating firms for other constraints, allowing existing manufacturers to capture large shares of domestic value-added while remaining uncompetitive in export markets. Large manufacturing subsectors of moderate to high energy intensity and more capital intensive enjoy higher tariff protection, creating a wedge that allows these industries to thrive in the domestic market. Despite joining numerous free trade agreements, Tanzania remains one of the most restrictive countries from a trade standpoint, eased by filing exceptions that shield individual products and entire domestic industries from competition. We have also found that effective taxation in Tanzania is relatively higher on labor (lower on capital, materialized through massive tax holidays granted within SEZ), skewing returns away from the country’s relative labor abundance. Failure to address the binding constraints creates a rationale for upholding protection, which reinforces biases towards capital and energy-intensive sectors. These policies go a long way in explaining the Tanzanian manufacturing puzzle.

Eight Decades of Changes in Occupational Tasks, Computerization and the Gender Pay Gap

We build a new longitudinal dataset of job tasks and technologies by transforming the U.S. Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT, 1939 -1991) and four books documenting occupational use of tools and technologies in the 1940s, into a database akin to, and comparable with its digital successor, the O*NET (1998 -today). After creating a single occupational classification stretching between 1939 and 2019, we connect all DOT waves and the decennial O*NET databases into a single dataset, and we connect these with the U.S. Decennial Census data at the level of 585 occupational groups. We use the new dataset to study how technology changed the gender pay gap in the United States since the 1940s. We find that computerization had two counteracting effects on the pay gap -it simultaneously reduced it by attracting more women into better-paying occupations, and increased it through higher returns to computer use among men. The first effect closed the pay gap by 3.3 pp, but the second increased it by 5.8 pp, leading to a net widening of the pay gap.